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Malware7 associated actors

Ghost RAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors7Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

Gh0st RAT is a long-running Windows remote access trojan associated with Chinese-language threat activity and historically linked to the GhostNet espionage campaign. Public reporting places its origins around 2008 and ties its development lineage to the C. Rufus Security Team. Over time, both original builds and source-derived variants have appeared across multiple China-nexus intrusion sets, including activity overlapping with APT27-related reporting and later campaigns targeting Tibetan communities and organizations in Asia.

Gh0st RAT provides full remote-control functionality typical of a mature RAT and is used as a backdoor for sustained post-compromise access. Reported variants support arbitrary command execution, persistence, and command-and-control over custom network protocols; some newer samples also use multi-stage loading, dynamic API resolution, and domain-generation-based command-and-control to complicate detection and tracking. In observed intrusions, operators have deployed Gh0st RAT after establishing an initial foothold through exposed web applications and web shells, then used it to maintain access and continue follow-on operations.

Recent reporting describes Gh0st RAT variants being installed after compromise of internet-exposed phpMyAdmin instances, where attackers abused database log poisoning to write a web shell, managed the host with AntSword, deployed the Nezha monitoring agent for staging and control, disabled Microsoft Defender protections, and then installed the RAT with service-based persistence. Victimology in that campaign was concentrated in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, with broader spread elsewhere. Gh0st RAT and closely related source-derived backdoors have also been observed in broader Chinese cyber-espionage operations against diplomatic, political, and regional targets.

Gh0st RAT remains notable less as a single static family than as an enduring codebase and operational pattern reused, modified, and repurposed by multiple actors for espionage-oriented remote access on Windows systems.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

7 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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apt24

Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant Ghost RAT APT27

Threat Group-3390

Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant Ghost RAT APT27

APT18

Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant Ghost RAT APT27

Phantom Taurus

“...deploying backdoors that very likely borrowed source code from Ghost RAT, a Trojan developed by Chinese threat actor C. Rufus Security Team. Ghost RAT appears to date to 2008...”

via bank info securitybankinfosecurity.com
C. Rufus Security Team

“...deploying backdoors that very likely borrowed source code from Ghost RAT, a Trojan developed by Chinese threat actor C. Rufus Security Team. Ghost RAT appears to date to 2008...”

via bank info securitybankinfosecurity.com
YouSnake

"SilverFox activity: Antiy says the SilverFox (YouSnake) group infected over 17,000 users with the Ghost RAT..."

via risky biz rssnews.risky.biz

+1 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

This report focuses on the URLs embedded in emails that bypassed email security controls like secure email gateways (SEGs) to deliver malware.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Infection URLs are embedded in emails and represent the first action that a victim must take to become infected.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

After installing the Nezha agent, it was used to run an interactive PowerShell so that Windows Defender exclusions could be created before deploying and running another executable called x.exe.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Everything in the red boxes show the creation of a persistence mechanism using a service named “SQLlite,” with a similarly misspelled binary placed in the System32 directory.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Everything in the red boxes show the creation of a persistence mechanism using a service named “SQLlite,” with a similarly misspelled binary placed in the System32 directory.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

All WinApi functions are resolved dynamically using GetProcAddress and are stored into a large function table which is trivially reassembled.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

SQLlite.exe is actually a renamed rundll32.exe executable dropped by the malware used to load a MainThread exported function of 32138546.dll.

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

Upon execution, x.exe creates a mutex named gd.bj2[.]xyz:53762:SQLlite, which corresponds to the domain, port, and service name used by the malware.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

powershell.exe executed Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\WINDOWS' to disable Windows Defender scanning the Windows folder.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Each of these POST requests represents the attacker’s C2 server sending instructions to the compromised web server via the deployed web shell.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The threat actor proceeded to download a secondary payload, an executable named live.exe, and an accompanying config.yml from a website built on Cloudflare pages: rism.pages[.]dev.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

HIDDEN COBRA – North Korean Remote Administration Tool: FALLCHILL

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors7Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.