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Group Khomyaki, also known as Khomyaki, is a financially motivated payment-skimming threat group associated with exploitation of CVE-2024-34102 (CosmicSting) against Adobe Commerce and Magento online stores in 2024. The group targeted high-profile merchants, including Cisco’s online store, and injected or delivered payment skimmers to collect customer payment information. Its malware loaders and exfiltration infrastructure used a distinctive pattern of two-character URI paths. Group Khomyaki relied substantially on infrastructure hosted on the Russian JSC network (AS29182).
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
8 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
21 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Targeting high-profile Adobe Commerce stores with CosmicSting-related infrastructure, using short-path loader endpoints and infrastructure hosted on the Russian JSC network.
Khomyaki targets high-profile stores, using short, two-letter URI endpoints for exfiltration and CosmicSting for initial access.
Group Khomyaki exploited the CosmicSting vulnerability to steal payment data and exfiltrate it to domains with a unique 2-character URI pattern.
Group Khomyaki exfiltrates stolen payment information to specific domains with short URIs, after compromising e-commerce sites.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.