Line Dancer
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
- Platforms
- Network device
Line Dancer is a memory-resident, 64-bit shellcode loader targeting Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) network devices. It was observed in attacks during late 2023 and early 2024 associated with the ArcaneDoor espionage campaign, conducted by the state-sponsored threat actor tracked as UAT4356 and Storm-1849. The campaign targeted government and critical national infrastructure networks globally.
The implant operates within the ASA's lina process by replacing a function pointer used to parse the WebVPN host-scan-reply XML field. It authenticates incoming tasking using a victim-specific 32-byte token, Base64-decodes the accompanying shellcode, copies it into executable memory, and executes it before returning control to the legitimate parser. Requests without the expected token are passed to the original parser. Its code and payloads occupy a non-file-backed, readable, writable, and executable memory region.
Line Dancer enables arbitrary shellcode and command execution. Associated payloads support device-configuration collection, network packet capture and exfiltration, disabling system logging, interference with crash-dump generation, and bypassing Authentication, Authorization and Accounting controls. Collected data can be exfiltrated over command-and-control channels.
Line Dancer is non-persistent and is distinct from Line Runner, a persistent Lua webshell observed alongside it on compromised ASA devices. Rebooting removes Line Dancer's memory-resident presence. The initial intrusion vector and the mechanism used to place Line Dancer into memory have not been established.
Associated vulnerabilities
5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Cisco assessed with high confidence that the same operators were responsible for the April 2024 ArcaneDoor campaign, which deployed custom malware frameworks (e.g., Line Dancer and Line Runner) on ASA devices.
Cisco Talos previously attributed this group to the ArcaneDoor campaign in 2024, where they exploited two Cisco ASA zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2024–20353, CVE-2024–20359) to deploy malware such as Line Dancer and Line Runner.
Techniques & procedures
40 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
These affected products have been compromised by malicious actors who successfully established unauthorized access through WebVPN sessions, commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services.
The attackers successfully exploited these vulnerable devices to deploy malware, execute remote commands, and potentially exfiltrate data.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
Line Runner is a persistent webshell enabling threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts.
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can execute native commands in networking device command line interfaces.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)
LINE DANCER is a persistent Lua-based shellcode loader, which is a component of a larger framework. This shellcode loader would process malicious payloads that execute system commands.
In ArcaneDoor incidents, threat actors exploited CVE-2024-20353 and CVE-2024-20359 to deliver a previously unidentified webshell dubbed LINE RUNNER and an in-memory implant dubbed LINE DANCER.
“To achieve execution, the pointer to the subroutine which handles parsing the <host-scan-reply> field… is overwritten to point to the shellcode loader… The pointer that is overwritten is in the data section of lina, not the text section…”
Persistence
9 techniques
Persistence
It modifies the /etc/init.d/unmountfs script to copy the malware ZIP file from a hidden location to disk0 during boot.
‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included configuration modification...
These affected products have been compromised by malicious actors who successfully established unauthorized access through WebVPN sessions, commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services.
UAT4356 deployed two backdoors as components of this campaign, ‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer,’ which were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target.
“Line Dancer is not persistent, the actor achieves persistence on ASA devices via Line Runner… a persistent Lua webshell…”
“An observed Line Dancer payload changes the memory protections of a region of lina, this results in the text section being split and causing multiple executable memory regions for lina… suspicious, especially if one is of size 0x1000.”
"maintain persistence... in the bootloader"; "they also infect the bootloader for persistence"
Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can modify the crash dump process on infected machines to skip crash dump generation and proceed directly to device reboot for both persistence and forensic evasion purposes.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
It modifies the /etc/init.d/unmountfs script to copy the malware ZIP file from a hidden location to disk0 during boot.
Injection of code into AAA and Crash Dump processes.
The blogpost from Talos outlines how two of the vulnerabilities were exploited to escalate privileges and to establish persistence.
Stealth
10 techniques
Stealth
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can hook both the crash dump process and the Autehntication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) functions on compromised machines to evade forensic analysis and authentication mechanisms.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
“This data is then base64-decoded and copied into a fixed memory address… The base64-decoded data is expected to be shellcode.”
Injection of code into AAA and Crash Dump processes.
...control the enabling and disabling of the devices’ syslog service to obfuscate additional commands...
After installation, it deletes itself from disk to avoid detection.
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) shellcode payloads are base64 encoded when transmitted to compromised devices.(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)
“An observed Line Dancer payload changes the memory protections of a region of lina, this results in the text section being split and causing multiple executable memory regions for lina… suspicious, especially if one is of size 0x1000.”
"maintain persistence... in the bootloader"; "they also infect the bootloader for persistence"
“To achieve execution, the pointer to the subroutine which handles parsing the <host-scan-reply> field… is overwritten to point to the shellcode loader… The pointer that is overwritten is in the data section of lina, not the text section…”
LINE DANCER is a shellcode loader used to deploy additional payloads.
Defense Impairment
4 techniques
Defense Impairment
‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included configuration modification...
Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.
Line Runner ... allow[s] attackers to disable syslog... 'Line Dancer' also manipulates crash dumps and authentication systems to hinder forensic analysis.
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can disable syslog on compromised devices.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can create and exfiltrate packet captures from compromised environments.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
"hook the authentication process... and they just write the passwords to clear text"; "can harvest credentials locally from the VPN appliance itself"
Bypassing of the AAA mechanism.
HTTP interception for C2 communications.
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
The two threats have been used by threat actors to modify configurations, conduct reconnaissance, capture and exfiltrate network traffic, and perform lateral movement to other systems.
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can create and exfiltrate packet captures from compromised environments.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) can gather system configuration information by running the native `show configuration` command.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Exploitation of the vulnerabilities requires enabled SSL VPN, IPsec IKEv2 VPN with “client services”, or exposure of the HTTPS administration interface.
Collection
5 techniques
Collection
These samples are commands that directed the devices to perform specific actions which resulted in the exfiltration of device configurations, configuration of network captures, and data exfiltration.
"hook the authentication process... and they just write the passwords to clear text"; "can harvest credentials locally from the VPN appliance itself"
Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers. Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2. Line Runner utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using Line Dancer.
Úspešné zneužitie umožňuje útočníkom šíriť malvér a zbierať citlivé informácie v cieľovom prostredí.
HTTP interception for C2 communications.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) uses HTTP POST requests to interact with compromised devices.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)
HTTP C2 one-way backdoor.
Skupine UAT4356 sa podarilo nasadiť dva backdoory, „Line Runner“ a „Line Dancer“...
Exfiltration
3 techniques
Exfiltration
[Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) exfiltrates collected data via command and control channels.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
‘Line Runner’ and ‘Line Dancer’... were used collectively to conduct malicious actions on-target, which included... network traffic capture/exfiltration...
Access, gained via exploitation of these vulnerabilities and malware deployment, allowed threat actors to “generate text versions of the device’s configuration file so that it could be exfiltrated through web requests..."
Observables
60 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
22 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.