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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Mischa

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPrivilege escalationDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

Mischa is a Windows file-encrypting ransomware closely associated with the Petya ransomware family and the Janus ransomware-as-a-service operation. It was introduced as a fallback payload for cases where Petya could not obtain the administrative privileges needed to overwrite the master boot record and encrypt the master file table. Unlike Petya’s disk-level approach, Mischa performs conventional file-by-file encryption and can operate with only user-level privileges, making it effective even when elevation fails.

Mischa has been distributed together with Petya through spam and phishing campaigns, including job-application themed lures, as part of a dual-payload installer. The installer decrypts embedded Petya and Mischa components and selects which ransomware to deploy based on the privileges of the current process token. When Mischa is chosen, the payload is prepared with victim-specific data and injected into legitimate Windows processes using reflective DLL injection, including execution via remote threads.

The malware targets a broad range of file types across fixed, removable, and remote drives, while excluding certain system and application directories to preserve system operability. It is notable for encrypting not only user documents and archives but also executables and libraries. Mischa can operate offline without retrieving keys from command-and-control infrastructure. It generates encryption material locally, uses per-file random data in its encryption workflow, appends victim-specific metadata to encrypted files, and drops ransom notes for the victim. Reporting has also noted code similarities with other ransomware families such as Chimera and Rokku.

Mischa is generally characterized as a straightforward but effective ransomware family whose fallback role significantly increased the success rate of Petya-linked campaigns. Because it encrypts files directly rather than relying on filesystem metadata disruption, recovery may be more difficult in many cases than with some early Petya variants that suffered from cryptographic implementation flaws.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Janus

If Petya has insufficient privileges to access MBR on HDD (Hard Disk Drive), the Mischa module is deployed and encrypts files one by one.

via avast blogblog.avast.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

This ransomware is primarily spread via spam email campaigns using different variations with different types of attachments (zip, pif, .pdf.exe, ..) or links to various online storage services. The fake emails looks like job applications, job offers, legal proceedings, among other things.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

This ransomware is primarily spread via spam email campaigns using different variations with different types of attachments (zip, pif, .pdf.exe, ..) ... it purely relies on user action to run the infected attachments.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

This ransomware is primarily spread via spam email campaigns using different variations with different types of attachments (zip, pif, .pdf.exe, ..) or links to various online storage services.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

After such preparation, Mischa.dlll is injected to conhost.exe and deployed as a remote thread.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Mischa.dlll is injected to conhost.exe and deployed as a remote thread.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Mischa if it is unable gain Administrative privileges.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

First, there is a request asking a user to elevate the application’s privileges... if it is not, then the it tries to run it’s new copy with higher privileges (using runas command). If this attempt failed, Mischa is dropped.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The dropper is simple and doesn’t contain any anti-debugging tricks, but it is very strongly obfuscated with a ton of junk code instructions and also uses self modifying methods.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

After such preparation, Mischa.dlll is injected to conhost.exe and deployed as a remote thread.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Mischa.dlll is injected to conhost.exe and deployed as a remote thread.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The dropper includes the XORed payload, which contains Petya’s bootloader and the Mischa module... In the first step, the Petya bootloader and the Mischa module are decrypted, using a simple 1-byte XOR algorithm.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

After decrypting the payloads, an environment check is performed in order to choose which one of them will be installed. The process token... is used for choosing which installation path to follow next. Dropper comes with a list of Anti-Malware products, which presence is checked before the payload is deployed.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

Mischa.dlll is injected to conhost.exe and deployed as a remote thread... Again we can see a DLL using ReflectiveLoader... This technique allows to produce a DLL that can be easily injected into another process.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The payload checks which privileges it has via the GetTokenInformation API function... The OS version verification is performed using an interesting method via the API functions VerSetConditionMask and VerifyVersionInfoW... The verification of the installed AV product is done by searching folder names inside “Program Files” or “Program Files (x86)” and comparing the results with the hardcoded list.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The verification of the installed AV product is done by searching folder names inside “Program Files” or “Program Files (x86)”... The folder search is carried out using the GetFileAttributesA API function... Mischa avoids the following directories...

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence2

Mischa fetches the list of mapped drives (GetLogicalDriveStringsA) and identifies the drive type by a Windows API function: GetDriveType. It attacks removable, fixed and remote drives.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Mischa is able to encrypt data on all local drives, connected USB drives and remote drives.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

After decrypting the payloads, an environment check is performed in order to choose which one of them will be installed. The process token... is used for choosing which installation path to follow next. Dropper comes with a list of Anti-Malware products, which presence is checked before the payload is deployed.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Petya and Mischa can also work offline, meaning they don’t need to communicate back to their C&C servers, something other ransomware needs to do in order to download the encryption key.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence5

This payload works just like any other ransomware – encrypting files one by one and dropping a ransom note... Every file is encrypted with a random key.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.