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GhostPoster is a malicious browser-extension campaign associated with Chinese cyber activity and linked in reporting to the broader DarkSpectre and ShadyPanda ecosystem. It is known for abusing browser extension marketplaces by presenting extensions as legitimate utilities while concealing malicious functionality through steganographic techniques. A notable tradecraft element attributed to GhostPoster is hiding executable code inside extension icon files, a method later observed in related extension-based operations. The campaign has also reused extension branding associated with ad-blocking themes, indicating an emphasis on blending into common consumer browser tooling. GhostPoster is best understood as part of a cluster of extension-centric intrusion activity focused on covert payload delivery, evasion of static inspection, and monetization or account compromise through browser-resident access. Its tradecraft overlaps with later campaigns that used delayed activation, hidden JavaScript payloads, and selective delivery mechanisms to reduce detection and frustrate analysis. The operational pattern indicates capability for initial access through malicious extensions, credential theft, session abuse through browser data access, exfiltration, and defense evasion via concealed payload storage and staged execution. Known aliases include GhostPoster. It has been referenced alongside ShadyPanda and DarkSpectre as related or associated activity rather than as a confirmed formal subgroup structure.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
10 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as a prior campaign sharing icon steganography methods and reused extension names with StegoAd.
A related malicious browser extension campaign that used the same technique of hiding code inside an extension icon.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
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Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.