Larva-24010 is a threat actor observed since at least 2023 targeting users of a South Korean VPN service through a trojanized installer distributed from the provider’s website. The campaign delivers the legitimate VPN software alongside multiple backdoors, including MeshAgent, gs-netcat, and NKNShell, enabling covert remote access and long-term compromise of victim systems. The actor’s intrusion chain uses a malicious installer that performs environment checks and launches PowerShell-based follow-on activity to retrieve and execute additional payloads. Reported post-compromise behavior includes disabling or bypassing security controls, suppressing telemetry, establishing persistence through scheduled tasks and WMI-based mechanisms, and injecting into benign processes for evasion and execution. NKNShell, a Go-based backdoor associated with this activity, supports extensive remote administration functions including system reconnaissance, file operations, command execution, code injection, and data exfiltration. The campaign has also used gs-netcat for remote shell access and MeshAgent for remote management and desktop control. Use of SQLMap has additionally been associated with automated SQL injection activity. The actor’s operations demonstrate emphasis on defense evasion, persistence, post-exploitation control, and theft of sensitive information from compromised hosts. High-confidence targeting in the available reporting is focused on Korean VPN users, indicating a geographically concentrated campaign against users in South Korea.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.