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MalwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

ROKRAT

RokRAT is a remote access trojan/backdoor associated with the North Korea-linked threat group APT37, also known as ScarCruft, RedEyes, Reaper, and TA-RedAnt. The content describes it as a malicious tool used by APT37/ScarCruft and notes it is used exclusively by North Korean hacking groups. RokRAT has been delivered through spearphishing emails with malicious Hangul Office (HWP) or Microsoft Word documents, malicious LNK shortcut files, and trojanized software in social-engineering campaigns, including a trojanized Wondershare PDFelement installer. It was also delivered in a supply-chain compromise of the sqgame Windows client via a trojanized mono.dll/downloader chain, where a malicious Windows update fetched shellcode containing RokRAT and then deployed the BirdCall backdoor.

Capabilities directly described in the content include collecting user credentials, downloading additional malware, stealing credentials stored in web browsers by querying SQLite databases, sending collected files back over its command-and-control channel, and fingerprinting hosts by reading the HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\mssmbios\Data\SMBiosData registry key to obtain the system manufacturer. RokRAT can inject into processes: APT37 was observed injecting RokRAT into cmd.exe, and the malware can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode in Notepad.exe. The content also states RokRAT can send collected data to cloud storage services such as pCloud and use the same C2 channel for exfiltration.

A notable characteristic is its abuse of legitimate web and cloud platforms for command and control. Reported C2 services include Twitter, Yandex, Dropbox, Mediafire, pCloud, and Zoho WorkDrive; one report also states RokRAT used legitimate social networking sites and cloud platforms for C2 communications. In one LNK-based campaign documented by ASEC, final-stage PowerShell downloaded encoded payload data from OneDrive, decoded it, and injected RokRAT into the PowerShell process; the malware then sent collected information to attacker-controlled cloud services such as pCloud and Yandex while disguising its User-Agent as Googlebot. Reported campaign artifacts and IoCs in the content include malicious LNK filenames such as 230407Infosheet.lnk, April 29th 2023 Seminar.lnk, 2023 Personal Evaluation.hwp.lnk, NK Diplomat Dispatch Selection and Diplomatic Offices.lnk, and NK Diplomacy Policy Decision Process.lnk; MD5 hashes 0f5eeb23d701a2b342fc15aa90d97ae0, 461ce7d6c6062d1ae33895d1f44d98fb, 657fd7317ccde5a0e0c182a626951a9f, 8e5cac0159a31ea808973508ce164e1d, and aa8ba9a029fa98b868be66b7d46e927b; OneDrive-related 1drv.ms and api.onedrive.com URLs; and a bearer token shown in file transmission: Authorization: Bearer RSbj7Zk5IYK5ThSbQZH4YBo7ZxiPOCH94RBbFuU9c04XXVJg7xbvX.

The malware is tied to espionage activity primarily affecting Windows systems, with campaigns targeting South Korean-related interests and, in the sqgame supply-chain case, ethnic Koreans in China’s Yanbian region, including individuals of interest to the North Korean regime such as refugees and defectors. The content also describes BirdCall as an advanced evolution of RokRAT and notes CloudMensis as spyware based on RokRAT targeting Windows and macOS systems.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2024-38178RCE in Microsoft Windows Scripting Engine (Edge IE Mode)Exploited in the wild

Once the vulnerability was exploited, a multi-stage malware chain was deployed, culminating in the execution of a variant of RokRAT, a known malicious tool used by TA-RedAnt. | The group leveraged a previously unknown vulnerability (CVE-2024-38178) in IE’s legacy Chakra engine (jscript9.dll). Delivered via seemingly innocuous toast ads—pop-up windows displayed in free software—the attack exploited the vulnerability to execute remote commands.

via security online infosecurityonline.info
CVE-2022-41128Windows JScript9 Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

Vulnerability Exploited CVE-2022-41128 (Internet Explorer Vulnerability) Malware and Tools RokRAT

