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Mallory
Threat actor

Teleboyi

Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware2Families
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs27Tracked
Origin
🇨🇳 China
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
INVNTRTHBR
Capabilities
Initial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injectionKeyloggingExfiltration
Also known asTeleboyi

TeleBoyi is a China-nexus advanced persistent threat group active since at least 2014. It conducts cyberespionage against critical infrastructure worldwide, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region and telecommunications. Other targeted sectors include energy, information technology, critical manufacturing, healthcare, nuclear infrastructure, government, and financial services. Its objectives include intelligence gathering and technology theft. TeleBoyi gains initial access through fake applications, malicious documents containing macros or HTA content, and exploitation of public-facing applications. Its exploitation vectors include Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, Apache Struts2 S2-045, and Java deserialization flaws. It deploys China Chopper and Godzilla webshells and uses self-extracting archives to package and disguise malicious components. Its custom loaders employ Themida or VMProtect packing, payload encryption, and custom string-decryption algorithms. Observed execution techniques include DLL sideloading and reflective DLL injection. The group's toolset includes PlugX, Winnti, ShadowPad, DeedRAT, TripleZero, LibreCoin, DoubleShell, FakeWorker, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, and AsyncRAT. LibreCoin, also known as RatelS, supports command execution, file operations, proxying, screenshot capture, and keylogging. DoubleShell provides disk and file management, screenshots, and command execution, and can retrieve updated command-and-control information through a dead-drop resolver. FakeWorker targets Linux systems and supports file transfers and pseudo-terminal command execution. TeleBoyi uses virtual private servers, compromised websites, and infrastructure impersonating companies associated with its targets. Its activity overlaps with Operation Harvest, but shared malware and infrastructure do not establish that other Chinese threat groups are aliases of TeleBoyi.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Capital Goods
  • Energy
  • Financial Services
  • Government & Administration
  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Software & Services
  • Technology Hardware & Equipment
  • Telecommunication Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Brazil
  • India
  • Thailand
  • Türkiye
  • Vietnam

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • China
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

21 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

9 of 15 tactics31 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566Phishing
T1566.001Spearphishing Attachment
TA0002Execution3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.003Windows Command Shell
T1059.004Unix Shell
T1059.005Visual Basic
T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204User Execution
T1204.002Malicious File
TA0003Persistence1 technique
T1505Server Software Component
T1505.003Web Shell
TA0004Privilege Escalation1 technique
T1055Process Injection
TA0005Stealth4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
T1055Process Injection
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005Mshta
T1620Reflective Code Loading
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1056Input Capture
T1056.001Keylogging
TA0007Discovery1 technique
T1083File and Directory Discovery
TA0009Collection3 techniques
T1056Input Capture
T1056.001Keylogging
T1113Screen Capture
T1560Archive Collected Data
TA0011Command and Control5 techniques
T1001Data Obfuscation
T1071Application Layer Protocol
T1090Proxy
T1102Web Service
T1102.001Dead Drop Resolver
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Indicators of compromise

Observables

27 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Teleboyi target?
Teleboyi targets Capital Goods, Energy, Financial Services, Government & Administration, Health Care Equipment & Services, Software & Services, Technology Hardware & Equipment, and Telecommunication Services in Brazil, India, Thailand, Türkiye, and Vietnam.
What malware does Teleboyi use?
Teleboyi is associated with PlugX and ShadowPad.
Where is Teleboyi from?
Mallory's sources associate Teleboyi with China.
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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trendai security blogNews · Jan 1, 2026Updated Shadowpad Malware Leads to Ransomware Deployment | TrendAI (US)Uses a custom PlugX loader with distinctive string decryption and PE icon characteristics. Historical domain and IP overlaps suggest a possible connection to the investigated Shadowpad campaign, but domain re-registration and a substantial gap between infrastructure observations prevent reliable attribution. Neither the current Shadowpad activity nor the unnamed ransomware is confidently attributed to Teleboyi.Read more ↗trendmicro comNews · Feb 20, 2025Updated Shadowpad Malware Leads to Ransomware Deployment | Trend Micro (FR)Referenced as a possible but weak attribution candidate for the observed Shadowpad/PlugX-linked activity based on code overlap and historical infrastructure overlap.Read more ↗f6News · May 5, 2024Восточный почерк: исследуем кибератаку азиатской группировки на российскую компанию - F6Named among Chinese threat groups exhibiting overlaps with the investigated ShadowPad campaign. The available indicators do not establish Teleboyi's responsibility, and the campaign's victims, malware deployment, and techniques cannot be definitively assigned to this group.Read more ↗jsac jpcertNews · Aug 14, 2026China-nexus espionage group active since 2014 targeting critical infrastructure worldwide, especially in APAC, with a strong focus on telecommunications as well as energy, IT, manufacturing, healthcare, nuclear, government, and financial sectors.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping21MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware2Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables27Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.