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Threat actorLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

毒云藤

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs1Associated
Malware3Families
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs112Tracked
Origin
🇹🇼 Taiwan
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
CN
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingSpoofing
Also known as毒云藤

Poison Vine, also tracked as 毒云藤, APT-C-01, and APT-Q-20, is a long-running Chinese-language cyber-espionage threat actor assessed in the supplied reporting as associated with Taiwan. Activity attributed to the group has been traced back to at least 2007, with public disclosure beginning in 2015. The actor primarily targets mainland China entities, especially government, military, defense, intelligence-related, and scientific research organizations, as well as higher-education institutions connected to research and national defense topics. Poison Vine is characterized by sustained credential-harvesting and intelligence-collection operations. Its campaigns have used spearphishing emails, phishing websites, watering-hole style attacks, and social-engineering lures themed around military affairs, cyber defense, civil-military fusion, recruitment, manuscript solicitation, and official notifications. The group has impersonated popular mainland email services, government portals, universities, enterprises, and consumer web applications to steal credentials and collect internal information. Some operations reused stolen internal notices from compromised mailboxes to improve lure credibility. The actor has operated multiple phishing frameworks, including LJFrame, LJFrame 2.0, LJFrame 3.0, CPFrame, and FAPPFrame. These frameworks supported credential capture, victim validation, redirection to legitimate services after submission, and infrastructure changes intended to hinder discovery. Reporting also links Poison Vine to malware delivery through malicious attachments and exploitation of CVE-2018-20250 in WinRAR ACE archives. Associated malware and post-compromise tooling have included custom loaders and backdoors as well as Cobalt Strike, Sliver, and tinyshell. Observed capabilities include credential theft, file discovery and exfiltration, remote command execution, process and drive enumeration, persistence via startup placement and autorun mechanisms, in-memory payload execution, and defense evasion such as anti-logging patching. The group has also been described as using publicly known N-day vulnerabilities and weak-password attacks against edge and embedded devices such as routers, cameras, smart-home devices, and firewalls to gain footholds or pivot into internal networks. Overall, Poison Vine is best understood as an espionage-oriented APT focused on long-term access, credential collection, and theft of sensitive internal information from mainland Chinese government, defense, military, and research targets.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Education & Research
  • Government & Administration
  • Military
  • Software & Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • China

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Taiwan
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

17 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

9 of 15 tactics21 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1189Drive-by Compromise
T1566Phishing
T1566.001Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002Spearphishing Link
TA0002Execution2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.003Windows Command Shell
T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
TA0005Stealth2 techniques
T1036Masquerading
T1684Social Engineering
T1684.001Impersonation
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1056Input Capture
TA0007Discovery2 techniques
T1082System Information Discovery
T1083File and Directory Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement1 technique
T1021Remote Services
T1021.006Windows Remote Management
TA0009Collection1 technique
T1056Input Capture
TA0011Command and Control3 techniques
T1071Application Layer Protocol
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219Remote Access Tools
TA0010Exfiltration2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 1 of them is exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2018-202501 evidence · Aug 14, 2026Exploited in the wildACE Archive Path Traversal in WinRAR去年该组织就使用编号为CVE-2018-20250 的WinRAR ACE 漏洞向中国大陆数十个重点目标投递了多个RAT 木马。投递的RAT 木马核心与3 年前的版本相比除了配置信息外并未发现新的功能性更新,证实在恶意软件层面毒云藤并未做较大的更迭。 其中一起攻击中,毒云藤组织投放了一个利用了CVE-2018-20250 的WinRAR ACE 漏洞的压缩包文件:2019 工作规划进度.rar。View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

112 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does 毒云藤 target?
毒云藤 targets Education & Research, Government & Administration, Military, and Software & Services in China.
What malware does 毒云藤 use?
毒云藤 is associated with Poison Ivy, xRAT, and ZxShell.
Where is 毒云藤 from?
Mallory's sources associate 毒云藤 with Taiwan.
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping17MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware3Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs1CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables112Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.