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Mallory
Threat actor

vasygrek

Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days15 mentions · peak 8 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware17Families
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs377Tracked
Origin
🇷🇺 Russia
Motivation
Financial
Targets
RUBYKZ
Ransomware tactics
Encryption
Capabilities
Initial accessCredential theftExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injectionReconnaissanceSpoofing
Also known asvasygrekVasyGrek (Fluffy Wolf)

VasyGrek, also known as Fluffy Wolf, is a Russian-speaking, financially motivated cybercriminal group active since at least 2016. It primarily targets Russian organizations and expanded its targeting to Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2026. Principal targets include metallurgical enterprises, suppliers of raw materials and industrial goods, and government institutions. Other targeted sectors include energy, oil and gas, healthcare, finance, agriculture, construction, information technology, and media. Its operations focus on compromising corporate systems, stealing credentials and confidential information, and obtaining access to business banking systems to steal funds. The group specializes in spearphishing aimed at finance and accounting personnel. Messages impersonate business partners or accounting departments and use reconciliation statements, invoices, payment orders, and overdue-debt notices as lures. Attachments and download links deliver malicious archives, scripts, installers, or macro-enabled documents. Infection chains employ decoy documents, legitimate online hosting services, encrypted payloads, in-memory execution, process injection, and steganographic delivery. The group also operates phishing websites impersonating banking and accounting services. VasyGrek's arsenal includes PureCrypter, PureHVNC/PureRAT, PureLogs Stealer, MetaStealer, RedLine, AZORult, WarzoneRAT/AveMaria, PowerLoader, and Go-based backdoors. It has also deployed Pay2Key ransomware. Historically, it used BurnsRAT, supplied by the malware developer Mr.Burns and built around modified legitimate remote-administration software, including Remote Utilities and TeamViewer. Its tooling supports persistent remote access, command execution, system reconnaissance, credential and file theft, and desktop control. Observed persistence and evasion techniques include Windows services, logon autostart mechanisms, DLL search-order hijacking, and concealment of remote-administration activity. Between January and September 2026, more than 100 attempted attacks were attributed to VasyGrek across Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Russian authorities subsequently announced the disruption of its infrastructure and action against three suspected members, placing the alleged organizer under house arrest and imposing travel restrictions on two others.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Energy
  • Financial Services
  • Food, Beverage & Tobacco
  • Government & Administration
  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Materials
  • Capital Goods
  • Utilities
  • Consumer Discretionary Distribution & Retail
  • Commercial & Professional Services
  • Media & Entertainment
  • Software & Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Russia
  • Belarus
  • Kazakhstan

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

34 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

10 of 15 tactics62 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1566Phishing
T1566.001Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002Spearphishing Link
TA0002Execution4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.003Windows Command Shell
T1204User Execution
T1204.002Malicious File
T1569System Services
T1569.002Service Execution
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0003Persistence2 techniques
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004Privilege Escalation3 techniques
T1055Process Injection
T1055.002Portable Executable Injection
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005Stealth7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.002Software Packing
T1036Masquerading
T1036.004Masquerade Task or Service
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1036.007Double File Extension
T1055Process Injection
T1055.002Portable Executable Injection
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004File Deletion
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
T1564Hide Artifacts
T1564.003Hidden Window
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0006Credential Access2 techniques
T1552Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001Credentials In Files
T1555Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0007Discovery7 techniques
T1033System Owner/User Discovery
T1082System Information Discovery
T1083File and Directory Discovery
T1217Browser Information Discovery
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
T1518Software Discovery
T1518.001Security Software Discovery
T1614System Location Discovery
T1614.001System Language Discovery
TA0009Collection2 techniques
T1005Data from Local System
T1113Screen Capture
TA0011Command and Control6 techniques
T1071Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001Web Protocols
T1095Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219Remote Access Tools
T1571Non-Standard Port
T1573Encrypted Channel
T1573.001Symmetric Cryptography
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Malware

Associated malware families

17 malware families Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting.

12 additional families tracked in Mallory.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

377 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does vasygrek target?
vasygrek targets Energy, Financial Services, Food, Beverage & Tobacco, Government & Administration, Health Care Equipment & Services, Materials, Capital Goods, Utilities, and 4 more in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
What malware does vasygrek use?
vasygrek is associated with Pay2Key, PureCrypter, BurnsRAT, PowerLoader, PureRAT, and 12 more.
Where is vasygrek from?
Mallory's sources associate vasygrek with Russia.
Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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xakepNews · Nov 5, 2026В МВД РФ сообщили о ликвидации инфраструктуры хак-группы VasyGrek - ХакерFinancially motivated group accused of targeted phishing, malware distribution, and theft from corporate bank accounts. Researchers recorded more than 100 attempted attacks against organizations in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan between January and September 2026. Its increasingly complex infection chains deployed remote-access malware, loaders, and ransomware. Russian authorities reported dismantling its infrastructure, placing the suspected organizer under house arrest, and imposing travel restrictions on two other suspects.Read more ↗cysecurity newsNews · Nov 4, 2026Russia Takes Down VasyGrek Cybercrime Network After Years of Phishing Attacks - CySecurity News - Latest Information Security and Hacking IncidentsFinancially motivated cybercrime group active since at least 2016, using targeted phishing, credential theft and remote-access malware to compromise corporate networks and steal funds. The report attributes more than 100 attempted attacks against organisations in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan between January and September 2026 to the group. Russian authorities arrested three suspected members and dismantled its infrastructure, but whether this will stop its operations remains unclear.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Nov 4, 2026Russian Police Arrest 3 Suspected VasyGrek Hackers, Dismantle Criminal InfrastructureFinancially motivated group active since 2016 that compromises organizations through financial-document phishing, deploys malware and remote-access tools, and steals funds. Russian authorities arrested three suspected members. Kaspersky recorded more than 100 attempted attacks against organizations in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan between January and September 2026.Read more ↗risky biz rssNews · Nov 4, 2026Risky Bulletin: Hackers lock out and extort Li Auto smart car owners in RussiaTargets Russian companies through phishing campaigns and rented malware. Russian authorities reportedly arrested three members.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping34MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware17Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables377Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.