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Malware2 associated actors5 associated CVEs

Line Dancer

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 22 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns5Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK40Techniques
IOCs60Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Platforms
Network device

Line Dancer is a memory-resident, 64-bit shellcode loader targeting Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) network devices. It was observed in attacks during late 2023 and early 2024 associated with the ArcaneDoor espionage campaign, conducted by the state-sponsored threat actor tracked as UAT4356 and Storm-1849. The campaign targeted government and critical national infrastructure networks globally.

The implant operates within the ASA's lina process by replacing a function pointer used to parse the WebVPN host-scan-reply XML field. It authenticates incoming tasking using a victim-specific 32-byte token, Base64-decodes the accompanying shellcode, copies it into executable memory, and executes it before returning control to the legitimate parser. Requests without the expected token are passed to the original parser. Its code and payloads occupy a non-file-backed, readable, writable, and executable memory region.

Line Dancer enables arbitrary shellcode and command execution. Associated payloads support device-configuration collection, network packet capture and exfiltration, disabling system logging, interference with crash-dump generation, and bypassing Authentication, Authorization and Accounting controls. Collected data can be exfiltrated over command-and-control channels.

Line Dancer is non-persistent and is distinct from Line Runner, a persistent Lua webshell observed alongside it on compromised ASA devices. Rebooting removes Line Dancer's memory-resident presence. The initial intrusion vector and the mechanism used to place Line Dancer into memory have not been established.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-20359via imda singaporeExploited in the wildPersistent Local Code Execution in Cisco ASA and FTDCVE-2024-20359 (CVSS: 6.0/10.0 - Medium) is a persistent local code-execution vulnerability. An authenticated local attacker with Administrator-level privileges can copy a crafted file to disk0: and execute arbitrary code with root privileges after the next device reload. | Line Dancer is an in-memory implant that enables the uploading and execution of arbitrary shellcode payloads. It exploits a legacy VPN client pre-loading mechanism on Cisco ASA devices.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-20353via imda singaporeExploited in the wildWeb Services Denial of Service in Cisco ASA and FTDCVE-2024-20353 (CVSS: 8.6/10.0 - High) is a denial-of-service vulnerability caused by incomplete error checking when parsing an HTTP header. A crafted HTTP request can cause an affected device to reload unexpectedly. | Line Dancer is an in-memory implant that enables the uploading and execution of arbitrary shellcode payloads. It exploits a legacy VPN client pre-loading mechanism on Cisco ASA devices.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20333via esentire product advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthenticated Root Code Execution in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerOn September 25th, 2025, Cisco disclosed two zero-day vulnerabilities, CVE-2025-20333 (CVSS: 9.9) and CVE-2025-20362 (CVSS: 6.5), in Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software. The disclosure confirmed that the vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild; CVE-2025-20333 allows authenticated, remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable ASA and FTD instances.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-20358via mnemonic blogExploited in the wildBackup Restore Command Injection in Cisco ASA and FTDPatches to the three vulnerabilities - CVE-2024-20353 (CVSS 8.6), CVE-2024-20359 (CVSS 6.0) and CVE-2024-20358 (CVSS 6.0) - are included in the advisory... The blogpost from Talos outlines how two of the vulnerabilities were exploited to escalate privileges and to establish persistence.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20362via esentire product advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerThe disclosure confirmed that the vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild; CVE-2025-20362 enables remote attackers to access restricted URL endpoints without authentication.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ArcaneDoor

Cisco assessed with high confidence that the same operators were responsible for the April 2024 ArcaneDoor campaign, which deployed custom malware frameworks (e.g., Line Dancer and Line Runner) on ASA devices.

via hunter strategy blogblog.hunterstrategy.net
UAT-4356

Cisco Talos previously attributed this group to the ArcaneDoor campaign in 2024, where they exploited two Cisco ASA zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2024–20353, CVE-2024–20359) to deploy malware such as Line Dancer and Line Runner.

via osint team blogosintteam.blog
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

40 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

These affected products have been compromised by malicious actors who successfully established unauthorized access through WebVPN sessions, commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

The attackers successfully exploited these vulnerable devices to deploy malware, execute remote commands, and potentially exfiltrate data.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

Line Runner is a persistent webshell enabling threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts.

