Skip to main content
Mallory
Threat actor

RedKitten

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware1Family
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Origin
🇮🇷 Iran
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
IR
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injectionSpoofing
Also known asRed Kittenredkitten

RedKitten is an Iran-linked, Farsi-speaking cyber-espionage threat cluster aligned with Iranian state interests and first publicly observed in early 2026 during unrest and protest crackdowns in Iran. The actor has targeted Iranian civil society, including human rights NGOs, activists, journalists, academics, and other individuals documenting abuses, with particular emphasis on protest-related themes and Kurdish community targets. Reporting also links the cluster to broader targeting of government officials and business leaders connected to Iran-focused issues. RedKitten is notable for combining social engineering with modular malware and widespread use of legitimate cloud and communications platforms. Its intrusion chains have used spearphishing lures themed around protester deaths and human rights abuses, typically delivered in Farsi-language archives containing malicious Excel documents with VBA macros. Those macros have been assessed as showing signs of AI-assisted or AI-obfuscated development. Execution leads to AppDomainManager injection and deployment of the SloppyMIO backdoor, a modular implant that uses GitHub as a dead-drop resolver, Google Drive for staged configuration and payload retrieval, and Telegram Bot API for command and control and exfiltration. SloppyMIO supports arbitrary command execution, file collection and exfiltration, additional payload delivery, process execution, and scheduled-task persistence. The actor has also operated credential-harvesting infrastructure impersonating communications and email services to steal account credentials and, in some cases, facilitate surveillance-oriented access requests. Use of commoditized platforms such as GitHub, Google Drive, and Telegram complicates infrastructure-based tracking while reflecting an effort to blend malicious traffic with normal services. RedKitten’s tradecraft overlaps with known Iranian intrusion sets including Charming Kitten, Nemesis Kitten, Tortoiseshell, and MuddyWater-linked activity discussed in relation to Operation Olalampo, but available information supports treating RedKitten as a distinct tracked cluster rather than conclusively equating it with those groups. The dominant assessed purpose of the activity is espionage and monitoring of dissidents, activists, and organizations documenting politically sensitive events inside Iran.

Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
Check your exposure
Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Public Sector
  • Civil Society & Non-Profit

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Iran

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Iran
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

9 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

5 of 15 tactics13 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1566Phishing
TA0002Execution2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001PowerShell
T1204User Execution
T1204.002Malicious File
TA0005Stealth2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.003Steganography
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
TA0011Command and Control2 techniques
T1071×2Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001Web Protocols
T1102Web Service
T1102.001Dead Drop Resolver
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Malware

Associated malware families

1 malware family Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does RedKitten target?
RedKitten targets Government & Public Sector and Civil Society & Non-Profit in Iran.
What malware does RedKitten use?
RedKitten is associated with SloppyMIO.
Where is RedKitten from?
Mallory's sources associate RedKitten with Iran.
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping9MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware1Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables3Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.