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RedFoxtrot is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber-espionage threat actor, also tracked as Nomad Panda and overlapping in some reporting with Temp.Trident. Public reporting has linked the group to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, specifically PLA Unit 69010 in Ürümqi, Xinjiang, and places its activity within the broader China-nexus espionage ecosystem. The group has been active since at least 2014. RedFoxtrot has primarily targeted government, telecommunications, aerospace and defense, mining, and research organizations across Central and South Asia, with a notable emphasis on India during periods of heightened China-India tensions. Reported victim countries include Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. More recent overlap reporting also associates related activity with telecommunications and defense targeting in South Asia. The actor is known for long-running espionage operations using a mix of bespoke and shared China-nexus tooling. Malware and intrusion tooling associated with RedFoxtrot includes PlugX, PCShare, Poison Ivy variants, IceFog, Royal Road-delivered lure documents, and likely ShadowPad. RedFoxtrot has repeatedly used DLL sideloading chains to deploy malware, including PlugX variants such as the Talisman cluster. Observed capabilities include modular backdoor deployment, persistence, process injection, credential access, remote shell access, file management, port forwarding, and data exfiltration. Reporting also notes overlaps with ShadowPad-related infrastructure and with later China-aligned clusters such as UAT-7290 and Moshen Dragon, though those overlaps do not by themselves establish identity. Operationally, RedFoxtrot has been characterized by extensive use of Dynamic DNS infrastructure and recurring hosting patterns, as well as infrastructure and tooling overlaps that have supported attribution. The group’s targeting profile and tradecraft are consistent with strategic intelligence collection in support of Chinese state interests rather than financially motivated activity.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
33 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
11 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
6 additional families tracked in Mallory.
51 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Suspected PLA-linked unit identified as a recipient of the commercially sold ShadowPad backdoor.
Attributed with medium confidence as the operator of the Talisman PlugX campaign targeting telecommunications and defense organizations in South Asia, using PlugX/PCShare-linked infrastructure and DLL sideloading-based backdoor deployment.
China-linked threat actor publicly linked by Recorded Future to PLA Unit 69010 and noted here for overlap in victimology, infrastructure, and tooling with UAT-7290.
China-linked threat actor referenced because UAT-7290 shares overlap in victimology, infrastructure, and tooling with it; publicly linked to PLA Unit 69010.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.