BadIIS operators are a likely China-nexus intrusion cluster associated with the WEBJACK campaign, which compromised Microsoft IIS servers to conduct SEO poisoning and online fraud. The activity is characterized by deployment and use of BadIIS malware on internet-facing web infrastructure, indicating post-compromise control of web servers for malicious traffic manipulation and monetization. Reported operational characteristics and tooling show overlap with other Chinese-linked clusters, including GhostRedirector, Operation Rewrite, UAT-8099, and TOLLBOOTH, supporting assessment of a broader Chinese nexus. High-confidence reporting supports web-server compromise and follow-on abuse for fraudulent and traffic-redirection purposes, but does not provide sufficient corroborated detail to attribute specific victim countries, industry concentration, or a fuller capability set beyond initial access, persistence, post-exploitation, and defense evasion on compromised IIS infrastructure.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.