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SmartApeSG is a malware-delivery threat cluster also tracked as ZPHP and HANEYMANEY. Active since at least late 2025, it primarily compromises legitimate websites or third-party web components to inject staged JavaScript loaders and redirect visitors to fake CAPTCHA or browser-verification pages. Its campaigns employ ClickFix social engineering: victims are instructed to paste attacker-controlled clipboard content into the Windows Run dialog, initiating download and execution chains involving PowerShell, HTML Applications, compressed archives, and legitimate executables abused for DLL side-loading. SmartApeSG has delivered NetSupport RAT, Remcos RAT, StealC, Sectop RAT (ArechClient2), and unidentified remote-access trojans. Campaigns have used browser and environment filtering, browser storage to suppress repeat execution, obfuscated runtime reconstruction of next-stage resources, dynamic script loading, password-protected archives, encoded payload retrieval, and deletion of staging artifacts. Persistence has been established through Windows Run-key modifications and scheduled tasks. Observed payloads provide remote access, credential-stealing, keylogging-capable surveillance, and data theft capabilities. In May 2026, SmartApeSG activity included a supply-chain compromise of a widely deployed e-commerce reviews widget, potentially exposing downstream retail websites to the ClickFix delivery chain.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
31 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
74 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting a ClickFix-based malware campaign in which JavaScript injected into legitimate websites redirects victims to fake CAPTCHA pages. Victims are induced to paste a malicious command into the Windows Run dialog; this executes an HTA downloader that retrieves a ZIP archive containing an unidentified RAT. The RAT uses DLL side-loading for execution and persistence and communicates with C2 over encrypted TCP/443.
Conducting a ClickFix campaign that leads victims to a fake CAPTCHA/human verification page, uses clipboard-injected text executed via the Run dialog, downloads an HTA file and ZIP archive, and ultimately deploys an unidentified RAT using DLL side-loading.
Conducted a supply chain attack by injecting malicious JavaScript into the Okendo Reviews widget to deliver malware to visitors of e-commerce websites. The campaign used staged JavaScript loading and social engineering to install remote access tools and information stealers on victim systems.
Conducted a supply chain attack via the Okendo Reviews widget by injecting staged malicious JavaScript into a widely used third-party e-commerce component. The loader used obfuscation, environment checks, staged retrieval, and ClickFix-style social engineering to deliver follow-on malware including RATs and information stealers.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.