Line Runner
- Type
- Webshell
- Capabilities
- PersistenceDefense evasionExfiltrationPost exploitation
- Platforms
- Network device
Line Runner is a persistent Lua-based webshell targeting Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) devices through their WebVPN customization and plug-in functionality. It was identified during the 2024 ArcaneDoor espionage campaign associated with the state-sponsored threat actor UAT4356, also tracked as Storm-1849. The campaign targeted government and critical national infrastructure networks globally, predominantly affecting ASA55xx appliances.
Line Runner executes attacker-supplied Lua scripts delivered through HTTP or HTTPS GET requests to legitimate WebVPN and AnyConnect endpoints. Tasking requires a victim-specific authentication token, and randomized query parameter names impede broad scanning and detection. The webshell provides remote access without normal WebVPN authentication and uses HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged by the separate Line Dancer implant. The two implants have been observed together, but Line Runner can remain present independently.
Persistence exploits CVE-2024-20359 by abusing the WebVPN client-bundle installation mechanism. A malicious archive executes during appliance startup, while modified shutdown scripts restore the installer for subsequent boots. Defense-evasion measures include hiding malicious customization files from normal administrative listings, suppressing evidence of plug-in installation, deleting artifacts, restoring modified resources, and manipulating timestamps and ownership. The webshell can also remove itself when WebVPN customizations are imported or exported.
ArcaneDoor operators used CVE-2024-20353 to trigger appliance reloads and CVE-2024-20359 to establish persistent code execution after gaining access. The campaign's original initial-access vector was not established.
Associated vulnerabilities
5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Cisco assessed with high confidence that the same operators were responsible for the April 2024 ArcaneDoor campaign, which deployed custom malware frameworks (e.g., Line Dancer and Line Runner) on ASA devices.
Cisco Talos previously attributed this group to the ArcaneDoor campaign in 2024, where they exploited two Cisco ASA zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2024–20353, CVE-2024–20359) to deploy malware such as Line Dancer and Line Runner.
Techniques & procedures
38 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
These affected products have been compromised by malicious actors who successfully established unauthorized access through WebVPN sessions, commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services.
The attackers successfully exploited these vulnerable devices to deploy malware, execute remote commands, and potentially exfiltrate data.
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
Line Runner ... [can] run CLI commands without authentication.
“Line Runner has the capability to run arbitrary Lua code sent via tasking.” / “interpreting and executing data it is sent via HTTP(S) GET parameters as a local Lua script.”
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) utilizes Lua scripts for command execution.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)
In ArcaneDoor incidents, threat actors exploited CVE-2024-20353 and CVE-2024-20359 to deliver a previously unidentified webshell dubbed LINE RUNNER and an in-memory implant dubbed LINE DANCER.
Persistence
9 techniques
Persistence
It modifies the /etc/init.d/unmountfs script to copy the malware ZIP file from a hidden location to disk0 during boot.
‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included configuration modification...
These affected products have been compromised by malicious actors who successfully established unauthorized access through WebVPN sessions, commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services.
UAT4356 deployed two backdoors as components of this campaign, ‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer,’ which were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target.
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) is a persistent Lua-based web shell.(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)
"maintain persistence... in the bootloader"; "they also infect the bootloader for persistence"
“Line Runner prepends code to several system files… /etc/init.d/umountfs… /asa/scripts/lina_exe_cs.sh…”
Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) used CVE-2024-20353 to trigger victim devices to reboot, in the process unzipping and installing the [Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) payload.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
It modifies the /etc/init.d/unmountfs script to copy the malware ZIP file from a hidden location to disk0 during boot.
CVE-2024-20359 (CVSS: 6.0): Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance and Firepower Threat Defense Software Persistent Local Code Execution Vulnerability ... allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with root-level privileges
“Line Runner prepends code to several system files… /etc/init.d/umountfs… /asa/scripts/lina_exe_cs.sh…”
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
“To write to this location it uses a directory traversal technique… ifs.dump(cbizipcontent, “disk0:/csco_config/../../../../../run/lock/subsys/krbkdc6”)”
“The code for this line is obfuscated with base64 encoding.”
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) uses a ZIP payload that is automatically extracted with its contents, a LUA script, executed for initial execution via CVE-2024-20359.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
...control the enabling and disabling of the devices’ syslog service to obfuscate additional commands...
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) removes its initial ZIP delivery archive after processing the enclosed LUA script.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
"maintain persistence... in the bootloader"; "they also infect the bootloader for persistence"
“when Line Runner is installed, no files or directories… are visible to an administrator.” / “disk0:/csco_config/ is not visible via a show or dir Cisco command due to having the hidden attribute set on the filesystem.”
"The second stage payload is an in-memory resident piece of malware"
Defense Impairment
3 techniques
Defense Impairment
‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included configuration modification...
Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.
Line Runner ... allow[s] attackers to disable syslog... 'Line Dancer' also manipulates crash dumps and authentication systems to hinder forensic analysis.
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
Line Runner ... [can] create packet captures.
"hook the authentication process... and they just write the passwords to clear text"; "can harvest credentials locally from the VPN appliance itself"
Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) intercepts HTTP requests to the victim Cisco ASA, looking for a request with a 32-character, victim dependent parameter. If that parameter matches a value in the malware, a contained payload is then written to a Lua script and executed.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
The two threats have been used by threat actors to modify configurations, conduct reconnaissance, capture and exfiltrate network traffic, and perform lateral movement to other systems.
Line Runner ... [can] create packet captures.
UAT4356 deployed two backdoors, “Line Runner” and “Line Dancer,” to conduct malicious actions, including configuration modification, reconnaissance, network traffic capture/exfiltration, and potentially lateral movement.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Exploitation of the vulnerabilities requires enabled SSL VPN, IPsec IKEv2 VPN with “client services”, or exposure of the HTTPS administration interface.
Collection
5 techniques
Collection
These samples are commands that directed the devices to perform specific actions which resulted in the exfiltration of device configurations, configuration of network captures, and data exfiltration.
"hook the authentication process... and they just write the passwords to clear text"; "can harvest credentials locally from the VPN appliance itself"
Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers. Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2. Line Runner utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using Line Dancer.
Úspešné zneužitie umožňuje útočníkom šíriť malvér a zbierať citlivé informácie v cieľovom prostredí.
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) intercepts HTTP requests to the victim Cisco ASA, looking for a request with a 32-character, victim dependent parameter. If that parameter matches a value in the malware, a contained payload is then written to a Lua script and executed.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) utilizes an HTTP-based Lua backdoor on victim machines.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)
HTTP C2 one-way backdoor.
Skupine UAT4356 sa podarilo nasadiť dva backdoory, „Line Runner“ a „Line Dancer“...
Exfiltration
3 techniques
Exfiltration
[Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using [Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186).(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included... network traffic capture/exfiltration...
Access, gained via exploitation of these vulnerabilities and malware deployment, allowed threat actors to “generate text versions of the device’s configuration file so that it could be exfiltrated through web requests..."
Observables
61 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
22 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.