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Malware5 associated actors7 associated CVEs

PLEAD

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days5 mentions · peak 5 in a dayToday
Vulns7Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK47Techniques
IOCs411Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
WindowsLinux

PLEAD is a remote-access trojan and backdoor associated with the China-linked cyberespionage group BlackTech, also known as BRONZE CANAL and Red Djinn. It has been used in espionage campaigns active since at least 2012, particularly against Taiwanese government agencies and private organizations. Its operators also use the separate DRIGO document-exfiltration tool.

PLEAD supports remote shell access, command and application execution, file upload and download, file deletion, and enumeration of drives, files, windows, processes, installed software, and system information. It can harvest saved credentials from Microsoft Outlook and browsers including Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, and Mozilla Firefox. Windows variants collect documents and other information and exfiltrate data over HTTP, with observed implementations using XOR encoding and RC4 encryption. Some variants retrieve additional backdoor routines from command-and-control infrastructure.

Windows implementations commonly use wrappers that decrypt and execute a shellcode-based core in memory. Observed variants support process injection, including a fileless implementation that injects the backdoor into Internet Explorer without writing the payload to disk. Some variants establish persistence through autorun entries or Windows services. Delivery includes spearphishing attachments and cloud-storage links, document-disguised installers, and decoy documents. Exploit-bearing documents have leveraged vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office, Equation Editor, and Adobe Flash, including CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2015-5119.

A Linux variant known as ELF_PLEAD extends the family to Unix-like systems. Analyzed versions support file operations, remote commands, pseudo-terminal shells, and proxy functionality, and use SSL for communications.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

7 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-5119via trendai security blogExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player AS3 ByteArray Use-After-FreePLEAD obtained an exploit for a Flash vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) leaked during the Hacking Team breach and used a short-lived, fileless version of its malware. | PLEAD’s toolset includes the self-named PLEAD backdoor and the DRIGO exfiltration tool.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-6352via trendai security blogExploited in the wildWindows OLE Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityWe’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities: ... CVE-2014-6352, patched ... by Microsoft last October, 2014. | PLEAD’s toolset includes the self-named PLEAD backdoor and the DRIGO exfiltration tool.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2012-0158via trendai security blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Common Controls ActiveX Remote Code ExecutionWe’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities: ... CVE-2012-0158 ... patched ... by Microsoft last April, 2012. | PLEAD’s toolset includes the self-named PLEAD backdoor and the DRIGO exfiltration tool.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-7269via trendai security blogRemote Code Execution in Microsoft IIS 6.0 WebDAVPLEAD’s toolset includes the self-named PLEAD backdoor and the DRIGO exfiltration tool.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-0199via trendai security blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office and WordPad OLE Remote Code ExecutionWe’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities: ... CVE-2017-0199 ... patched ... by Microsoft last April, 2017. | PLEAD’s toolset includes the self-named PLEAD backdoor and the DRIGO exfiltration tool.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-0802via freebufExploited in the wildStack Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Office Equation Editor“OLE1则包含了0day CVE-2018-0802的漏洞利用程序……这两个漏洞均位于Microsoft Office的公式编辑器Eqnedt32.exe中。” | 本次攻击使用的是一个代号为PLEAD的后门程序,该木马的核心功能以shellcode的形式存在View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-11882via freebufExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation Editor“OLE 2包含了CVE-2017-11882的漏洞利用程序……微软在11月份发布的补丁中,修复了CVE-2017-11882漏洞。” | 本次攻击使用的是一个代号为PLEAD的后门程序,该木马的核心功能以shellcode的形式存在View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CopperTurtle

In the CopperTurtle case, pdfset.exe in the PDF24 folder loaded the PLEAD RAT on May 3, 2026, and GitDoor followed on May 4.

via cryptika blogcryptika.com
BlackTech

PLEAD’s toolset includes the self-named PLEAD backdoor and the DRIGO exfiltration tool.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
BRONZE CANAL

