Skip to main content
Mallory
Threat actorChinaLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

RedFoxtrot

Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVEs2Associated
Malware14Families
ATT&CK34Techniques
IOCs51Tracked
Origin
🇨🇳 China
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
IN
Capabilities
Initial accessCredential theftPersistenceLateral movementDLL sideloadingProcess injectionDefense evasionPost exploitation
Also known asNOMAD PANDAred_foxtrotRedFoxtrot

RedFoxtrot, also known as Nomad Panda and Red Foxtrot, is a Chinese state-sponsored cyberespionage group linked to the People’s Liberation Army’s Unit 69010. Its espionage activity dates to at least 2014 and focuses on strategically significant organizations in Asian countries bordering China. Targets include government agencies, aerospace and defense enterprises, telecommunications providers, mining companies, and research organizations. Its Indian targets have included a state-owned enterprise involved in the nuclear, space, and defense sectors. RedFoxtrot uses remote-access malware including PlugX, PcShare, and ShadowPad. Its operations include exploitation of Internet-facing systems, theft of Active Directory authentication data, web-shell persistence, and lateral movement through enterprise networks. Associated malware deployment techniques include DLL sideloading, encrypted payload loading, and process injection, supporting persistent access while reducing detection. RedFoxtrot shares tooling, infrastructure, and victimology with other Chinese espionage clusters. UAT-7290 exhibits significant overlap with RedFoxtrot, while Moshen Dragon activity partially overlaps with RedFoxtrot and Nomad Panda tracking. These overlaps do not establish that the clusters are identical; shared malware and infrastructure are recurring features of the broader Chinese cyberespionage ecosystem.

Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
Check your exposure
Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Telecommunication Services
  • Government & Administration
  • Military
  • Banks
  • Capital Goods
  • Transportation

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • India
  • Japan

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • China
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

34 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

13 of 15 tactics56 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0042Resource Development1 technique
T1587Develop Capabilities
T1587.001Malware
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1190×4Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566Phishing
TA0002Execution4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005Scheduled Task
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1106Native API
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0003Persistence6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005Scheduled Task
T1112Modify Registry
T1205Traffic Signaling
T1505Server Software Component
T1505.003Web Shell
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.002Authentication Package
TA0004Privilege Escalation3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005Scheduled Task
T1543Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003Windows Service
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.002Authentication Package
TA0005Stealth6 techniques
T1036Masquerading
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1205Traffic Signaling
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
T1620Reflective Code Loading
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1112Modify Registry
TA0006Credential Access2 techniques
T1003×2OS Credential Dumping
T1056Input Capture
TA0007Discovery5 techniques
T1012Query Registry
T1049System Network Connections Discovery
T1057Process Discovery
T1135Network Share Discovery
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001System Checks
TA0008Lateral Movement2 techniques
T1021Remote Services
T1021.003Distributed Component Object Model
T1570Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009Collection3 techniques
T1005Data from Local System
T1056Input Capture
T1113Screen Capture
TA0011Command and Control5 techniques
T1071×2Application Layer Protocol
T1090×2Proxy
T1090.003Multi-hop Proxy
T1095Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1205Traffic Signaling
T1219Remote Access Tools
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 2 of them are exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2024-218871 evidence · Oct 9, 2026Exploited in the wildCommand Injection in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureThe report attributes initial intrusion to likely exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887. Files detected by Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool matched filenames associated with LITTLELAMB, WOOLTEA, PITSOCK, and PITFUEL, and the observed evidence resembled previously reported attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities.View vulnerability →
CVE-2024-218931 evidence · Oct 9, 2026Exploited in the wildUnauthenticated SAML SSRF in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTAThe report identifies CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 as the likely initial-entry vulnerabilities in a campaign targeting Japanese shipping and transportation companies and their subsidiaries. Numerous ERR31093 critical errors, associated with processing malicious SAML payloads exploiting CVE-2024-21893, were recorded near the suspected intrusion time.View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

51 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does RedFoxtrot target?
RedFoxtrot targets Telecommunication Services, Government & Administration, Military, Banks, Capital Goods, and Transportation in India and Japan.
What malware does RedFoxtrot use?
RedFoxtrot is associated with PlugX, PcShare, ShadowPad, AsyncRAT, Cobalt Strike, and 9 more.
What other names is RedFoxtrot known by?
RedFoxtrot is also known as NOMAD PANDA.
Where is RedFoxtrot from?
Mallory's sources associate RedFoxtrot with China.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+17 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping34MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware14Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs2CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables51Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.