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Water Hydra is a financially motivated, Russian-speaking cybercriminal threat actor associated with malware delivery, remote access tooling, and theft-focused campaigns targeting traders, cryptocurrency users, and related victims. The actor is also linked with the aliases evilgrou-tech and DarkCasino. Activity attributed to this cluster includes operation of QuasarRAT-based campaigns and overlap with CountLoader infrastructure, indicating a broader ecosystem of credential theft, wallet theft, and post-compromise access operations. The actor has operated multiple QuasarRAT campaigns, including an earlier campaign tagged Office04 that targeted forex traders and a later campaign tagged Pumpfun aimed at cryptocurrency users. A newer QuasarRAT variant referred to as Sentinel expands capability beyond standard remote administration by adding Hidden VNC for covert browser-session interaction, keylogging, and browser credential theft from Chromium- and Firefox-based browsers. Delivery has included PowerShell-based loaders that request elevation, unpack embedded .NET payloads, and establish user-level persistence. Infrastructure associated with this actor has shown use of bulletproof or abuse-tolerant hosting, dynamic DNS, GitHub-hosted payload staging, and command-and-control servers that appear to enforce IP-based access controls or whitelisting at the application layer. Historical infrastructure analysis indicates a multi-year evolution in hosting and delivery tradecraft. The actor has also been linked to malware distribution channels involving Amadey and to infrastructure shared with CountLoader operations. CountLoader is a malware platform tied through infrastructure overlap and operational context to the same cluster. It masquerades as legitimate software, uses mshta-delivered HTA payloads, establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and autoruns, and targets cryptocurrency wallet extensions across many browsers. It also includes Active Directory reconnaissance functionality that collects domain topology, group membership, and related enterprise information useful for lateral movement and broader compromise. This combination of wallet theft, credential theft, reconnaissance, and remote access indicates an operator capable of both consumer-focused financial theft and enterprise-oriented post-exploitation. Attribution points to Russian origin or operation, supported by Russian-language development artifacts, Russian-speaking operator characteristics, and UTC+3 development patterns. Known aliases and linked designations include evilgrou-tech, Water Hydra, and DarkCasino.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
32 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
43 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Runs parallel financially motivated malware campaigns targeting forex traders and cryptocurrency users, using QuasarRAT variants and DarkMe, with infrastructure tied to bulletproof hosting and GitHub-hosted payload delivery.
Associated with QuasarRAT C2 infrastructure; mentioned here due to infrastructure overlap with CountLoader hosting on the same /24 netblock and provider.
A Russian-speaking threat actor operating QuasarRAT v1.4.1 infrastructure. The actor used a live C2 at 91.124.98.29, migrated from port 2525 to 2626, and appears to protect the C2 with application-layer IP-based access control that accepts TLS handshakes but immediately drops unauthorized clients after they send data.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.