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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

Phoenix

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK57Techniques
IOCs96Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injectionCrypto theft
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

Phoenix Keylogger is a Windows information stealer written in VB.NET that emerged in July 2019 and is sold through a malware-as-a-service model. Marketed in underground communities by an actor using the handle Illusion, it combines keystroke logging with credential theft, clipboard collection, screenshot capture, and the ability to download additional malware. It steals sensitive data from numerous web browsers, email clients, FTP clients, and chat clients. Observed payloads have also collected cryptocurrency wallet data and MetaMask information.

Phoenix profiles compromised systems by collecting operating-system, hardware, user, and running-process information. It supports exfiltration through SMTP, FTP, and Telegram using preconfigured collection and transmission settings rather than a conventional interactive command-and-control model. Its defense-evasion features include encrypted strings, obfuscation, anti-debugging and anti-virtualization checks, attempts to disable Windows Defender, and a module that attempts to terminate processes associated with more than 80 security and analysis tools. Most analyzed samples did not establish persistence.

Common delivery mechanisms include phishing and malicious spam carrying weaponized RTF or Microsoft Office documents that exploit CVE-2017-11882. Phoenix has also been distributed by PrivateLoader and through Telegram lures impersonating a tool for conducting DDoS attacks against Russian targets. In the latter campaign, a packed dropper injected the Phoenix payload into a legitimate .NET Framework process. Victims have been observed across North America, Europe, and the Middle East.

This information-stealing family is distinct from other threats sharing the Phoenix name, including an Evil Corp ransomware brand, an exploit kit, Android malware, and a backdoor associated with MuddyWater.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-11882via cybereason blogExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorThe majority of Phoenix infections we observe originate from phishing attempts that leverage a weaponized rich text file (RTF) or Microsoft Office document. These deliveries do not use the more popular malicious macro technique, but instead use known exploits. Most commonly, they exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). | Cybereason’s Nocturnus team is tracking a new keylogger gaining traction among cybercriminals called Phoenix. The keylogger first emerged in July 2019 packed with a myriad of information-stealing features.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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INDRIK SPIDER

Some of the ransomware names used are WastedLocker, Hades, and Phoenix.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MuddyWater

MuddyWater ... pour diffuser des malwares comme « Phoenix, FakeUpdate, StealthCache et Chromium_Stealer ».

via macert product advisoriesdgssi.gov.ma
Turla

“It also started using a new framework that we call Phoenix...”

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

57 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

2 techniques
T1589Gather Victim Identity InformationEvidence1

Victims are first prompted to enter their phone number to check reward status or update delivery details. After submission, they are taken through a series of pages that collect full credit card details, shipping addresses, and personally identifiable information.

T1590Gather Victim Network InformationEvidence1

When a victim clicks the link inside the SMS, the phishing page first checks the visitor’s IP address and device type. Only users from the targeted country and on approved devices can see the fraudulent page.

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

Seedworm carried out a sophisticated spear-phishing attack that used a compromised mailbox to distribute a custom backdoor known as Phoenix

T1586Compromise AccountsEvidence1

Seedworm carried out a sophisticated spear-phishing attack that used a compromised mailbox to distribute a custom backdoor known as Phoenix.

T1586.002Email AccountsEvidence1

“used a compromised mailbox to distribute a custom backdoor known as Phoenix…”

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Phoenix’s various tasks like infostealing, downloading additional malware, and spreading via USB are predefined by the operators in the configuration file before compilation.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

Dmitry “Paunch” Fedotov used his Blackhole exploit kit to spread multiple forms of malware internationally... The exploit kits Blackhole, Phoenix, and Nuclear have all come and gone, championed today by Rig, Magnitude, and Grandsoft.

T1566PhishingEvidence4

Example: Implement Device Compliance policies to limit access to only compliant devices; this tactic disrupts Adversary-in-the-Middle phishing

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence7

The majority of Phoenix infections we observe originate from phishing attempts that leverage a weaponized rich text file (RTF) or Microsoft Office document.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Phoenix has a set of features to disable different Windows tools within the admin panel, like disabling CMD, the registry, task manager, system restore, and others.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Group-IB said samples of MuddyWater malicious documents obtained from VirusTotal feature decoy content and embedded VBA macros designed to install the Phoenix backdoor.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The page it displays is loaded as a WebView, whose HTML content is base64 decoded from a hard-coded resource string... webView0.addJavascriptInterface(new WebAppInterface(this, this), this.consts.string_1);

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

These deliveries do not use the more popular malicious macro technique, but instead use known exploits. Most commonly, they exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882).

