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Mallory
Threat actorLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

SantaAd

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs4Associated
Malware1Family
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Origin
🇷🇺 Russia
Motivation
Financial
Targets
USINTRUA
Ransomware tactics
Raas affiliate
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationInitial accessLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanningBrute force
Also known asSantaAd

SantaAd is a Russian-speaking initial access broker associated with large-scale acquisition and resale of access to internet-facing enterprise systems, especially Fortinet FortiGate and FortiOS SSL-VPN environments. The actor has been linked to the FortiBleed operation, a broad credential-harvesting and access-brokering campaign that combined internet-wide scanning, brute-force and credential-based intrusion, validation of stolen access, enrichment of victim metadata, and resale-oriented monetization. Reporting characterizes SantaAd as operating in Russian-speaking cybercrime ecosystems and advertising bulk access to compromised Fortinet devices for sale to ransomware operators and other criminal buyers. SantaAd’s activity is centered on obtaining validated remote access at scale rather than deploying bespoke malware for destructive or espionage purposes. Observed tradecraft includes reconnaissance and scanning of exposed services, brute-force and dictionary attacks, use of credentials from prior leaks and infostealer collections, cracking of FortiOS administrative password hashes with rented GPU infrastructure, and abuse of legitimate device functionality for post-compromise credential collection. In Fortinet-focused intrusions, compromised edge devices were reportedly used as passive collection points to capture authentication material traversing the network, including plaintext credentials, Kerberos material, NTLM-related data, and session artifacts. The actor has also been associated with replay of session cookies to maintain or regain access. The operation attributed to SantaAd expanded beyond Fortinet products to include other exposed enterprise technologies such as network-attached storage, firewalls, remote access portals, and database services. Victim data was reportedly enriched with organizational attributes including sector, revenue, and employee count, indicating a brokerage model designed to increase resale value. Available evidence indicates opportunistic, high-volume targeting with particular interest in small and mid-sized organizations and IT service providers, including managed service providers, whose compromise could enable downstream access to customer environments. Post-compromise behavior linked to the broader campaign includes credential harvesting, Active Directory reconnaissance, lateral movement, access to internal file shares, and exfiltration of victim data. SantaAd has been publicly associated with auctions and sale listings for large volumes of Fortinet access on a Russian-speaking underground forum, and has been described as a multi-operator group by some researchers. The dominant assessed motivation is financial gain through access brokerage, including sales to ransomware affiliates and other cybercriminal actors.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
  • Military
  • Capital Goods
  • Commercial & Professional Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • United States
  • India
  • Türkiye
  • Ukraine

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

18 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

8 of 15 tactics24 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance2 techniques
T1590Gather Victim Network Information
T1595Active Scanning
TA0001Initial Access3 techniques
T1078×4Valid Accounts
T1133External Remote Services
T1190×2Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0003Persistence3 techniques
T1078×4Valid Accounts
T1133External Remote Services
T1136Create Account
TA0004Privilege Escalation1 technique
T1078×4Valid Accounts
TA0005Stealth2 techniques
T1078×4Valid Accounts
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0006Credential Access6 techniques
T1003OS Credential Dumping
T1040×2Network Sniffing
T1110×4Brute Force
T1110.002Password Cracking
T1110.003Password Spraying
T1212Exploitation for Credential Access
T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
T1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007Discovery4 techniques
T1018Remote System Discovery
T1040×2Network Sniffing
T1046Network Service Discovery
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0011Command and Control1 technique
T1090Proxy
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 4 of them are exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2018-133791 evidence · Jun 30, 2026Exploited in the wildUnauthenticated Path Traversal in Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy SSL VPNCVE-2018-13379 was a FortiOS SSL-VPN path traversal flaw that exposed plaintext credentials, and I believe someone collected around 500,000 accounts from that.View vulnerability →
CVE-2025-597181 evidence · Jun 25, 2026Exploited in the wildFortiCloud SSO SAML Authentication Bypass in Fortinet ProductsПредставители Fortinet допускали, что в кампании могли использоваться уязвимости CVE-2026-24858, CVE-2025-59718 и CVE-2025-59719.View vulnerability →
CVE-2025-597191 evidence · Jun 25, 2026Exploited in the wildFortinet FortiWeb FortiCloud SSO Authentication BypassПредставители Fortinet допускали, что в кампании могли использоваться уязвимости CVE-2026-24858, CVE-2025-59718 и CVE-2025-59719.View vulnerability →
CVE-2026-248581 evidence · Jun 25, 2026Exploited in the wildFortiCloud SSO Cross-Account Administrative Authentication BypassПредставители Fortinet допускали, что в кампании могли использоваться уязвимости CVE-2026-24858, CVE-2025-59718 и CVE-2025-59719.View vulnerability →
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does SantaAd target?
SantaAd targets Software & Services, Military, Capital Goods, and Commercial & Professional Services in United States, India, Türkiye, and Ukraine.
What malware does SantaAd use?
SantaAd is associated with FortigateSniffer.
Where is SantaAd from?
Mallory's sources associate SantaAd with Russia.
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
eclypsium blogNews · Jun 30, 2026BTS #77 - FortiBleed Uncovered: How Attackers Harvest Credentials from Fortinet Devices - Eclypsium | Supply Chain Security for the Modern EnterpriseInitial access broker group attributed to the FortiBleed campaign, conducting large-scale credential harvesting and access brokering against internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate and FortiOS SSL-VPN devices.Read more ↗xakepNews · Jun 25, 2026В кампании FortiBleed использовался сниффер, специально созданный для FortiGate - ХакерРусскоязычный брокер первоначального доступа, предположительно связанный с кампанией FortiBleed. Операторы массово сканировали интернет-доступные системы, брутфорсили административные панели, SSL-VPN и SSH, эксплуатировали старые уязвимости FortiGate, устанавливали кастомный сниффер FortigateSniffer и перехватывали учетные данные для последующего использования, перепродажи или передачи другим преступникам.Read more ↗security affairsNews · Jun 24, 2026FortiBleed: The Broker Who Turned 73,000 Firewalls Into a Product CatalogFinancially motivated initial access brokering operation focused on obtaining, validating, cataloging, and reselling Fortinet firewall and remote-access credentials at global scale, likely for resale to ransomware crews.Read more ↗hudsonrock blogNews · Jun 22, 2026Supercomputing on a Credit Card From The AI Rush Enabled The Massive FortiBleed Campaign | Hudson RockInitial Access Broker observed selling bulk access to compromised Fortinet devices to ransomware affiliates and other cybercriminals.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping18MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware1Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs4CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
ObservablesDomains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.