Skip to main content
Mallory
2 malware families

CrazyHunter

Also known ascrazyhunter

CrazyHunter is an emerging ransomware group and ransomware family first observed in mid-2024. It is described as a Go-based fork of Prince ransomware that primarily targets organizations in Taiwan, with repeated attacks against the healthcare sector, including hospitals. Reporting cited six compromised or targeted organizations in Taiwan. The group commonly gains initial access by exploiting weaknesses in Active Directory environments, including weak domain passwords. It propagates laterally by abusing Group Policy Objects with SharpGPOAbuse, enabling rapid spread across enterprise networks. For privilege escalation and defense evasion, CrazyHunter uses a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver technique with a modified Zemana anti-malware driver, zam64.sys, to terminate security products. Deployment has been reported to involve ru.bat, AV-killer components such as go.exe and go2.exe, the primary encryptor go3.exe, a Donut loader bb.exe with crazyhunter.sys shellcode, and a backup encryptor crazyhunter.exe. CrazyHunter encrypts Windows systems using ChaCha20 with partial encryption, typically encrypting one byte and skipping the next two, and protects per-file keys and nonces with ECIES. Encrypted files are typically renamed with a .hunter extension. The operators maintain a data leak site and conduct double extortion, threatening to publish stolen data if ransom demands are not paid. Their leak site reportedly includes a “Strategic Manifesto” and references “Premium Criminal Branding Services.” Victim communications have been reported via email, Telegram, and a Tor onion site, with ransom demanded in cryptocurrency. A dual-use tool, file.exe, has also been associated with operations and assessed as supporting extortion through file-server or monitoring/deletion functionality. Aliases directly mentioned in the content: crazyhunter.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

11 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

10 of 15 tactics23 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1078.002
Domain Accounts
TA0002
Execution
1 technique
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1078.002
Domain Accounts
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1078.002
Domain Accounts
T1484
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1484.001
Group Policy Modification
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1036
Masquerading
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1078.002
Domain Accounts
TA0112
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
T1484
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1484.001
Group Policy Modification
T1553
Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.002
Code Signing
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
TA0007
Discovery
1 technique
T1018
Remote System Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
TA0040
Impact
2 techniques
T1485
Data Destruction
T1486
Data Encrypted for Impact
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping11

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal2

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.