Ghost RAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
Gh0st RAT is a long-running Windows remote access trojan associated with Chinese-language threat activity and historically linked to the GhostNet espionage campaign. Public reporting places its origins around 2008 and ties its development lineage to the C. Rufus Security Team. Over time, both original builds and source-derived variants have appeared across multiple China-nexus intrusion sets, including activity overlapping with APT27-related reporting and later campaigns targeting Tibetan communities and organizations in Asia.
Gh0st RAT provides full remote-control functionality typical of a mature RAT and is used as a backdoor for sustained post-compromise access. Reported variants support arbitrary command execution, persistence, and command-and-control over custom network protocols; some newer samples also use multi-stage loading, dynamic API resolution, and domain-generation-based command-and-control to complicate detection and tracking. In observed intrusions, operators have deployed Gh0st RAT after establishing an initial foothold through exposed web applications and web shells, then used it to maintain access and continue follow-on operations.
Recent reporting describes Gh0st RAT variants being installed after compromise of internet-exposed phpMyAdmin instances, where attackers abused database log poisoning to write a web shell, managed the host with AntSword, deployed the Nezha monitoring agent for staging and control, disabled Microsoft Defender protections, and then installed the RAT with service-based persistence. Victimology in that campaign was concentrated in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, with broader spread elsewhere. Gh0st RAT and closely related source-derived backdoors have also been observed in broader Chinese cyber-espionage operations against diplomatic, political, and regional targets.
Gh0st RAT remains notable less as a single static family than as an enduring codebase and operational pattern reused, modified, and repurposed by multiple actors for espionage-oriented remote access on Windows systems.
Associated threat actors
7 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant Ghost RAT APT27
Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant Ghost RAT APT27
Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant Ghost RAT APT27
“...deploying backdoors that very likely borrowed source code from Ghost RAT, a Trojan developed by Chinese threat actor C. Rufus Security Team. Ghost RAT appears to date to 2008...”
“...deploying backdoors that very likely borrowed source code from Ghost RAT, a Trojan developed by Chinese threat actor C. Rufus Security Team. Ghost RAT appears to date to 2008...”
"SilverFox activity: Antiy says the SilverFox (YouSnake) group infected over 17,000 users with the Ghost RAT..."
+1 more in the app. View in Mallory
Techniques & procedures
11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
This report focuses on the URLs embedded in emails that bypassed email security controls like secure email gateways (SEGs) to deliver malware.
Infection URLs are embedded in emails and represent the first action that a victim must take to become infected.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
After installing the Nezha agent, it was used to run an interactive PowerShell so that Windows Defender exclusions could be created before deploying and running another executable called x.exe.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Everything in the red boxes show the creation of a persistence mechanism using a service named “SQLlite,” with a similarly misspelled binary placed in the System32 directory.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Everything in the red boxes show the creation of a persistence mechanism using a service named “SQLlite,” with a similarly misspelled binary placed in the System32 directory.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
All WinApi functions are resolved dynamically using GetProcAddress and are stored into a large function table which is trivially reassembled.
SQLlite.exe is actually a renamed rundll32.exe executable dropped by the malware used to load a MainThread exported function of 32138546.dll.
Upon execution, x.exe creates a mutex named gd.bj2[.]xyz:53762:SQLlite, which corresponds to the domain, port, and service name used by the malware.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
powershell.exe executed Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\WINDOWS' to disable Windows Defender scanning the Windows folder.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
Each of these POST requests represents the attacker’s C2 server sending instructions to the compromised web server via the deployed web shell.
The threat actor proceeded to download a secondary payload, an executable named live.exe, and an accompanying config.yml from a website built on Cloudflare pages: rism.pages[.]dev.
HIDDEN COBRA – North Korean Remote Administration Tool: FALLCHILL
Observables
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.