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Mallory
Threat actor

Haskers Gang

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware3Families
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Origin
🇷🇺 Russia
Motivation
Financial
Targets
RU
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injectionCrypto theft
Also known ashaskers_gang

Haskers Gang is a crimeware threat actor active since at least 2020 and associated with the creation, promotion, and distribution of the .NET-based infostealer ZingoStealer. The group operates primarily in Russian-speaking cybercrime communities and is assessed to be based in Eastern Europe, with strong indications of Russian-language operations. Haskers Gang used Telegram and Discord as core operational platforms for malware distribution, update announcements, coordination, and delivery of stolen-data logs to users of its tooling. The group’s best-documented activity centers on ZingoStealer, which it released for free to its community and later attempted to sell. ZingoStealer targets consumer systems, especially Russian-speaking home users, and is commonly distributed through social-engineering lures themed around game cheats, cracks, key generators, pirated software, and free software offers. The malware steals browser data, saved credentials, cookies, system information, collaboration-platform tokens, cryptocurrency wallet extensions, wallet files, screenshots, and user desktop files. It stages and archives collected data before exfiltration. Haskers Gang also used ZingoStealer as a loader for secondary payloads, notably RedLine Stealer and an XMRig-based miner referred to as ZingoMiner, expanding monetization beyond simple credential and wallet theft. Observed follow-on activity included downloading and executing additional malware, establishing persistence, injecting mining components into legitimate processes, and adding antivirus exclusions to support mining operations. The group additionally offered an ExoCrypt crypter service to help users evade antivirus detection. The actor’s operational pattern is consistent with financially motivated cybercrime focused on credential theft, cryptocurrency theft, and broader monetization of infected consumer endpoints. Available evidence indicates a preference for avoiding victims in CIS countries, a behavior commonly associated with Russian-speaking criminal operators.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Russia

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

24 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

12 of 15 tactics34 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1566Phishing
T1566.002Spearphishing Link
TA0002Execution3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2Scheduled Task
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×3PowerShell
T1204User Execution
T1204.002Malicious File
TA0003Persistence1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2Scheduled Task
TA0004Privilege Escalation2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2Scheduled Task
T1055×2Process Injection
TA0005Stealth5 techniques
T1036Masquerading
T1055×2Process Injection
T1070Indicator Removal
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1685×2Disable or Modify Tools
TA0006Credential Access4 techniques
T1056Input Capture
T1528Steal Application Access Token
T1539×2Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555×2Credentials from Password Stores
TA0007Discovery4 techniques
T1082×2System Information Discovery
T1217Browser Information Discovery
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1614System Location Discovery
TA0009Collection4 techniques
T1005×2Data from Local System
T1056Input Capture
T1113×2Screen Capture
T1560×3Archive Collected Data
TA0011Command and Control1 technique
T1105×3Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1041×3Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
TA0040Impact1 technique
T1496Resource Hijacking
Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Haskers Gang target?
Haskers Gang targets organizations in Russia.
What malware does Haskers Gang use?
Haskers Gang is associated with ZingoStealer, XMRig, and RedLine.
Where is Haskers Gang from?
Mallory's sources associate Haskers Gang with Russia.
Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping24MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware3Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables8Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.