Grief, also known as PayOrGrief, is a ransomware and data-extortion threat group that emerged in May 2021. It is widely assessed as part of the Evil Corp cybercrime ecosystem and has also been described as a rebrand or successor of DoppelPaymer, which itself shares lineage with BitPaymer. Reporting has additionally linked Grief activity to TA505 and the broader Indrik Spider/Evil Corp cluster. The group is associated with Russian cybercrime and operates a public leak site used to pressure victims by publishing stolen data. Grief conducts financially motivated ransomware and extortion operations. Its tradecraft includes compromising organizations, stealing internal data, threatening public release of that data, and maintaining a leak site to shame non-paying victims. The group has been observed using stolen-data publication as a core pressure mechanism and has been tied to campaigns against school districts, local governments, healthcare organizations, education entities, and other enterprises. Victim reporting also places Grief activity against manufacturing, hospitality, information technology services, pharmaceuticals, food and beverage, agriculture, online retail, and advanced technology organizations. The group is notably linked to attacks in the United States, including multiple campaigns against government, healthcare, and education targets, as well as the high-profile extortion of the National Rifle Association. In that case, Grief publicly claimed the intrusion, released selected internal documents, and threatened further disclosure unless a ransom was paid. Grief has also been discussed in the context of broader multi-pressure extortion trends, including public amplification of victim incidents, although direct attribution for such amplification activity has not been established. Because of its assessed ties to Evil Corp, Grief is significant not only as a ransomware actor but also as a sanctions-risk actor. Any ransom payment involving the group may carry legal and regulatory implications where Evil Corp sanctions apply.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
4 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Named as one of multiple ransomware groups operating data leak sites and listing fresh victims.
Ransomware-extortion group with a public leak site for stolen victim data; mentioned here because TA505 is suspected of leveraging it.
Mentioned only as a comparison for API-based admin panel and leak-site architecture similar to Hive.
Ransomware/extortion activity targeting the NRA, involving theft and publication of internal documents and sensitive personal and financial information to pressure for ransom payment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.