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North Korea🇰🇵 KP28 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

APT37

Also known asAPT37Group123InkySquidReaperRicochet ChollimaScarCruftTEMP.Reaper

APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored espionage threat actor, also referred to in the provided content as ScarCruft, Reaper, Ricochet Chollima, InkySquid, Group123, Red Eyes, and Erebus. The content links the group to North Korean interests and notes reporting that associates it with the Reconnaissance General Bureau. ScarCruft/APT37 has operated since at least 2012 and primarily targets South Korea, while also targeting other Asian entities and individuals of interest to the North Korean regime. Reported targets in the provided content include government and military organizations, companies linked to North Korean interests, diplomatic and North Korean human rights organizations and people, journalists specializing in DPRK reporting, a South Korean online newspaper focused on North Korea, and users of a gaming platform serving the Yanbian region in China, likely to collect intelligence on refugees and defectors. The group uses spearphishing and watering-hole tradecraft. The content states APT37 delivers malware via spearphishing emails with malicious HWP attachments, and one campaign targeting journalists used phishing emails sent from a previously compromised account belonging to a former South Korean National Intelligence Service director. That campaign delivered ZIP archives containing oversized LNK files disguised as documents, which launched PowerShell scripts, displayed a decoy document, and retrieved shellcode from Microsoft OneDrive. The content also describes a watering-hole attack against a South Korean newspaper using an Internet Explorer exploit, shellcode, BLUELIGHT, and then the Dolphin backdoor on selected victims. Another reported campaign used malicious Hangul Word Processor EPS content exploiting CVE-2017-8291 and steganography to deploy M2RAT from a JPEG image. Separate reporting in the content notes attacks using Flash zero-days CVE-2016-4171 and CVE-2018-4878. The provided content attributes multiple malware families and tools to APT37/ScarCruft, including Goldbackdoor, BLUELIGHT, Dolphin, M2RAT, Freenki, ROKRAT, BirdCall, and the browser credential stealer ZUMKONG. Goldbackdoor is described as a successor to Bluelight and supports remote command execution, keylogging, file operations, self-uninstallation, and exfiltration through Google Drive and Microsoft OneDrive, using embedded API keys to authenticate to Azure for command retrieval. Dolphin is described as a Windows C++ backdoor used as a selective second-stage payload that communicates with Google Drive for command-and-control and exfiltration. It can collect host profiling data, search fixed drives, removable drives, and portable devices such as smartphones, steal browser passwords and cookies from Chrome, Edge, and Internet Explorer, log keystrokes, capture screenshots, execute shell commands, and receive shellcode for execution. Earlier Dolphin versions could also modify signed-in Google and Gmail account settings to enable IMAP and less secure app access. M2RAT is described as an evasive RAT supporting keylogging, screenshots, command execution, theft of files from Windows systems and connected portable devices, password-protected RAR staging, and shared-memory-based command-and-control and exfiltration to reduce forensic traces. Freenki is noted as listing running processes via the Windows API. The group is also reported to use a Bluetooth device harvester based on Windows Bluetooth APIs. Observed techniques in the content include use of social networking and cloud platforms for command-and-control, specifically AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, Box, Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive, and Azure-backed services; persistence via HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry keys and scheduled tasks; command-line execution; Ruby scripts to execute payloads; process injection, including reported injection of ROKRAT into cmd.exe and M2RAT into explorer.exe; string and payload obfuscation; collection of data from victims' local systems; collection of computer name, BIOS model, execution path, usernames, local and external IP addresses, OS version, RAM details, installed security products, and debugger or inspection-tool checks; browser credential theft; keylogging; screenshot capture; and exfiltration of staged data, including encrypted ZIP archives. Recent activity in the provided content includes ESET reporting that ScarCruft compromised a gaming platform in a supply-chain attack affecting the Yanbian region in China, with associated Android BirdCall samples, a trojanized Mono library, a downloader leading to RokRAT, and Windows BirdCall-related malware. The content also states that APT37 was discovered targeting journalists specializing in the DPRK with the Goldbackdoor malware strain.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Consumer Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇨🇳 China

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • KP
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

11 of 15 tactics64 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
2 techniques
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1598
Phishing for Information
TA0001
Initial Access
4 techniques
T1133
External Remote Services
T1189×2
Drive-by Compromise
T1195
Supply Chain Compromise
T1195.002
Compromise Software Supply Chain
T1566×4
Phishing
T1566.001×2
Spearphishing Attachment
TA0002
Execution
6 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2
Scheduled Task
T1059×3
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×4
PowerShell
T1059.003×4
Windows Command Shell
T1059.008
Network Device CLI
T1106
Native API
T1129
Shared Modules
T1203×3
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204×2
User Execution
T1204.002×4
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2
Scheduled Task
T1133
External Remote Services
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×6
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2
Scheduled Task
T1055×7
Process Injection
T1055.001
Dynamic-link Library Injection
T1055.003
Thread Execution Hijacking
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×6
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
4 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.003
Steganography
T1036×3
Masquerading
T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1055×7
Process Injection
T1055.001
Dynamic-link Library Injection
T1055.003
Thread Execution Hijacking
T1564
Hide Artifacts
T1564.003
Hidden Window
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×3
Keylogging
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0007
Discovery
4 techniques
T1033×2
System Owner/User Discovery
T1082×3
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1120
Peripheral Device Discovery
TA0009
Collection
7 techniques
T1005×4
Data from Local System
T1025×2
Data from Removable Media
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×3
Keylogging
T1074
Data Staged
T1074.001
Local Data Staging
T1113×3
Screen Capture
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
T1560×2
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1071×4
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2
Web Protocols
T1102×2
Web Service
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1041×2
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002×2
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
IOCS

Observables

66 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping47

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal28

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs13

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables66

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.