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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 17 actorsExploits 1 CVE

IcedID

Also known asBokBot

IcedID, also known as BokBot, is a modular information-stealing malware and loader used in financially motivated intrusion chains and as a precursor to ransomware. It has been delivered through spearphishing and thread-hijacked email campaigns using Word and Excel documents with malicious macros, PDFs with malicious links, HTML smuggling chains, password-protected ZIP archives, ISO images, and LNK files that execute a malicious DLL. It has also been distributed by other malware and access brokers, including Emotet, TA551, Storm-0324, and BazarCall campaigns. Reported follow-on activity includes delivery of Cobalt Strike and use as an access vector before ransomware such as Nokoyawa, Maze, Egregor, and by groups using Royal and BlackSuit lockers.

Observed behavior includes use of SSL/TLS for C2 communications; execution of binaries via WMI; creation of scheduled tasks for persistence; embedding malicious functionality in a legitimate DLL; checking the active console country/language using "cmd.exe /c chcp >&2"; manipulation of the Keitaro Traffic Direction System to filter researcher and sandbox traffic; and built-in capability to extract and exfiltrate browser cookies. In one documented intrusion, IcedID was executed from an ISO/LNK chain via a renamed rundll32 binary, established hourly scheduled-task persistence, contacted trentonkaizerfak[.]com to retrieve a next stage, and communicated over 443 with 5.255.103[.]16 using pikchayola[.]pics and questdisar[.]com; the associated SSL certificate used subject and issuer CN=localhost with O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd.

IcedID has been associated with Wizard Spider activity, Storm-0324 distribution, TA551 delivery, Lockean access, and broader crimeware ecosystems. It has been observed targeting sectors including healthcare and has appeared prominently in 2022 botnet/C2 reporting.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2023-21716Microsoft Word RTF Heap Corruption Remote Code Execution

Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process ... CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption, CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability ...

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

17 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA579

Proofpoint has tracked a new malware loader called Bumblebee used by multiple crimeware threat actors previously observed delivering BazaLoader and IcedID.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
TA578

Proofpoint has tracked a new malware loader called Bumblebee used by multiple crimeware threat actors previously observed delivering BazaLoader and IcedID.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
WIZARD SPIDER

Most notable are the acquisitions of developers from Emotet, Qakbot, and IcedID, bringing them to the DEV-0193 umbrella.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
Storm-0324

Storm-0324 has distributed a range of first-stage payloads since at least 2016, including: ... IcedID, a modular information-stealing malware

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
Lockean

In at least one known instance, Lockean used the IcedID malware distribution service to get access to the network.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
TA551

Inside the ZIP was an ISO file... When the malicious DLL was executed, persistence was also established via a scheduled task on the beachhead host... Around three hours after execution of the initial IcedID malware, a cmd process was spawned from IcedID. This new process began beaconing to a Cobalt Strike server.

via dfir reportthedfirreport.com
TA544

IcedID is a malware originally classified as a banking trojan and was first observed in 2017. It also acts as a loader for other malware, including ransomware.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
TA577

IcedID is a malware originally classified as a banking trojan and was first observed in 2017. It also acts as a loader for other malware, including ransomware.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
TA581

IcedID is a malware originally classified as a banking trojan and was first observed in 2017. It also acts as a loader for other malware, including ransomware.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
Lunar Spider

Persistent infrastructure overlaps include SSL certificates with issuer fields "AU," "Some-State," and "Internet Widgits Pty Ltd," frequently linked to LUNAR SPIDER’s IcedID operations. Additionally, ASN 395092 (SHOCK-1) consistently hosts both IcedID and Latrodectus campaigns, indicating a shared resource pool across malware families.

via contagiodump blogcontagiodump.blogspot.com
TA571

Proofpoint researchers identified TA571 delivering the Forked variant of IcedID in two campaigns on 11 and 18 October 2023... The VBS script... ran an embedded IcedID Forked loader with regsvr32. The loader in turn downloaded the IcedID bot.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
Storm-0249

Microsoft attributes this campaign to Storm-0249... known for distributing, at minimum, BazaLoader, IcedID, Bumblebee, and Emotet malware.

