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Malware8 associated actors

PcShare

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors8Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs34Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingExploit kit
Platforms
Windows

PCShare is an open-source Windows remote access trojan and backdoor used by multiple Chinese threat actors for persistent remote control and cyberespionage. Its publicly available code has enabled customized deployments across distinct intrusion campaigns. Its capabilities include interactive remote desktop access, shell command execution, bidirectional file transfer, downloading and executing files, process and Windows Registry manipulation, webcam video capture, self-updating, and modification of command-and-control settings. It can query the Registry, upload files and host information to command-and-control servers, and remove its registry-based persistence mechanisms.

Observed deployments include 32-bit and 64-bit loaders, encrypted payloads and configuration, reflective loading, and injection into legitimate Windows processes. Customized versions establish persistence through COM hijacking and disguise their droppers as Windows Update components. Other deployments use DLL side-loading through legitimate NVIDIA software. Chinoxy has also been used to deploy PCShare; the initial infection vector in that government-targeting campaign was not established.

PCShare has been used by RedFoxtrot, Soft Cell, and BRONZE EDGEWOOD, and customized instances have appeared in Operation Redbonus. Documented campaigns include government-sector espionage and intrusions into telecommunications providers in Southeast Asia. PCShare is also the code base for RtlShare, a modified backdoor used by Space Pirates. Its availability and use by multiple actors mean that its presence alone does not establish threat-actor attribution.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

8 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Space Pirates

The attackers use ... a modified version of PcShare.

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
RedFoxtrot

The attackers use ... a modified version of PcShare.

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
Operation Redbonus

During our investigations, we also spotted other backdoors in use, such as Whitebird, IceFog and a customized instance of PCShare.

via sentinelone blogsentinelone.com
BRONZE EDGEWOOD

BRONZE EDGEWOOD ... Tools ... Chinoxy, Cobalt Strike, FunnyDream, Md_client, Nishang Post Exploitation Framework, PCShare, Zuguo

via secureworkssecureworks.com
GOBLIN PANDA

Drop PCshare

via vblocalhostvblocalhost.com
APT41

In recent times, RedFoxtrot has increasingly favored the use of PCShare, PlugX, and ShadowPad, with the group’s use of IceFog, Poison Ivy, and Royal Road declining.

via web archiveweb.archive.org

+2 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence2

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the attackers were able to execute them remotely using WMI and by creating scheduled tasks remotely to run them

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

allowing the attackers to run arbitrary commands, exfiltrate data and deploy additional tools

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attackers used the DLL search order hijacking technique in order to load Mimikatz

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the attackers were able to execute them remotely using WMI and by creating scheduled tasks remotely to run them

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching rundll32.exe ... AADInternals can modify registry keys ... ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values ... [many additional examples].

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"Some variants of ADVSTORESHELL achieve persistence by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object." / "APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate MMDeviceEnumerator object with a payload." / "BBSRAT has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList {42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1} or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem {F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1}..." / "ComRAT samples have been seen which hijack COM objects for persistence by replacing the path to shell32.dll in registry location HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32." / "WarzoneRAT can perform COM hijacking by setting the path to itself to the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command key with a DelegateExecute parameter."

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

the attackers were able to execute them remotely using WMI and by creating scheduled tasks remotely to run them

T1055Process InjectionEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"Some variants of ADVSTORESHELL achieve persistence by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object." / "APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate MMDeviceEnumerator object with a payload." / "BBSRAT has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList {42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1} or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem {F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1}..." / "ComRAT samples have been seen which hijack COM objects for persistence by replacing the path to shell32.dll in registry location HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32." / "WarzoneRAT can perform COM hijacking by setting the path to itself to the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command key with a DelegateExecute parameter."

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

PcShare was executed via a Loader DLL (NvSmartMax.dll) and a Payload (NvSmartMax.dat) attempting to masquerade as a legitimate module by NVIDIA

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity ... FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities ... SUNBURST ... deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence6

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attackers used the DLL search order hijacking technique in order to load Mimikatz

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching rundll32.exe ... AADInternals can modify registry keys ... ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values ... [many additional examples].

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

The Sophos System Protection Service.exe sample is signed using a digital code signing certificate issued to 东莞信大融合创新研究院

Discovery

3 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, opening, and reading Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations" and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, enumerating PIDs, checking for specific process names, or using APIs such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and commands such as tasklist and ps.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The content references repeated use of remote administration and remote execution tools such as PsExec, AnyDesk, Atera, ConnectWise, RemoteUtilities, SimpleHelp, PcShare, VNC, and commodity remote access tools.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Agent Tesla can access the victim’s webcam and record video. AsyncRAT can record screen content on targeted systems. Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing video from a victim's webcam. ... ZxShell has a command to perform video device spying.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Using Recorded Future adversary infrastructure detection methods, we identified that a large proportion of the RedFoxtrot domains are linked to AXIOMATICASYMPTOTE and PlugX C2 infrastructure. Many of these were also used as C2s for different malware families, such as PCShare.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the attackers created another scheduled task with the same name ... used curl.exe binary in order to download a payload

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

Use of a large number of Dynamic DNS (DDNS) domains which form part of overlapping infrastructure clusters

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

34 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching34Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors8Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.