BRONZE CANAL ... Tools ... Bifrose, Deuterbear, DRIGO, Flagpro, Gh0stTimes, KIVARS, PLEAD, Spiderpig, Waterbear, XBOW

via secureworkssecureworks.com
Huapi

HUAPI (a.k.a BlackTech/PLEAD) was definitely the most ambitious group in Taiwan. Their attacks counts around 30% of incidents we analyzed and the targeting scope includes almost all the industries we listed. The supply chain attacks we mentioned in previous paragraphs were also conducted by them.

via teamt5teamt5.org
Earth Hundun

Uncover ELF version of PLEAD / TSCookie by JPCERT

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

47 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

PLEAD actors use a router scanner tool to scan for vulnerable routers, after which the attackers will enable the router’s VPN feature then register a machine as virtual server. This virtual server will be used either as a C&C server or an HTTP server that delivers PLEAD malware to their targets.

T1584.001DomainsEvidence1

A sophisticated hacking group tied to the government of China is exploiting routers in attacks on a variety of organizations... The group specifically targets “branch routers” — smaller appliances used at more remote branch offices to connect to a corporate headquarters.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

PLEAD also uses CVE-2017-7269, a buffer overflow vulnerability Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) 6.0 to compromise the victim’s server. This is another way for them to establish a new C&C or HTTP server.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

PLEAD uses spear-phishing emails to deliver and install their backdoor, either as an attachment or through links to cloud storage services.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence3

PLEAD uses spear-phishing emails to deliver and install their backdoor, either as an attachment or through links to cloud storage services.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to execute shell commands on the compromised host.(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018)

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

The backdoor contains the ability to create a new thread and provide the operator with a pseudo-terminal (tty) shell. Shell commands are executed using “echo -e”

T1106Native APIEvidence3

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) can use `ShellExecute` to execute applications.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities: CVE-2015-5119, CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-6352, CVE-2017-0199.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails... has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer... has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence3

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has been executed via malicious links in e-mails.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence5

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has been executed via malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

Persistence

3 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

some were seen to be installed as a service, such as a fake Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

While most PLEAD and DRIGO variants utilize autorun registry as a persistence mechanism, some were seen to be installed as a service

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Specifically, upon gaining an initial foothold into a target network and gaining administrator access to network edge devices, BlackTech cyber actors often modify the firmware to hide their activity across the edge devices to further maintain persistence in the network.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

some were seen to be installed as a service, such as a fake Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

While most PLEAD and DRIGO variants utilize autorun registry as a persistence mechanism, some were seen to be installed as a service

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

The malware is embedded into the resource of other executable file. The resource name is usually a popular file extension, such as AVI and BMP.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Like PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow uses spear-phishing emails with backdoor-laden attachments that utilize the RTLO technique and accompanied by decoy documents. | PLEAD’s installers are disguised as documents using the right-to-left-override (RTLO) technique to obfuscate the malware’s filename. They are mostly accompanied by decoy documents to further trick users.

T1036.002Right-to-Left OverrideEvidence1

PLEAD: This campaign has become well-known for its use of the right-to-left override (RTLO) technique to make targets think they were opening a PowerPoint® file instead of a malicious .SCR file.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to delete files on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Multiple layers of encryption are involved... The loader would first reconstruct the hexadecimal data into correct order in stack, and then decrypts it into encryption key. RC4 is used to perform second decryption to get the shellcode

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

ELF_PLEAD conducts a number of checks to ensure it has landed on the correct target. This is important not only for fingerprinting the victim system but also due to the fact that the ELF binary is dynamically linked.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

A loader component executable will connect to the C&C server to download the main backdoor and load it in memory.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

Signature Spoofing, malware may use stolen or forged digital signatures to appear legitimate, tricking users and security software into executing the malicious file. Plead malware uses digital signatures stolen from Taiwan. Lapsus$, leaked NVIDIA certificates used to sign malware

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Specifically, upon gaining an initial foothold into a target network and gaining administrator access to network edge devices, BlackTech cyber actors often modify the firmware to hide their activity across the edge devices to further maintain persistence in the network.

