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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors5 associated CVEs

Line Runner

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns5Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK38Techniques
IOCs61Tracked
Type
Webshell
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionExfiltrationPost exploitation
Platforms
Network device

Line Runner is a persistent Lua-based webshell targeting Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) devices through their WebVPN customization and plug-in functionality. It was identified during the 2024 ArcaneDoor espionage campaign associated with the state-sponsored threat actor UAT4356, also tracked as Storm-1849. The campaign targeted government and critical national infrastructure networks globally, predominantly affecting ASA55xx appliances.

Line Runner executes attacker-supplied Lua scripts delivered through HTTP or HTTPS GET requests to legitimate WebVPN and AnyConnect endpoints. Tasking requires a victim-specific authentication token, and randomized query parameter names impede broad scanning and detection. The webshell provides remote access without normal WebVPN authentication and uses HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged by the separate Line Dancer implant. The two implants have been observed together, but Line Runner can remain present independently.

Persistence exploits CVE-2024-20359 by abusing the WebVPN client-bundle installation mechanism. A malicious archive executes during appliance startup, while modified shutdown scripts restore the installer for subsequent boots. Defense-evasion measures include hiding malicious customization files from normal administrative listings, suppressing evidence of plug-in installation, deleting artifacts, restoring modified resources, and manipulating timestamps and ownership. The webshell can also remove itself when WebVPN customizations are imported or exported.

ArcaneDoor operators used CVE-2024-20353 to trigger appliance reloads and CVE-2024-20359 to establish persistent code execution after gaining access. The campaign's original initial-access vector was not established.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-20359via cert ssi alertsExploited in the wildPersistent Local Code Execution in Cisco ASA and FTDLa vulnérabilité CVE-2024-20359 permet à un utilisateur authentifié avec des droits administrateur d'exécuter du code arbitraire avec les privilèges root. | Once on the equipment, the attacker exploits the two vulnerabilities to install an implant named Line Runner by Talos, described as a persistent backdoor.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-20353via cert ssi alertsExploited in the wildWeb Services Denial of Service in Cisco ASA and FTDCisco indique que l'attaquant peut exploiter la vulnérabilité CVE-2024-20353 pour déclencher son redémarrage. | Once on the equipment, the attacker exploits the two vulnerabilities to install an implant named Line Runner by Talos, described as a persistent backdoor.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20333via esentire product advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthenticated Root Code Execution in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerOn September 25th, 2025, Cisco disclosed two zero-day vulnerabilities, CVE-2025-20333 (CVSS: 9.9) and CVE-2025-20362 (CVSS: 6.5), in Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software. The disclosure confirmed that the vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild; CVE-2025-20333 allows authenticated, remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable ASA and FTD instances.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-20358via mnemonic blogExploited in the wildBackup Restore Command Injection in Cisco ASA and FTDPatches to the three vulnerabilities - CVE-2024-20353 (CVSS 8.6), CVE-2024-20359 (CVSS 6.0) and CVE-2024-20358 (CVSS 6.0) - are included in the advisory... The blogpost from Talos outlines how two of the vulnerabilities were exploited to escalate privileges and to establish persistence.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20362via esentire product advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerThe disclosure confirmed that the vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild; CVE-2025-20362 enables remote attackers to access restricted URL endpoints without authentication.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ArcaneDoor

Cisco assessed with high confidence that the same operators were responsible for the April 2024 ArcaneDoor campaign, which deployed custom malware frameworks (e.g., Line Dancer and Line Runner) on ASA devices.

via hunter strategy blogblog.hunterstrategy.net
UAT-4356

Cisco Talos previously attributed this group to the ArcaneDoor campaign in 2024, where they exploited two Cisco ASA zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2024–20353, CVE-2024–20359) to deploy malware such as Line Dancer and Line Runner.

via osint team blogosintteam.blog
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

38 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

These affected products have been compromised by malicious actors who successfully established unauthorized access through WebVPN sessions, commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

The attackers successfully exploited these vulnerable devices to deploy malware, execute remote commands, and potentially exfiltrate data.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence5

Line Runner ... [can] run CLI commands without authentication.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

“Line Runner has the capability to run arbitrary Lua code sent via tasking.” / “interpreting and executing data it is sent via HTTP(S) GET parameters as a local Lua script.”

T1059.011LuaEvidence3

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) utilizes Lua scripts for command execution.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

In ArcaneDoor incidents, threat actors exploited CVE-2024-20353 and CVE-2024-20359 to deliver a previously unidentified webshell dubbed LINE RUNNER and an in-memory implant dubbed LINE DANCER.

