FakeTicketer is a threat cluster linked to Operation HollowQuill, a campaign targeting Russian industrial enterprises. Reporting ties the group to this activity through overlapping dropper code and domain-naming patterns. In the observed intrusion chain, victims were lured with archive-delivered malware that launched a .NET dropper, followed by a Golang loader, decoy content delivered through OneDrive, and ultimately a Cobalt Strike payload. The tradecraft indicates a focus on phishing-based initial access, staged malware delivery, and post-compromise tooling consistent with espionage-oriented intrusion activity against industrial targets in Russia. FakeTicketer is currently documented primarily through its linkage to Operation HollowQuill; additional aliases, sub-groups, or broader victimology are not currently available from the supplied facts.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.