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Mallory
2 malware families

SheldIO

Also known assheldio

SheldIO is a cybercriminal threat actor associated with the sale and marketing of ACR Stealer (AcridRain) and its successor/rebrand Amatera Stealer as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS). The actor is explicitly described as selling Amatera Stealer on Telegram and previously marketing ACR Stealer on underground forums, including the RAMP darknet forum. Amatera is described as a rebranded version of ACR Stealer and, in later reporting, as lineage malware descending from ACR Stealer through GrMsk Stealer. Reporting links SheldIO to the Russian-speaking MaaS ecosystem. The malware associated with SheldIO is an information stealer focused on credential theft, browser data, cryptocurrency wallets, messaging data, password manager material, and sensitive files. Observed Amatera capabilities include in-memory execution via multi-stage PowerShell or fileless loader chains, reflective loading, string encryption, direct or indirect syscall-based evasion including RecycledGate/FreshyCalls-style syscall resolution, anti-debugging, anti-analysis checks, geofencing for Ukrainian keyboard layouts and Kaspersky-related environments, and encrypted command-and-control communications. Reported theft scope includes browser credentials and cookies, wallet browser extensions, desktop cryptocurrency wallets, Discord and Signal data, password manager files, FTP credentials, email service tokens, system fingerprinting data, and file collection from victim Downloads directories. Known aliases and related names directly mentioned in the content include SheldIO, ACR Stealer, AcridRain Stealer, and Amatera Stealer. The content does not provide high-confidence evidence of nation-state affiliation.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Financial Services
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

6 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

5 of 15 tactics8 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001
Domains
TA0002
Execution
1 technique
T1204
User Execution
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0007
Discovery
1 technique
T1082
System Information Discovery
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1005
Data from Local System
IOCS

Observables

48 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping6

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal2

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables48

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.