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT37

Once the vulnerability was exploited, a multi-stage malware chain was deployed, culminating in the execution of a variant of RokRAT, a known malicious tool used by TA-RedAnt.

via security online infosecurityonline.info
TA-RedAnt

Once the vulnerability was exploited, a multi-stage malware chain was deployed, culminating in the execution of a variant of RokRAT, a known malicious tool used by TA-RedAnt.

via security online infosecurityonline.info
RedEyes

ASEC confirmed that the RedEyes threat group (also known as APT37, ScarCruft) has also recently distributed the RokRAT malware through LNK files. RokRAT is malware that is capable of collecting user credentials and downloading additional malware.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The IE vulnerability was exploited through a program that displays toast ads… Hackers infiltrated a server for a domestic ad agency and injected a malicious iframe into the HTML code delivered to the toast ad program.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

ScarCruft Indicators of Compromise A rigged game: ScarCruft compromises gaming platform in a supply-chain attack

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

Trojanized game with Android BirdCall version 2.0.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

RokRAT was once distributed through HWP and Word files.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware being delivered through phishing or spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM, ISO, IMG, HTA, LNK, and executable files disguised as documents.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The LNK files that were discovered this time contain PowerShell commands that can perform malicious behavior by creating and executing a script file along with a normal file in the temp folder.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The PowerShell command that is executed through cmd.exe upon executing the LNK file is as follows: /c powershell -windowstyle hidden ...

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

The group leveraged a previously unknown vulnerability (CVE-2024-38178) in IE’s legacy Chakra engine (jscript9.dll). Delivered via seemingly innocuous toast ads—pop-up windows displayed in free software—the attack exploited the vulnerability to execute remote commands.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2
TacticExecution

RedEyes threat group ... has also recently distributed the RokRAT malware through LNK files.

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

First-Stage Malware: Injected into explorer.exe, designed to evade analysis.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe. Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe. Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread. Woody RAT can inject code into a targeted process by writing to the remote memory of an infected system and then create a remote thread.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

The UserAgent in the request header is disguised as Googlebot.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

First-Stage Malware: Injected into explorer.exe, designed to evade analysis.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe. Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe. Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread. Woody RAT can inject code into a targeted process by writing to the remote memory of an infected system and then create a remote thread.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1
TacticStealth

/c powershell -windowstyle hidden

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

RokRAT is malware that is capable of collecting user credentials and downloading additional malware.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

Second-Stage Malware: Collecting system information and relaying it to a staging server.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

BADNEWS crawls the victim's local drives and collects documents with selected extensions; Machete searches the file system for files of interest; Rover searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

BoomBox can encrypt data using AES prior to exfiltration. ROKRAT can encrypt data prior to exfiltration by using an RSA public key. Trojan.Karagany can base64 encode and AES-128-CBC encrypt data prior to transmission.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

RokRAT: Leveraging cloud services for command and control, exfiltrating sensitive data, and executing commands. AhnLab’s analysis revealed, “The malware was configured to use Yandex Cloud by default, but it also includes functionality to communicate with other cloud services on command”

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

The adversaries had communicated to both Dropbox and Pastebin. APT28 has used Google Drive for C2. APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The final PowerShell command that is executed downloads the encoded data from hxxps://api.onedrive[.]com/... decodes it, and injects it into the PowerShell process to perform malicious behavior.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

RokRAT: Leveraging cloud services for command and control, exfiltrating sensitive data, and executing commands.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The collected information is sent to the threat actor’s cloud server using cloud services such as pcloud and yandex.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

Akira will exfiltrate victim data using applications such as Rclone. APT41 DUST exfiltrated collected information to OneDrive. BoomBox can upload data to dedicated per-victim folders in Dropbox. During C0015, the threat actors exfiltrated files and sensitive data to the MEGA cloud storage site using the Rclone command.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

27 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
15 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
7 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
5 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

119 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching27

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping35

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.