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Threat actor

Janus

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware3Families
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
Motivation
Financial
Targets
UA
Ransomware tactics
EncryptionRaas operator
Capabilities
Initial accessDefense evasionProcess injection
Also known asJanus

Janus is the threat actor name associated with the Petya ransomware family and its later Mischa and GoldenEye variants. The actor operated a ransomware-as-a-service program under the Janus name, allowing affiliates to distribute the malware in exchange for a tiered share of profits, reportedly reaching as high as 85% for top-performing distributors. The branding and naming of Petya, Mischa, GoldenEye, and Janus drew on references to the James Bond film GoldenEye. Janus became known for technically distinctive ransomware operations beginning in 2016. Petya differed from conventional file-encrypting ransomware by overwriting boot-related disk sectors and encrypting the Master File Table, rendering files inaccessible after a forced reboot while leaving file contents physically present on disk. Because Petya required elevated privileges to complete this attack chain, Janus paired it with Mischa, a fallback ransomware module that performed traditional file-by-file encryption when administrative access was unavailable. These capabilities were later combined and rebranded in GoldenEye. The actor relied heavily on socially engineered spam campaigns for initial access, especially phishing lures themed as job applications, job offers, and legal matters. Campaigns were noted for polished language, including fluent German in some operations, and for using malicious attachments or links to online storage services. The malware emphasized user execution rather than exploit kits or advanced exploitation. Janus-associated malware demonstrated substantial tradecraft in payload protection and execution. Reported characteristics include heavily obfuscated droppers, self-modifying code, privilege checks to determine whether to deploy Petya or Mischa, offline key generation without dependence on command-and-control infrastructure, and forced system reboot behavior to trigger Petya’s disk-encryption routine. Mischa also used reflective loading and process injection into legitimate Windows processes, and encrypted data across local, removable, and remote drives. GoldenEye and earlier Petya/Mischa campaigns were regarded as effective and profitable criminal ransomware operations. Available reporting also indicates that the original Janus author was likely not responsible for the later Ukraine-focused Petya-like destructive campaign commonly referred to as NotPetya; that later operation was assessed as using pirated and modified Petya code rather than being a direct Janus campaign. Janus has also been identified as the original author of Petya and as the operator behind the final GoldenEye-era releases.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Ukraine
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

17 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

6 of 15 tactics18 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1566×2Phishing
T1566.001Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×2Spearphishing Link
TA0004Privilege Escalation2 techniques
T1055Process Injection
T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
TA0005Stealth4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
T1055Process Injection
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1620Reflective Code Loading
TA0007Discovery4 techniques
T1082System Information Discovery
T1083File and Directory Discovery
T1120Peripheral Device Discovery
T1135Network Share Discovery
TA0011Command and Control1 technique
T1071Application Layer Protocol
TA0040Impact3 techniques
T1486×3Data Encrypted for Impact
T1529System Shutdown/Reboot
T1561Disk Wipe
T1561.001Disk Content Wipe
Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Janus target?
Janus targets organizations in Ukraine.
What malware does Janus use?
Janus is associated with Petya, Mischa, and NotPetya.
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping17MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware3Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables9Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.