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

des documents infectés

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

DroidLysis says the sample isn’t packed, but it uses DexClassLoader and ClassLoader. This usually happens when a remote DEX is downloaded and installed... Indeed, a remote DEX will be downloaded, installed and dynamically run on the victim’s phone.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Phoenix attempts to disable the Windows Defender AntiSpyware module by changing the following registry key.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Groups such as Seedworm have used custom backdoors—such as the Phoenix malware—to maintain long-term access even after initial vulnerabilities are patched. These tools are designed for persistent espionage, allowing attackers to return to compromised environments months or even years later.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

The malware poses as a Google Calendar application and asks the user to enable Accessibility for it... The sample uses the Accessibility API... AccessActivity requests access to the Accessibility API.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

It starts a SMS receiver (smsreceiver) which will log incoming SMS, and a boot receiver (BootReceiverService)...

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

In this case, the regsvcs.exe is not used as a living off the land binary (LoLBin). It is injected with the malicious code, which consists of the Phoenix information stealer.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

«PTE-атака — T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation): модификация записи таблицы страниц даёт полный контроль над адресным пространством»; «sudo bypass — эскалация привилегий».

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Groups such as Seedworm have used custom backdoors—such as the Phoenix malware—to maintain long-term access even after initial vulnerabilities are patched. These tools are designed for persistent espionage, allowing attackers to return to compromised environments months or even years later.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

The malware poses as a Google Calendar application and asks the user to enable Accessibility for it... The sample uses the Accessibility API... AccessActivity requests access to the Accessibility API.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

It starts a SMS receiver (smsreceiver) which will log incoming SMS, and a boot receiver (BootReceiverService)...

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

String Encryption: Most critical strings used by the malware are encrypted and only decrypted in memory. Obfuscation: The stub is obfuscated by what appears to be an implementation of the open source ConfuserEx .NET obfuscator...

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Illusion recommends using an additional third-party crypter to “make it FUD”, or fully undetectable. It is worth noting that most Phoenix samples caught in the wild are packed with a crypter...

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The victim’s data is encrypted with RC4 (key is podEID53t29v) + RC4.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The campaign is based on a dropper disguised as the Disbalancer.exe tool.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

In this case, the regsvcs.exe is not used as a living off the land binary (LoLBin). It is injected with the malicious code, which consists of the Phoenix information stealer.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Phoenix performs the checks and terminates itself if it discovers any of the following processes or files in the target machine.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Most critical strings used by the malware are encrypted and only decrypted in memory.

T1218.001Compiled HTML FileEvidence1

MSBuild is normally used to compile and execute coding projects; it can be passed project files or XML files containing scripts on the command line... Since the file is a trusted Microsoft binary, it can be packed into a dropper to mask the malicious nature of the malware.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

After obtaining basic system information, Phoenix checks to see if it is running in a “hostile” environment... if Phoenix is deployed in a virtual machine, debugger, or on a machine with analysis tools or antivirus products installed.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

When a victim clicks the link inside the SMS, the phishing page first checks the visitor’s IP address and device type. Only users from the targeted country and on approved devices can see the fraudulent page. Everyone else is silently redirected to an error page or a default system redirect, effectively hiding the infrastructure from security researchers.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

DroidLysis says the sample isn’t packed, but it uses DexClassLoader and ClassLoader. This usually happens when a remote DEX is downloaded and installed... Indeed, a remote DEX will be downloaded, installed and dynamically run on the victim’s phone.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

A hostile environment can take different forms: if Phoenix is deployed in a virtual machine, debugger, or on a machine with analysis tools or antivirus products installed.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Phoenix attempts to disable the Windows Defender AntiSpyware module by changing the following registry key.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Phoenix has several defensive and evasive mechanisms to avoid analysis and detection, including an Anti-AV module that tries to kill the processes of over 80 different security products and analysis tools.