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence8

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to steal saved passwords from Microsoft Outlook.(Citation: ESET PLEAD Malware July 2018)

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence10

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) can harvest saved credentials from browsers such as Google Chrome, Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Mozilla Firefox.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: ESET PLEAD Malware July 2018)

T1555.005Password ManagersEvidence1

Evilnum can collect email credentials from victims... Malteiro has obtained credentials from mail clients via NirSoft MailPassView... MgBot includes modules for stealing stored credentials from Outlook and Foxmail email client software... PLEAD has the ability to steal saved passwords from Microsoft Outlook.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Specifically, upon gaining an initial foothold into a target network and gaining administrator access to network edge devices, BlackTech cyber actors often modify the firmware to hide their activity across the edge devices to further maintain persistence in the network.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

BlackTech uses router-level MitM attack to deploy PLEAD in TW

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

BlackTech steals digital certificates from D-Link and other TW tech organisations

Discovery

6 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence4

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to list open windows on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

PLEAD actors use a router scanner tool to scan for vulnerable routers

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence8

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to list processes on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

PLEAD’s backdoor can: List drives, processes, open windows, and files

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence9

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to list drives and files on the compromised host.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

ELF_PLEAD conducts a number of checks to ensure it has landed on the correct target. This is important not only for fingerprinting the victim system but also due to the fact that the ELF binary is dynamically linked.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

PLEAD also uses CVE-2017-7269, a buffer overflow vulnerability Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) 6.0 to compromise the victim’s server. This is another way for them to establish a new C&C or HTTP server.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

PLEAD also uses the document-targeting exfiltration tool DRIGO, which mainly searches the infected machine for documents.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

BlackTech uses router-level MitM attack to deploy PLEAD in TW

Command and Control

11 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The content of network packet is encoded by XOR.

T1001.001Junk DataEvidence3

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) samples were found to be highly obfuscated with junk code.(Citation: ESET PLEAD Malware July 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The functions visible in Figure 1 hint that the binary makes a connection to some infrastructure using SSL... The backdoor connects to an IP (168.95[.]1.1)... The backdoor described in the November 2020 post utilized the domain mx[.]msdtc.tw for command and control.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence8

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has used HTTP for communications with command and control (C2) servers.(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

T1090ProxyEvidence5

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to proxy network communications.(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018)

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence3

"APT41 used a tool called CLASSFON to covertly proxy network communications." / "BADCALL functions as a proxy server between the victim and C2 server." / "Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic..."

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

the attackers will enable the router’s VPN feature then register a machine as a virtual server. This virtual server will be used as either a C&C server or an HTTP server

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has the ability to upload and download files to and from an infected host.(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Many of the same commands including file operations, remote shell, and proxy modes are found in this version of PLEAD.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has used RC4 encryption to download modules.(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Exfiltration of documents is done via POST HTTP requests. The same is done with other information the backdoor gathers from its victim.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

411 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

59 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
cryptika blogNews · Nov 17, 2026Hackers Abuse Microsoft SharePoint and GitHub to Hide GraphDoor Backdoor Attacks on Government Networks | Cryptika CybersecurityRemote access trojan loaded by pdfset.exe from a PDF24 directory in the CopperTurtle case. GitDoor appeared the following day; this sequence does not establish a direct link between GitDoor and the actor.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Nov 17, 2026Hackers Abuse Microsoft SharePoint and Ably to Hide GraphDoor Backdoor Attacks on Government NetworksRemote access trojan loaded by pdfset.exe from a PDF24 directory in a case associated with CopperTurtle. GitDoor appeared the following day, although the report does not consider this sufficient to prove a direct relationship.Read more ↗malware newsNews · Nov 17, 2026Operation ShadowCloud: cloud service-based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 2 - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsRemote access trojan injected into memory by pdfset.exe in the CopperTurtle activity examined for attribution overlaps. Its deployment occurred in the same staging directory within one day of a GitDoor deployment; this does not establish that CopperTurtle operated GitDoor.Read more ↗securelistNews · Nov 17, 2026Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor backdoor, plug-ins and attribution | SecurelistRemote access trojan injected into memory by pdfset.exe during CopperTurtle activity. Its deployment shared a staging location with GitDoor and occurred one day before the listed GitDoor deployment, providing an attribution overlap rather than proof of common ownership.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching411Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities7CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping47Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.