Persistence

9 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence2

It modifies the /etc/init.d/unmountfs script to copy the malware ZIP file from a hidden location to disk0 during boot.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included configuration modification...

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

These affected products have been compromised by malicious actors who successfully established unauthorized access through WebVPN sessions, commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services.

T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

UAT4356 deployed two backdoors as components of this campaign, ‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer,’ which were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence8

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) is a persistent Lua-based web shell.(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

"maintain persistence... in the bootloader"; "they also infect the bootloader for persistence"

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

“Line Runner prepends code to several system files… /etc/init.d/umountfs… /asa/scripts/lina_exe_cs.sh…”

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence3

Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.

T1653Power SettingsEvidence4

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) used CVE-2024-20353 to trigger victim devices to reboot, in the process unzipping and installing the [Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) payload.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence2

It modifies the /etc/init.d/unmountfs script to copy the malware ZIP file from a hidden location to disk0 during boot.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

CVE-2024-20359 (CVSS: 6.0): Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance and Firepower Threat Defense Software Persistent Local Code Execution Vulnerability ... allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with root-level privileges

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

“Line Runner prepends code to several system files… /etc/init.d/umountfs… /asa/scripts/lina_exe_cs.sh…”

Stealth

8 techniques
T1006Direct Volume AccessEvidence1

“To write to this location it uses a directory traversal technique… ifs.dump(cbizipcontent, “disk0:/csco_config/../../../../../run/lock/subsys/krbkdc6”)”

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“The code for this line is obfuscated with base64 encoding.”

T1027.015CompressionEvidence3

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) uses a ZIP payload that is automatically extracted with its contents, a LUA script, executed for initial execution via CVE-2024-20359.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

...control the enabling and disabling of the devices’ syslog service to obfuscate additional commands...

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence8

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) removes its initial ZIP delivery archive after processing the enclosed LUA script.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

"maintain persistence... in the bootloader"; "they also infect the bootloader for persistence"

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

“when Line Runner is installed, no files or directories… are visible to an administrator.” / “disk0:/csco_config/ is not visible via a show or dir Cisco command due to having the hidden attribute set on the filesystem.”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

"The second stage payload is an in-memory resident piece of malware"

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included configuration modification...

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence3

Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Line Runner ... allow[s] attackers to disable syslog... 'Line Dancer' also manipulates crash dumps and authentication systems to hinder forensic analysis.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence7

Line Runner ... [can] create packet captures.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

"hook the authentication process... and they just write the passwords to clear text"; "can harvest credentials locally from the VPN appliance itself"

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence3

Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence5

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) intercepts HTTP requests to the victim Cisco ASA, looking for a request with a 32-character, victim dependent parameter. If that parameter matches a value in the malware, a contained payload is then written to a Lua script and executed.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The two threats have been used by threat actors to modify configurations, conduct reconnaissance, capture and exfiltrate network traffic, and perform lateral movement to other systems.

T1040Network SniffingEvidence7

Line Runner ... [can] create packet captures.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

UAT4356 deployed two backdoors, “Line Runner” and “Line Dancer,” to conduct malicious actions, including configuration modification, reconnaissance, network traffic capture/exfiltration, and potentially lateral movement.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

Exploitation of the vulnerabilities requires enabled SSL VPN, IPsec IKEv2 VPN with “client services”, or exposure of the HTTPS administration interface.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

These samples are commands that directed the devices to perform specific actions which resulted in the exfiltration of device configurations, configuration of network captures, and data exfiltration.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

"hook the authentication process... and they just write the passwords to clear text"; "can harvest credentials locally from the VPN appliance itself"

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers. Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2. Line Runner utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using Line Dancer.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

Úspešné zneužitie umožňuje útočníkom šíriť malvér a zbierať citlivé informácie v cieľovom prostredí.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence5

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) intercepts HTTP requests to the victim Cisco ASA, looking for a request with a 32-character, victim dependent parameter. If that parameter matches a value in the malware, a contained payload is then written to a Lua script and executed.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence7

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) utilizes an HTTP-based Lua backdoor on victim machines.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1102.003One-Way CommunicationEvidence2

HTTP C2 one-way backdoor.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Skupine UAT4356 sa podarilo nasadiť dva backdoory, „Line Runner“ a „Line Dancer“...

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence8

[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using [Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186).(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included... network traffic capture/exfiltration...

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence2

Access, gained via exploitation of these vulnerabilities and malware deployment, allowed threat actors to “generate text versions of the device’s configuration file so that it could be exfiltrated through web requests..."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

61 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

22 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching61Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities5CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping38Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.