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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

ZingoStealer

Tracked since Aug 10, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationReconnaissanceDefense evasionPersistenceProcess injectionCrypto theftPost exploitation
Delivery
Cracked softwareLure
Platforms
Windows

ZingoStealer is a .NET-based Windows information stealer associated with the crimeware group Haskers Gang and first observed in 2022. It was promoted in Russian-speaking cybercrime communities and distributed free to members of the group’s Telegram ecosystem, which contributed to rapid adoption and active iterative development. Campaigns primarily targeted home users, especially Russian-speaking victims, using lures themed around game cheats, cracks, key generators, pirated software, and similar illicit downloads.

The malware collects a broad range of victim data, including browser-stored credentials and cookies, system profiling information, screenshots, collaboration-platform tokens, cryptocurrency wallet extension data, desktop wallet data, and files from the user desktop. It stages the stolen material locally, compresses it into an archive, and exfiltrates it to operator-controlled infrastructure. ZingoStealer also uses Telegram-centric workflows for build distribution and handling of stolen logs.

Beyond core infostealing, ZingoStealer functions as a loader for additional payloads. Observed secondary payloads include RedLine Stealer and an XMRig-based Monero mining component referred to as ZingoMiner, enabling operators to further monetize compromised hosts. The mining component has been observed adding Defender exclusions, establishing persistence through scheduled tasks, and injecting the miner into another process. Reporting also indicates geolocation-based logic consistent with avoiding victims in CIS countries. ZingoStealer has additionally been offered with the ExoCrypt crypter service to improve evasion. Ownership of the project was later advertised as being transferred, and the source code was offered for sale, indicating its role as a commodity crimeware tool rather than a tightly controlled bespoke implant.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Haskers Gang

Cisco Talos recently observed a new information stealer, called "ZingoStealer" that has been released for free by a threat actor known as "Haskers Gang."

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The video description contained a link to the tool hosted on Google Drive.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

This feature was added in a recent release, and uses PowerShell to add the necessary exclusions on Windows Defender and execute the miner.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

In many cases, ZingoStealer is currently being distributed under the guise of game cheats, cracks and code generators.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The hyperlink points to a password-protected RAR archive stored in Google Drive that contains an executable called "loader.exe." This executable is responsible for infecting the system with ZingoStealer.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

In many cases, ZingoStealer is currently being distributed under the guise of game cheats, cracks and code generators.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

It then iterates through the array and performs a modulo operation on each of the values... Finally, the second array is passed back to the Main() function, saved to disk as ZingoStealer, and executed

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The functionality of the code is straightforward: It is responsible for implementing a randomized sleep interval before decrypting the contents of the ZingoStealer binary

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

This feature was added in a recent release, and uses PowerShell to add the necessary exclusions on Windows Defender and execute the miner.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

A new information-stealing malware called ZingoStealer has been discovered with powerful data-stealing features... From a data-stealing perspective, this is a potent malware targeting the following apps and data points...

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

ZingoStealer attempts to collect sensitive information, including user account tokens for collaboration software that may be installed, including Discord and Telegram.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

This includes saved local data, cookies, login data, etc.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Next the malware begins to identify and collect sensitive information stored by web browsers installed on the system. This includes saved local data, cookies, login data, etc.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The malware also attempts to enumerate environmental and system information. This data is saved within a text file called "system.txt"

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1

ZingoStealer also attempts to access information related to Chrome extensions that may be present within the victim's web browser.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The functionality of the code is straightforward: It is responsible for implementing a randomized sleep interval before decrypting the contents of the ZingoStealer binary

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

ZingoStealer performs a geolocation check to ensure the victim isn't located in a CIS country, as it's predominately used by Russian-speaking actors...

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The stealer then creates a directory structure which is used to collect and save sensitive information that is later exfiltrated to the attacker.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

A new information-stealing malware called ZingoStealer has been discovered with powerful data-stealing features... From a data-stealing perspective, this is a potent malware targeting the following apps and data points...

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

ZingoStealer then begins the system enumeration and data collection process, starting by taking a screenshot of the victim's system and storing it as a PNG called "Screenshot.PNG"

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

DotNetZip creates an archive containing all the information, which is then exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Following the geolocation check, the malware requests a list of URLs that it uses to retrieve and execute additional malware payloads, at the discretion of the attacker.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

DotNetZip creates an archive containing all the information, which is then exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server.

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

In addition to the above, ZingoStealer also features the XMRig cryptocurrency mining malware to use the victim's computer for direct financial profit.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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palo alto networks unit 42 blogNews · Aug 10, 2026The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum’s Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and CommunicationsReferenced only as a possible behavioral comparison for some exfiltration activity; the article explicitly says it cannot fully attribute the activity to ZingoStealer.Read more ↗bleeping computerNews · Apr 14, 2022New ZingoStealer infostealer drops more malware, cryptominersAn information-stealing .NET malware promoted in Russian-speaking cybercrime channels that steals browser, wallet, and system data, exfiltrates it to an operator server, performs a CIS geolocation check, can retrieve and execute second-stage payloads, and can deploy XMRig to mine Monero.Read more ↗talosintelligence otherNews · Apr 14, 2022Threat Spotlight: "Haskers Gang" Introduces New ZingoStealerAn information stealer first seen in March 2022 that steals credentials, browser data, crypto wallet information, Discord/Telegram tokens, screenshots, and system information; exfiltrates data via attacker infrastructure and Telegram workflows; and also acts as a loader for secondary payloads including RedLine Stealer and XMRig-based mining malware.Read more ↗talosintelligence otherNews · Apr 14, 2022Threat Spotlight: "Haskers Gang" Introduces New ZingoStealerAn information stealer first seen in March 2022 that steals credentials, browser data, collaboration-platform tokens, cryptocurrency wallet data, screenshots, and system information, exfiltrates data via attacker infrastructure and Telegram workflows, and also downloads and executes secondary payloads.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.