TamperedChef
- Origin
- 🇺🇦 Ukraine
- Motivation
- Financial
- Targets
- USILCAAUFRDE
- Capabilities
- Initial accessDefense evasionPersistenceReconnaissanceCredential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPost exploitation
TamperedChef, also known as EvilAI, is a financially motivated malware campaign ecosystem that distributes trojanized productivity applications through malvertising, sponsored search results, and search-engine poisoning. Related activity dates to at least early 2023. Its lures include functional PDF editors, calendar applications, archive utilities, converters, and other desktop tools. Victimization is global, with no strong industry-specific targeting; affected countries include the United States, Israel, Canada, Australia, France, and Germany. The operations combine professional-looking download sites, legitimate code-signing certificates, and delayed activation to make malicious applications appear trustworthy. Operators obtain certificates through networks of shell companies, rotate certificates following revocation, and frequently postpone malicious behavior for weeks or months. Payloads establish persistence, collect system information, communicate with command-and-control infrastructure, and retrieve additional malware. Delivered capabilities include credential theft, information exfiltration, remote command execution, browser hijacking, adware, and proxying traffic through compromised systems. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks and registry autorun entries. Related activity is tracked in clusters CL-CRI-1089, CL-UNK-1090, and CL-UNK-1110; the TamperedChef designation is most closely associated with CL-UNK-1110. Associated campaigns include Calendaromatic, AppSuite PDF, CrystalPDF, OneZip, JustAskJacky, and ManualReaderPro. CL-CRI-1089 also encompasses the macOS Operation FlutterBridge campaign, which distributes FlutterShell through malicious advertisements. FlutterShell combines adware and backdoor functionality, including browser-session theft, system fingerprinting, file-system access, and environment-variable exfiltration. Observed FlutterShell applications used valid Apple Developer signatures and passed notarization. The geographic distribution of signing entities and shell companies does not establish a single country of origin for the broader ecosystem.
Targeting
Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Software & Services
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- United States
- Australia
- Canada
- Germany
- France
- Israel
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- Ukraine
- Israel
- United States
- Malaysia
- United Kingdom
Tradecraft
10 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.
Observables
18 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Frequently asked questions
- Who does TamperedChef target?
- TamperedChef targets Software & Services in United States, Australia, Canada, Germany, France, and Israel.
- Where is TamperedChef from?
- Mallory's sources associate TamperedChef with Ukraine, Israel, United States, Malaysia, and 1 more.
Recent activity
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.