T1059.008Network Device CLIEvidence3

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can execute native commands in networking device command line interfaces.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

LINE DANCER is a persistent Lua-based shellcode loader, which is a component of a larger framework. This shellcode loader would process malicious payloads that execute system commands.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

In ArcaneDoor incidents, threat actors exploited CVE-2024-20353 and CVE-2024-20359 to deliver a previously unidentified webshell dubbed LINE RUNNER and an in-memory implant dubbed LINE DANCER.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

“To achieve execution, the pointer to the subroutine which handles parsing the <host-scan-reply> field… is overwritten to point to the shellcode loader… The pointer that is overwritten is in the data section of lina, not the text section…”

Persistence

9 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

It modifies the /etc/init.d/unmountfs script to copy the malware ZIP file from a hidden location to disk0 during boot.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included configuration modification...

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

These affected products have been compromised by malicious actors who successfully established unauthorized access through WebVPN sessions, commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services.

T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

UAT4356 deployed two backdoors as components of this campaign, ‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer,’ which were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

“Line Dancer is not persistent, the actor achieves persistence on ASA devices via Line Runner… a persistent Lua webshell…”

T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence1

“An observed Line Dancer payload changes the memory protections of a region of lina, this results in the text section being split and causing multiple executable memory regions for lina… suspicious, especially if one is of size 0x1000.”

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

"maintain persistence... in the bootloader"; "they also infect the bootloader for persistence"

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence4

Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.

T1653Power SettingsEvidence4

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can modify the crash dump process on infected machines to skip crash dump generation and proceed directly to device reboot for both persistence and forensic evasion purposes.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

It modifies the /etc/init.d/unmountfs script to copy the malware ZIP file from a hidden location to disk0 during boot.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Injection of code into AAA and Crash Dump processes.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The blogpost from Talos outlines how two of the vulnerabilities were exploited to escalate privileges and to establish persistence.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence3

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can hook both the crash dump process and the Autehntication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) functions on compromised machines to evade forensic analysis and authentication mechanisms.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“This data is then base64-decoded and copied into a fixed memory address… The base64-decoded data is expected to be shellcode.”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Injection of code into AAA and Crash Dump processes.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

...control the enabling and disabling of the devices’ syslog service to obfuscate additional commands...

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After installation, it deletes itself from disk to avoid detection.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence5

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) shellcode payloads are base64 encoded when transmitted to compromised devices.(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence1

“An observed Line Dancer payload changes the memory protections of a region of lina, this results in the text section being split and causing multiple executable memory regions for lina… suspicious, especially if one is of size 0x1000.”

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

"maintain persistence... in the bootloader"; "they also infect the bootloader for persistence"

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

“To achieve execution, the pointer to the subroutine which handles parsing the <host-scan-reply> field… is overwritten to point to the shellcode loader… The pointer that is overwritten is in the data section of lina, not the text section…”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence3

LINE DANCER is a shellcode loader used to deploy additional payloads.

Defense Impairment

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included configuration modification...

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence4

Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Line Runner ... allow[s] attackers to disable syslog... 'Line Dancer' also manipulates crash dumps and authentication systems to hinder forensic analysis.

T1690Prevent Command History LoggingEvidence3

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can disable syslog on compromised devices.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence11

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can create and exfiltrate packet captures from compromised environments.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

"hook the authentication process... and they just write the passwords to clear text"; "can harvest credentials locally from the VPN appliance itself"

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence4

Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

HTTP interception for C2 communications.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The two threats have been used by threat actors to modify configurations, conduct reconnaissance, capture and exfiltrate network traffic, and perform lateral movement to other systems.

T1040Network SniffingEvidence11

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can create and exfiltrate packet captures from compromised environments.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence7

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can gather system configuration information by running the native `show configuration` command.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

Exploitation of the vulnerabilities requires enabled SSL VPN, IPsec IKEv2 VPN with “client services”, or exposure of the HTTPS administration interface.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

These samples are commands that directed the devices to perform specific actions which resulted in the exfiltration of device configurations, configuration of network captures, and data exfiltration.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

"hook the authentication process... and they just write the passwords to clear text"; "can harvest credentials locally from the VPN appliance itself"

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers. Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2. Line Runner utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using Line Dancer.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

Úspešné zneužitie umožňuje útočníkom šíriť malvér a zbierať citlivé informácie v cieľovom prostredí.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

HTTP interception for C2 communications.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence8

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) uses HTTP POST requests to interact with compromised devices.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1102.003One-Way CommunicationEvidence1

HTTP C2 one-way backdoor.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Skupine UAT4356 sa podarilo nasadiť dva backdoory, „Line Runner“ a „Line Dancer“...

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence7

[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) exfiltrates collected data via command and control channels.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included... network traffic capture/exfiltration...

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence2

Access, gained via exploitation of these vulnerabilities and malware deployment, allowed threat actors to “generate text versions of the device’s configuration file so that it could be exfiltrated through web requests..."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

60 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

22 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching60Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities5CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping40Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.