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Sneaky 2FA is a phishing-as-a-service adversary-in-the-middle phishing kit focused primarily on compromising Microsoft 365 accounts. Active since at least October 2024 and publicly identified in late 2024, it is used to relay victim authentication traffic to legitimate Microsoft services, steal credentials and multi-factor authentication inputs, and capture authenticated session cookies for account takeover. The operation is associated with the Telegram-based Sneaky Log service, which distributes licensed and obfuscated copies of the kit to customers for independent deployment. Sneaky 2FA is notable for combining Microsoft-focused credential theft with mature anti-analysis and evasion features. Reported capabilities include CAPTCHA gating, traffic filtering, IP-based filtering, bot and sandbox evasion, browser developer-tool detection, and redirection of unwanted visitors to benign Microsoft-related content. The kit can validate stolen credentials through legitimate Microsoft APIs and has been observed using browser-in-the-browser functionality to present convincing fake authentication windows. Researchers have also reported code similarities with W3LL Panel OV6, suggesting reuse or derivation within the broader phishing-kit ecosystem. Operationally, Sneaky 2FA has been positioned as one of the more aggressive successors to Tycoon 2FA in the phishing-as-a-service market. It has been cited alongside EvilProxy and other commercial phishing platforms that lowered the barrier to entry for Microsoft 365-focused account compromise. Its campaigns have used lures such as QR codes and document-themed pretexts, and defenders have identified behavioral artifacts such as inconsistent client fingerprints across authentication steps. The actor’s core objective is unauthorized access to cloud identities by bypassing the practical protections of conventional MFA through session hijacking rather than defeating MFA cryptographically.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
8 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Active AiTM phishing service targeting Microsoft 365 accounts, distributed via Telegram-based channels and capable of stealing credentials and authenticated session cookies; later added Browser-in-the-Browser capability.
Phishing-as-a-Service platform conducting AiTM phishing against Microsoft 365 to relay credentials to Microsoft and steal authenticated session cookies after victims complete real MFA.
Mentioned only as another PhaaS platform with similar features to Forg365; no direct connection established in the article.
A newer phishing platform described as an aggressive newcomer benefiting from the ecosystem shift after Tycoon 2FA's takedown.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.