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Armored Likho is a recently documented threat actor also known as Eagle Werewolf. The group has conducted cyber-espionage campaigns against organizations while also showing financially motivated activity against private individuals. Observed targeting has centered on Russia, Kazakhstan, and Brazil, with victims including government entities, electric power organizations, IT companies, educational institutions, major corporations, and private users. Armored Likho relies heavily on phishing and social-engineering lures, including fake government notices, social-program themes, psychological tests, humanitarian-aid requests, and donation-themed applications. Delivery chains have used malicious archives, Windows shortcut abuse, NSIS-based droppers, DLL sideloading, PowerShell-based loaders, and staged payload retrieval from private and public code-hosting platforms. Multiple reports note signs consistent with generative-AI-assisted development in some first-stage loaders and utilities. The actor’s malware ecosystem includes BusySnake, AquilaRAT, Go2Tunnel, Kharon RAT, and the Rust-based Still Toolkit. BusySnake has appeared in multiple implementations, including Python and Golang variants, and functions as both an infostealer and backdoor. It has stolen browser credentials and cookies, Telegram session data, documents, screenshots, clipboard contents, one-time-password secrets, cryptocurrency-related data, and other host information. BusySnake also supports command execution, reverse SSH tunneling, file operations, in-memory script execution, anti-analysis delays, AMSI and ETW bypassing in newer variants, and persistence through scheduled tasks and related mechanisms. Kharon RAT delivery chains have used custom loaders, anti-debugging, sandbox evasion, encrypted payload staging, and process injection. Still Toolkit introduced dedicated modules for Telegram session theft and covert microphone surveillance, enabling collection of chats, media, account metadata, and speech recordings. Armored Likho has repeatedly used legitimate cloud and developer services as part of command-and-control and payload delivery, including Telegram, GitLab CI/CD workflows and variables, GitHub-hosted content, and dead-drop-style fallback mechanisms. The group has shown continued tool evolution, migration from public to private repositories, and increasing modularity aimed at long-term access, stealth, and multi-channel intelligence collection. Available reporting supports espionage as the dominant motivation, despite evidence of some financially motivated operations. Attribution to a specific nation state is not established by the available facts.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
49 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
9 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
4 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
138 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Developing and evolving its own malware toolkit, especially BusySnake RAT, and conducting campaigns using legitimate services such as GitLab, GitHub, and Telegram for C2, delivery, persistence, and file exfiltration. The group also used Kharon RAT in a newly identified campaign.
Deploying an information stealer to collect browser credentials, cookies, documents, screen data, and enable reverse SSH tunneling.
Conducting a new cyber-espionage campaign using a fake charity-aid application as an initial infection vector, deploying the new Still Toolkit to steal Telegram Desktop session data and perform covert microphone-based audio surveillance for long-term intelligence collection.
Conducting a cyber-espionage campaign using a fake donation application to infect targets in Russia with the Rust-based Still Toolkit, enabling Telegram session theft, chat and file collection, and microphone surveillance.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.