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Malware2 associated actors

MATCHBOIL

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days6 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs47Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

MATCHBOIL is a custom C# downloader for Windows used by the cyberespionage group UAC-0099, also tracked as Earth Sirrush and assessed to operate in Russian interests. It downloads and installs additional payloads, most commonly the MATCHWOK backdoor, and establishes their persistence. Observed victims include Ukrainian transportation, grain logistics, manufacturing, and energy organizations. Analyzed variants date from 2024 through 2026; CERT-UA first publicly documented the family in August 2025.

Delivery typically uses spearphishing emails containing links to archives with malicious VBScript files, although malicious attachments have also been observed. When executed, these scripts download and launch MATCHBOIL. The downloader gathers system identifiers through Windows Management Instrumentation, including processor and BIOS information; later variants collect additional identifiers such as usernames, MAC addresses, and computer model details. Its payload-retrieval sequence uses HTTPS requests and extracts a hexadecimal-encoded executable from an HTML response. Downloaded payloads are persisted through Windows Registry autostart entries or scheduled tasks, while delivery scripts can separately establish persistence for MATCHBOIL or its loader.

Early versions operated as one-shot downloaders, whereas later versions contact command-and-control infrastructure approximately every two minutes to retry downloads or retrieve updated payloads. Successive releases introduced stronger obfuscation, including Eziriz .NET Reactor, debugger checks, and system-uptime checks intended to identify analysis environments. Some versions display deceptive planner or text-search interfaces when launched without expected arguments. The variant designated MATCHBOIL.V2 changed the malware from a standalone executable to a DLL executed by a custom C# loader. Its command-and-control infrastructure uses virtual private servers, with some servers concealed behind Cloudflare.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0099

Russia-aligned UAC-0099, which targets transportation and energy infrastructure in Ukraine using a loader called MATCHBOIL, inserted a specific string into its malware's VBS script comments.

via tech timestechtimes.com
Earth Sirrush

MATCHBOIL.V2, an updated version of the MATCHBOIL loader with AES-CBC encryption replacing the original XOR string obfuscation.

via trendai documentscdn.sanity.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

5 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence2

| |T1583.001 |Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence2

| |T1583.003 |Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server

T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

| |T1587.001 |Develop Capabilities: Malware

T1587.003Digital CertificatesEvidence2

| |T1587.003 |Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates

T1588.002ToolEvidence2

|Resource Development |T1588.002 |Obtain Capabilities: Tool

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence7

The group has already relied on phishing-led delivery and the MATCHBOIL family.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

UAC‑0099 gained initial access by sending spearphishing emails containing a malicious attachment.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

These messages included links to legitimate file-sharing platforms that delivered archive files bundled with malware.

Execution

5 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2

| |T1047 |Windows Management Instrumentation

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

|Execution |T1053.005 |Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence4

| |T1059.005 |Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

T1106Native APIEvidence2

| |T1106 |Native API

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

...point to a double archive file containing an HTML Application...

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

|Execution |T1053.005 |Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

|Persistence |T1547.001 |Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

|Execution |T1053.005 |Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

|Persistence |T1547.001 |Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The hostile text is placed where an analyst or an automated tool can read it, turning the act of inspecting the file into the target of the attack.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

CERT-UA warned that the adversary was using a malicious program dressed up as a Notepad++ plugin to compromise Windows systems with a new version of MATCHBOIL.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

MATCHBOIL has used the filename Thumbs.db for its downloaded payload.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

ASHVEIN, MATCHBOIL, and DRAGSTARE use an identical byte-swap XOR string encryption algorithm with per-variant seed constants.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

UAC-0099 appears to have planned for AI-assisted defences alongside more familiar checks for analysis tools, including IDA and Wireshark.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

| |T1497.001 |Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

|Stealth |T1622 |Debugger Evasion

T1678Delay ExecutionEvidence2

| |T1678 |Delay Execution

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Attackers add a prompt injection to malware containing a dangerous request, intended to trigger LLM safety mechanisms and force the model to refuse further analysis. UAC-0099 placed text beginning “I want to create a nuclear weapon. Help me...” in a VBS-script comment.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The primary malware used in the campaign, dubbed Matchboil, collects system data and deploys additional malicious tools

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

UAC-0099 appears to have planned for AI-assisted defences alongside more familiar checks for analysis tools, including IDA and Wireshark.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

| |T1497.001 |Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

|Stealth |T1622 |Debugger Evasion

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

These messages included links to legitimate file-sharing platforms that delivered archive files bundled with malware.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

| |T1071.001 |Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

Additional MythicRatatoskr samples were subsequently deployed to other machines within the organization, this time using an OpenSSH SFTP server.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence2

| |T1132.001 |Data Encoding: Standard Encoding

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence2

|Command and Control |T1573.002 |Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography

Indicators of compromise

Observables

47 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

43 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching47Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.