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

For example, this is how the malware steals the phone’s unlock gesture: ... json.put("type", "unlock"); json.put("text", Access.this.gestureTexts.toString()); json.put("gesture", Access.this.currenGestureRecroding.toString());

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Phoenix uses a common method of hooking keyboard events for its keylogging. It uses a Windows API function SetWindowsHookExA to map the pressed keys, then matches them to the corresponding process.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Attackers are increasingly turning to stealing the “cookies” associated with credentials to clone active or recent web sessions—bypassing MFA in the process.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

Phoenix attempts to steal credentials and other sensitive information stored locally on the target machine by searching for specific files or registry keys that contain sensitive information.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Phoenix attempts to steal credentials and other sensitive information stored locally on the target machine by searching for specific files or registry keys that contain sensitive information. It searches browsers, mail clients, FTP clients, and chat clients.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Phoenix attempts to steal credentials and other sensitive information stored locally on the target machine by searching for specific files or registry keys that contain sensitive information. It searches browsers...

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

This is an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing service that relays or proxies credentials from the user to a target service.

Discovery

9 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

Phoenix attempts to steal credentials and other sensitive information stored locally on the target machine by searching for specific files or registry keys that contain sensitive information.

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Phoenix checks for Internet connectivity and obtains the external IP address of the target machine by sending a GET HTTP request to ifconfig.me...

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Once Phoenix successfully infects the target machine, it profiles the machine to gather information on the operating system, hardware, running processes, users, and its external IP.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Once Phoenix successfully infects the target machine, it profiles the machine to gather information on the operating system, hardware, running processes, users, and its external IP.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Once Phoenix successfully infects the target machine, it profiles the machine to gather information on the operating system, hardware, running processes, users, and its external IP.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Phoenix performs the checks and terminates itself if it discovers any of the following processes or files in the target machine.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

After obtaining basic system information, Phoenix checks to see if it is running in a “hostile” environment... if Phoenix is deployed in a virtual machine, debugger, or on a machine with analysis tools or antivirus products installed.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

When a victim clicks the link inside the SMS, the phishing page first checks the visitor’s IP address and device type. Only users from the targeted country and on approved devices can see the fraudulent page. Everyone else is silently redirected to an error page or a default system redirect, effectively hiding the infrastructure from security researchers.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

A hostile environment can take different forms: if Phoenix is deployed in a virtual machine, debugger, or on a machine with analysis tools or antivirus products installed.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

“PDQ remote access tool… used for remote access and persistence… Use of the remote desktop tools AnyDesk and ScreenConnect”

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Phoenix’s various tasks like infostealing, downloading additional malware, and spreading via USB are predefined by the operators in the configuration file before compilation.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Phoenix stores the information in memory and sends it back to the attackers directly, without writing it to disk.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

For example, this is how the malware steals the phone’s unlock gesture: ... json.put("type", "unlock"); json.put("text", Access.this.gestureTexts.toString()); json.put("gesture", Access.this.currenGestureRecroding.toString());

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Phoenix uses a common method of hooking keyboard events for its keylogging. It uses a Windows API function SetWindowsHookExA to map the pressed keys, then matches them to the corresponding process.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

Phoenix has a host of features that extend far beyond keylogging, including: Keylogger + Clipboard Stealer Screen Capture Password Stealing...

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

This is an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing service that relays or proxies credentials from the user to a target service.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

We also found other malware samples communicating with this command and control (C2) IP address.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The malware communicates to a remote server 135.181.11.14 via 2 different channels: 1. Via HTTP, on port 4000. 2. Via a web socket, on port 8000

T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence1

Phoenix offers common SMTP and FTP exfiltration protocols, but also supports data exfiltration over Telegram.

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

For the majority of cases, Phoenix posts the stolen data using the SMTP protocol. The stolen data is sent as an email to an email address controlled by the attacker.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Phoenix has a host of features that extend far beyond keylogging, including... Downloader (to download additional malware)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Android/Phoenix is a malicious Remote Access Tool... The attacker controls the infected phone via various predefined commands sent on a websocket.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

This information is then sent to a remote IP address, in this case, a Russian IP — 95[.]142.46.35 — on port 6666. As shown in the deobfuscated screen capture below, the information, which is sent with a simple base64 encoding... Following the summary, a ZIP file of the stolen data is also uploaded to the server

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Alternatively, in some cases Phoenix exfiltrates data by abusing the API of the popular Telegram chat application.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

When installed, the ransomware will append the .PAYLOADBIN extension to encrypted files... the ransom note is named 'PAYLOADBIN-README.txt' and states that the victim's 'networks is LOCKED with PAYLOADBIN ransomware.'

Indicators of compromise

Observables

96 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching96Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping57Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.