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Guedz is the alias of the developer and administrator behind SniperDz, a long-running phishing-as-a-service operation active since at least 2015 and associated with Algeria. The operation also used the names JokerDz, StormDz, and SpamDz as it rebranded over time. SniperDz was distributed and promoted through Telegram and Facebook channels and provided roughly 80 phishing templates impersonating more than 30 major brands, with content primarily in Arabic, English, and French. The platform enabled large-scale credential harvesting and broader social-engineering campaigns. It collected usernames, passwords, timestamps of compromise, victim IP data, and victim geolocation information. SniperDz also included tooling to convert standard HTML phishing pages into Blogger-compatible formats, allowing operators and affiliates to abuse legitimate hosting platforms for delivery and evasion. The ecosystem relied on affiliate recruitment and operator-produced tutorial videos to onboard users and expand campaign volume. Unlike many criminal platforms that charge subscriptions, SniperDz reportedly used a free-access model and monetized operations through stolen credentials and downstream fraud schemes. Victims were also redirected into carrier-billing fraud, premium SMS abuse, browser-notification abuse, and related affiliate-driven scams. Investigators linked more than 20,000 domains to the broader SniperDz ecosystem and tied the operation to Guedz through technical correlations, historical registration data, social-media activity, recruitment messaging, and attribution evidence exposed in tutorial material. The actor’s activity was observed in social-engineering campaigns affecting the MENA region, including compromised accounts associated with government infrastructure. Law-enforcement action under Operation Ramz led to disruption of SniperDz infrastructure and the arrest of the alleged administrator known as Guedz. Guedz is best characterized as a financially motivated cybercriminal operator focused on phishing enablement, credential theft, and fraud at scale.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
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Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
4 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
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