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
TA542

Proofpoint researchers have observed and documented, for the first time, three distinct variants of the malware known as IcedID. Proofpoint calls the two new variants recently identified “Forked” and “Lite” IcedID.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
vacant_viper

“Vacant Viper is known to affiliate with TA571, for which the 404TDS delivered IcedID and other malware.”

via infoblox threat intel bloginfoblox.com
Gold Dupont

By allowing the macro inside the document, it will attempt to download the IcedID trojan... As a common IcedID approach it used steganography as a method to deliver the payload through a .png file... For persistence, IcedID creates a scheduled task to run hourly...

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
UNC2198

Since its discovery in 2017 as a banking trojan, ICEDID evolved into a pernicious point of entry for financially motivated actors to conduct intrusion operations.

via fireeyefireeye.com
UNC2420

Since its discovery in 2017 as a banking trojan, ICEDID evolved into a pernicious point of entry for financially motivated actors to conduct intrusion operations.

via fireeyefireeye.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Storm-0324 manages a malware distribution chain and has used exploit kit and email-based vectors to deliver malware payloads.

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Proofpoint researchers have observed Bumblebee being distributed in email campaigns by at least three tracked threat actors.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware being delivered through phishing or spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM, ISO, IMG, HTA, LNK, and executable files disguised as documents.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

A smaller subset of entries mention attachments or PDFs containing malicious links, such as 'Wizard Spider has used spearphishing attachments to deliver ... PDFs containing malicious links to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar' and 'XLoader has been delivered as a phishing attachment, including PDFs with embedded links.'

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2
TacticExecution

When the Excel macros are enabled, the BazarCall malware will be downloaded and executed on the victim's computer.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly mentions malicious macros in Word/Excel documents, such as "enable macros," "embedded macros," and "macro-enabled documents."

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4
TacticExecution

Examples include: "Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros..."; "Bumblebee has relied upon a user opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs"; "Lumma Stealer has gained initial execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives, and MSI files within RAR files."

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The content repeatedly references malicious shortcut files: e.g., "APT38 has used malicious Word documents and shortcut files," "Bumblebee... opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs," and "Mustang Panda distributed malicious LNK objects for user execution."

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

BUMBLEBEE has Rabbort.DLL embedded, using it for process injection... shi Injects task’s data into a new process... dij Injects task’s data into a new process.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The content repeatedly references malicious shortcut files: e.g., "APT38 has used malicious Word documents and shortcut files," "Bumblebee... opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs," and "Mustang Panda distributed malicious LNK objects for user execution."

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1
TacticStealth

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

BUMBLEBEE has Rabbort.DLL embedded, using it for process injection... shi Injects task’s data into a new process... dij Injects task’s data into a new process.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1
TacticStealth

These included copying rundll32 and a malicious DLL from within the ISO to the host, before executing the malware.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

A “pass-the-cookie” attack is a type of attack where an attacker can bypass authentication controls by compromising browser cookies... If an attacker can compromise a device and extract the browser cookies, they could pass that cookie into a separate web browser on another system, bypassing security checkpoints along the way.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Infostealers live in infected computers and gather information, allowing attackers to exploit organizations and obtain credentials.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get * /Format:List

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities... Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian... Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function... Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1550Use Alternate Authentication MaterialEvidence1

A “pass-the-cookie” attack is a type of attack where an attacker can bypass authentication controls by compromising browser cookies... “Pass-the-cookie” is like pass-the-hash or pass-the-ticket attacks in Active Directory.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Infostealers live in infected computers and gather information, allowing attackers to exploit organizations and obtain credentials.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Recorded Future tracks the creation and modification of new malicious infrastructure for a multitude of post-exploitation toolkits, custom malware, and open-source remote access trojans (RATs). We observed over 17,000 unique command-and-control (C2) servers during 2022...

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

BUMBLEBEE has been observed to download and execute different malicious payloads such as Cobalt Strike beacons... NCC Group’s RIFT has observed mostly Cobalt Strike and Meterpeter being sent as tasks. However, third parties have confirmed the drop of Sliver and Bokbot payloads.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

87 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
52 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
23 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
12 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching87

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution17

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping29

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.