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🇷🇺 RU6 malware families

GREYVIBE

Also known asGREYVIBE

GREYVIBE is a previously undocumented, Russia-linked threat actor tracked by WithSecure and active since at least August 2025. The group has persistently targeted Ukraine and Ukraine-related entities across military, government, civilian, and business sectors. WithSecure assessed that GREYVIBE’s targeting, lures, and post-compromise objectives align with Russian state intelligence interests in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, while also identifying ties to the broader cybercrime ecosystem. Researchers reported that the operators and developers are Russian-speaking and operate broadly in the Moscow time zone. GREYVIBE uses multiple delivery vectors, including spear-phishing emails, fake CAPTCHA or verification pages, fraudulent Ukrainian adult-club websites, and charity-themed lure sites. Its activity has been grouped into five attack chains: PhantomMail, PhantomClick, PrincessClub, DroneLink, and Nebo. PhantomMail used spear-phishing emails linking to malicious ZIP or RAR archives hosted on services such as Google Drive and 4sync; these archives contained JavaScript-based or PyInstaller-based loaders that launched decoy documents and deployed PhantomRelay. PhantomClick used ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHA pages impersonating services such as Zoom and LAPAS and tricked victims into executing commands that installed PhantomRelay. PrincessClub used fake Ukrainian adult-club websites and fake female Telegram personas to target victims, including confirmed Ukrainian combatants in Kharkiv, delivering FallSpy on Android and PhantomRelayV1 or LegionRelay on Windows; later versions added WebRTC-based live call functionality to capture victim audio and video. DroneLink used websites masquerading as charitable foundations supporting the Armed Forces of Ukraine and delivered WireGuard together with LegionRelay. Nebo used FallSpy samples and fake Russian-language login interfaces. Known GREYVIBE malware and tooling include PhantomRelay, LegionRelay, and FallSpy, as well as loaders and obfuscators such as DAYLIGHT, LOOKVALPS, LOOKVALJS, and TEASOUP. PhantomRelay is a modular PowerShell-based RAT using a two-stage execution chain and secure WebSocket communications. LegionRelay is a lightweight PowerShell-based RAT using REST API methods for file enumeration and exfiltration, screenshot capture, browser data theft, Telegram and WhatsApp data theft, messaging database enumeration, and RDP access setup. FallSpy is Android spyware that harvests contacts, call logs, installed applications, SIM-linked phone numbers, device and network information, Wi-Fi SSID, last-known location, public IP, and media files. WithSecure found strong evidence that GREYVIBE systematically used generative AI platforms including ChatGPT, Google Gemini, and Ideogram AI across lure creation, image generation, malware and obfuscator development, backend infrastructure setup, and post-compromise command generation. Researchers assessed that this AI use helped the group accelerate development, compensate for capability gaps, and vary code structures. At the same time, GREYVIBE was described as low-to-moderately sophisticated and prone to operational security mistakes, including exposing backend functionality through design flaws in LegionRelay, uploading test samples to VirusTotal, and leaving development artifacts such as "letsrollboyos," "totallyunsus," and "cuteuwu." WithSecure stated it had not identified definitive links between GREYVIBE and any previously tracked threat group, but assessed with moderate confidence that the actor has ties to the broader cybercrime ecosystem and with low-to-moderate confidence that it may involve current or former cybercriminals. Reported indicators of this overlap include use of an ISO builder with suspected ties to TrickBot and UAC-0098, slang-based artifact naming, deployment of XMRig on a small number of infected machines, and appearance of PhantomRelay variants in unrelated cybercrime activity. Known aliases and campaign or sub-cluster names directly mentioned in the reporting are GREYVIBE, GreyVibe, PhantomMail, PhantomClick, PrincessClub, DroneLink, and Nebo.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Military

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇦 Ukraine

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • RU
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

34 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics37 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
2 techniques
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1598
Phishing for Information
T1598.004
Spearphishing Voice
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1587
Develop Capabilities
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1189×5
Drive-by Compromise
T1566×2
Phishing
T1566.001×3
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×5
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×5
PowerShell
T1059.003
Windows Command Shell
T1059.007×3
JavaScript
T1204×5
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1027×4
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036×4
Masquerading
TA0006
Credential Access
3 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0007
Discovery
4 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
T1082×2
System Information Discovery
T1083×2
File and Directory Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001×2
Remote Desktop Protocol
TA0009
Collection
5 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1113×3
Screen Capture
T1123×4
Audio Capture
T1125×4
Video Capture
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2
Web Protocols
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041×2
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1496×3
Resource Hijacking
IOCS

Observables

1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping34

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal6

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables1

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.