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BlackTech, also known as HUAPI and PLEAD, is a long-running China-linked espionage threat actor active since at least 2007 and heavily associated with operations against Taiwan. The group has targeted government, military, high-technology, telecommunications, think tanks, education, healthcare, finance, and other critical sectors, and has also victimized organizations in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. It has been described as one of the most active China-nexus groups targeting Taiwan and has been linked to broad, multi-sector intrusion activity as well as supply-chain compromises affecting upstream providers and downstream government, military, and critical infrastructure networks. BlackTech is associated with malware families including PLEAD, TSCOOKIE, KIVARS, CAPGELD, BiFrost, and DBGPRINT, the latter also known as Waterbear. Its tooling shows sustained engineering maturity, including custom encryption schemes based on modified RC4, shellcode-based stagers, in-memory payload decryption and execution, plugin loading, anti-debugging checks, self-modifying code, and evolving payload formats. Reported tradecraft includes spearphishing, exploitation of public-facing applications, compromise of trusted third parties for downstream access, use of relay infrastructure to obscure operations, and double DLL sideloading in later malware variants. Observed capabilities include remote shell access, file upload and download, file and drive enumeration and manipulation, process and service management, registry management, screenshot capture, remote desktop functionality, network connection management, and broader post-compromise control of infected systems. The group has also been linked to malware deployment on Linux systems and to campaigns abusing vulnerable edge or perimeter infrastructure and trusted service relationships to maintain durable access and evade conventional endpoint-focused defenses. BlackTech is assessed primarily as a state-linked cyber-espionage actor aligned with Chinese strategic interests. Its operations against Taiwan have included persistent intelligence collection, targeting across nearly all major sectors, and supply-chain intrusions designed to expand access into strategically significant networks.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
27 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
2 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Described as a China-nexus threat actor leveraging a supply-chain style "Fail-of-Trust Model" by compromising upstream IT/service providers and then pivoting into downstream government, military, and critical infrastructure targets.
A China-linked threat actor associated with the Linux version of the BiFrost backdoor, observed exploiting GhostCat on vulnerable Tomcat servers to upload malware and conduct long-term intrusions. The group is described as having targeted Taiwan for over a decade, especially government entities, as well as high-tech, telecom, and think tank organizations.
Highly active China-linked APT targeting Taiwan across many sectors; associated here with broad intrusion activity and supply chain attacks.
Long-running threat actor associated in this content with the DBGPRINT/Waterbear malware family and related tooling, targeting multiple sectors including government, education, healthcare, finance, technology, and think tanks.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.