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ExfilSquad is a financially motivated cybercrime and data-extortion group that emerged in mid-2026. The group is associated with hack-and-leak operations that focus on stealing data from externally exposed cloud and SaaS environments and coercing victims with threats to publish the stolen information, rather than deploying file-encrypting ransomware. ExfilSquad has operated a leak site and has also distributed victim data through peer-to-peer torrent infrastructure, a tactic that increases resilience of leaked material and complicates takedown and containment. The group has been linked to at least 13 victims, and initially claimed compromises affecting 15 organizations. Reported victims span government, education, financial services, manufacturing, and other enterprise environments. Publicly named victims include the UK Department for Education, the UK Police National Legal Database, Newcastle University, District of Columbia Public Schools, the City of Atlanta, Wesco, and other organizations in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Nigeria. ExfilSquad’s activity is strongly associated with large-scale data theft from Microsoft business application ecosystems, especially Microsoft Dynamics 365, Dataverse, Power Pages, and related CRM or case-management portals. Multiple analyses assessed that the most likely intrusion pattern involved unauthorized access to publicly exposed or misconfigured Power Pages or Dataverse-backed portals that permitted anonymous or overly broad read access, rather than exploitation of a widespread software vulnerability in Dynamics 365 itself. Reported ATT&CK-aligned behaviors include exploitation of public-facing applications for initial access, collection of data from cloud storage, and exfiltration over web services. Victim reporting and third-party analysis also indicate reconnaissance or enumeration of exposed portals at scale. The group’s operations center on exfiltration and extortion. In several incidents, ExfilSquad claimed responsibility, published sample data to substantiate access, set negotiation deadlines, and released larger datasets when payment was not made. The actor has been described as conducting encryption-less extortion, with stolen data itself serving as the primary leverage. Available reporting does not support routine use of ransomware payloads, destructive malware, or disruptive encryption by this actor.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
20 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Data extortion campaign involving exfiltration and public release of victim data via torrents, likely by identifying and abusing publicly exposed Microsoft D365 CRM/ERP data through misconfigured Microsoft Power Pages portals.
Claimed responsibility for the breach of England's Department for Education and reportedly published or advertised stolen data online after the intrusion.
Data extortion campaign involving exfiltration and public release of stolen data from at least 13 victims after alleged failure to meet the group's demands. The activity is assessed as likely involving unauthorized read access to Microsoft D365 CRM/ERP data via misconfigured Microsoft Power Pages portals and related enumeration/scanning for exposed instances.
Data extortion activity involving alleged theft and publication of Wesco CRM records after ransom negotiations failed; the group has also claimed other breaches and has been linked by researchers to targeting misconfigured Microsoft Power Pages data tables.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.