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Turkey3 malware families

Bloody Wolf

Also known asbloody_wolfstan_ghouls

Bloody Wolf, also tracked by Kaspersky as Stan Ghouls, is a cybercriminal threat actor active since at least 2023. The group has conducted targeted spear-phishing campaigns against organizations in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, with reporting also describing activity primarily against Uzbekistan and Russia and later expansion in Central Asia. Targeted sectors and entity types directly mentioned in the reporting include manufacturing, finance, IT, government, logistics, medical, education, and justice-related organizations. The group’s campaigns deliver remote access malware, most notably NetSupport RAT through abuse of the legitimate NetSupport Manager tool. Reporting states Bloody Wolf previously used STRRAT (Strigoi Master) and later shifted to NetSupport. Initial access commonly involves localized spear-phishing emails, including Uzbek- and Kyrgyz-language lures, impersonating government, judicial, legal, or Ministry of Justice entities. The emails contain malicious PDF attachments or decoy PDFs with links that lead victims to download a custom Java-based JAR loader. The loader displays fake error messages, checks execution conditions, and in some reporting limits installation attempts to fewer than three before terminating. The Java loader downloads NetSupport components from attacker-controlled external domains, with reporting noting frequent command-and-control domain rotation and new domains registered for campaigns. Persistence mechanisms directly described include batch scripts placed in the Windows Startup folder, Registry Run key entries, and scheduled tasks that execute the NetSupport launch script at logon. Once installed, NetSupport provides the attackers with full remote control of victim machines. Victimology described in the reporting includes roughly 50 victims in Uzbekistan and about 10 in Russia in one campaign, with over 60 total targets or victims reported overall. Additional lower-volume infections were reported in Kazakhstan, Turkey, Serbia, Belarus, and in some reporting activity against Kyrgyzstan since at least June 2025, later expanding to Uzbekistan by October 2025. One report states the Uzbekistan phase used geofencing, redirecting requests from outside Uzbekistan to a legitimate site while serving the malicious JAR to local users. Kaspersky assessed the likely primary motive as financial gain, particularly given targeting of financial institutions, while also noting that the heavy use of RATs could indicate possible espionage. Reporting also notes Mirai botnet payloads staged on infrastructure associated with Bloody Wolf, suggesting possible but unconfirmed expansion toward IoT targeting or shared infrastructure. Known aliases: Stan Ghouls.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

17 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

7 of 15 tactics27 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001×6
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1053×2
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×4
Scheduled Task
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.003
Windows Command Shell
T1059.007
JavaScript
T1204×3
User Execution
T1204.001×2
Malicious Link
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1053×2
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×4
Scheduled Task
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×5
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1053×2
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×4
Scheduled Task
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×5
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1036×3
Masquerading
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0007
Discovery
1 technique
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1105×5
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×5
Remote Access Tools
T1568
Dynamic Resolution
T1568.002
Domain Generation Algorithms
IOCS

Observables

75 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping17

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal3

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables75

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.