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Mallory
Threat actor

TamperedChef

Updated 8 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware0Families
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs18Tracked
Origin
🇺🇦 Ukraine
Motivation
Financial
Targets
USILCAAUFRDE
Capabilities
Initial accessDefense evasionPersistenceReconnaissanceCredential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPost exploitation
Also known astamperedchefTamperedChef (malvertising campaign)

TamperedChef, also known as EvilAI, is a financially motivated malware campaign ecosystem that distributes trojanized productivity applications through malvertising, sponsored search results, and search-engine poisoning. Related activity dates to at least early 2023. Its lures include functional PDF editors, calendar applications, archive utilities, converters, and other desktop tools. Victimization is global, with no strong industry-specific targeting; affected countries include the United States, Israel, Canada, Australia, France, and Germany. The operations combine professional-looking download sites, legitimate code-signing certificates, and delayed activation to make malicious applications appear trustworthy. Operators obtain certificates through networks of shell companies, rotate certificates following revocation, and frequently postpone malicious behavior for weeks or months. Payloads establish persistence, collect system information, communicate with command-and-control infrastructure, and retrieve additional malware. Delivered capabilities include credential theft, information exfiltration, remote command execution, browser hijacking, adware, and proxying traffic through compromised systems. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks and registry autorun entries. Related activity is tracked in clusters CL-CRI-1089, CL-UNK-1090, and CL-UNK-1110; the TamperedChef designation is most closely associated with CL-UNK-1110. Associated campaigns include Calendaromatic, AppSuite PDF, CrystalPDF, OneZip, JustAskJacky, and ManualReaderPro. CL-CRI-1089 also encompasses the macOS Operation FlutterBridge campaign, which distributes FlutterShell through malicious advertisements. FlutterShell combines adware and backdoor functionality, including browser-session theft, system fingerprinting, file-system access, and environment-variable exfiltration. Observed FlutterShell applications used valid Apple Developer signatures and passed notarization. The geographic distribution of signing entities and shell companies does not establish a single country of origin for the broader ecosystem.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • United States
  • Australia
  • Canada
  • Germany
  • France
  • Israel

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Ukraine
  • Israel
  • United States
  • Malaysia
  • United Kingdom
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

10 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

8 of 15 tactics13 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0042Resource Development1 technique
T1583Acquire Infrastructure
TA0002Execution2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1204User Execution
TA0003Persistence1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
TA0004Privilege Escalation2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
TA0005Stealth1 technique
T1036×2Masquerading
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1553Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.002×2Code Signing
TA0009Collection1 technique
T1185Browser Session Hijacking
TA0011Command and Control3 techniques
T1071×2Application Layer Protocol
T1090Proxy
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Indicators of compromise

Observables

18 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does TamperedChef target?
TamperedChef targets Software & Services in United States, Australia, Canada, Germany, France, and Israel.
Where is TamperedChef from?
Mallory's sources associate TamperedChef with Ukraine, Israel, United States, Malaysia, and 1 more.
Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping10MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malwareFamilies linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables18Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.