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Tengu Ransomware, later rebranded as Shisa Ransomware, is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service operation first observed in October 2025. The group conducts hands-on-keyboard double-extortion attacks, stealing data before deploying ransomware and threatening publication through a Tor-based leak site. It operates a structured affiliate model and has offered ransomware payloads for Windows, Linux, and ESXi environments, alongside custom data-exfiltration tooling. Tengu affiliates have used brute-force attacks against exposed remote-access services, stolen or reused credentials, spearphishing, and exploitation of public-facing applications for initial access. Reported operations include abuse of legitimate Windows administration utilities, disabling or impairing security controls, clearing logs, deleting shadow copies, and exploitation of ZeroLogon to obtain domain-administrator privileges in at least one intrusion. The operation has targeted organizations across North America, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America, with technology and manufacturing among its most affected sectors. Its affiliate program prohibited attacks against Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States countries.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
23 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
13 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Hands-on-keyboard ransomware-as-a-service operation using double extortion.
Referenced as another Japanese-themed ransomware group for comparison/background.
Mentioned only as a group with no Q2 industrial claims.
Named as another ransomware group that claimed a victim weeks after the operator's compromise, reinforcing the pattern of access being sold or transferred to downstream extortion actors.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.