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MalwareUsed by 8 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

SparkRAT

SparkRAT is a cross-platform remote access trojan/backdoor written in Go and publicly available as open-source software. It supports Windows, Linux, and macOS and has been described as providing remote shell or direct command-line interaction, command execution, file upload and download/file management, system fingerprinting, and encrypted command-and-control. Reporting cited here notes Go variants compatible with Windows, Linux, and OSX, and also describes SparkRAT as an infostealer in some campaign reporting.

SparkRAT was first widely reported in 2023 during DragonSpark activity and has continued to appear in modified forms after the original project was reportedly abandoned in February 2023. Kroll documented a Golang loader dubbed LESLIELOADER used to deploy SparkRAT; that loader decodes and AES-192 decrypts an embedded secondary payload using the key string "LeslieCheungKwok," derives an IV from the tail of the payload container, and injects the final payload into a suspended notepad.exe process. In the analyzed case, the loader used files named Ntmssvc.dll and RemovableStorage.dll and attempted an initial beacon to 209.141.50.215:443.

The malware has been observed across multiple intrusion sets and campaigns. It was reported in BeyondTrust Remote Support/Privileged Remote Access exploitation tied to CVE-2026-1731, where attackers deployed SparkRAT alongside VShell, PowerShell downloaders, Linux download-and-execute cradles, web shells, and attempted Meterpreter reverse shells. Those BeyondTrust intrusions affected organizations in sectors including financial services, technology, higher education, legal services, healthcare, retail, and wholesale, across countries including the United States, France, Germany, Australia, and Canada. SparkRAT has also been listed among tools used by the cyber-espionage cluster TGR-STA-1030/UNC6619, alongside Cobalt Strike, VShell, Havoc, and Sliver, in compromises of government and critical infrastructure organizations across dozens of countries. Additional reporting links SparkRAT usage to Webworm, RedNovember, TAG-140, and attacks involving IIS web application exploitation.

Operationally, SparkRAT has been delivered through several vectors in the cited reporting: phishing campaigns, trojanized archives and loaders, exploitation of public-facing applications, and post-exploitation deployment after initial access. Hunt researchers and Talos reporting indicate actors may use per-target SparkRAT builds. One Webworm-related analysis specifically found independently submitted SparkRAT siblings with differing ldflags COMMIT values, assessed as evidence of per-victim builds.

High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the content include the LESLIELOADER AES key string "LeslieCheungKwok," associated filenames Ntmssvc.dll and RemovableStorage.dll, and the beacon destination 209.141.50.215:443 from the analyzed loader chain.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2026-1731Pre-auth OS Command Injection RCE in BeyondTrust Remote Support and PRAExploited in the wild

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-1731, is an operating system command injection flaw that also impacts some older versions of BeyondTrust Privileged Remote Access. The flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on a server without the need for credentials or any user interaction. | A critical vulnerability in BeyondTrust Remote Support is facing an increase in threat activity, with hackers deploying SparkRAT and vShell backdoors and using remote management tools to conduct reconnaissance...

via cybersecurity divecybersecuritydive.com
CVE-2024-43451Windows NTLM Hash Disclosure via Malicious .url FileExploited in the wild

ClearSky Cyber Security has uncovered a new zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2024-43451, actively exploited in the wild, targeting Windows systems primarily in Ukraine. This flaw enables attackers to exploit URL files for malicious activity by performing actions as simple as a single right-click.

via security online infosecurityonline.info
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

8 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Webworm

Sandbox family search for family:sparkrat . Returned a per-victim SparkRAT sibling submitted independently to the sandbox. Its ldflags COMMIT differs from the case sample. Confirms the operator uses per-target SparkRAT builds.

via github gist webgist.github.com
UAC-0194

The initial analysis showed that the ZIP files downloaded were installing SparkRAT on some systems, while later variations utilized Redline Stealer.

via security online infosecurityonline.info
RedNovember

...Leslieloader that downloads a backdoor dubbed SparkRAT. The Go variants are compliant with Windows, Linux and OSX. They support file upload and download, system fingerprinting and direct command-line interaction with infected hosts.

via bank info securitybankinfosecurity.com
SideCopy

"...including CurlBack, SparkRAT, AresRAT, Xeno RAT, AllaKore, and ReverseRAT."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
DragonSpark

The attacks are characterized by the use of the little known open source SparkRAT and malware that attempts to evade detection through Golang source code interpretation.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
unk_coltcentury

...UNK_ColtCentury... likely an attempt to deploy the SparkRAT backdoor.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
hafnium

"CVE-2026-1731 (BeyondTrust) is associated with HAFNIUM and linked to Lumma Stealer, SparkRAT, and VShell malware deployments."

via labs greynoise iolabs.greynoise.io
TGR-STA-1030

“The primary C2 frameworks observed were Cobalt Strike, VShell, Havoc, Sliver, and SparkRat.”

via rescana blogrescana.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence6

A critical vulnerability in BeyondTrust Remote Support is facing an increase in threat activity ... Multiple BeyondTrust Remote Support users have been confirmed targets ... The flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on a server without the need for credentials or any user interaction.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

“Command execution: including execution of arbitrary Windows system and PowerShell commands.”

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

“Command execution: including execution of arbitrary Windows system and PowerShell commands.”

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-1731, is an operating system command injection flaw ... The flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on a server without the need for credentials or any user interaction.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

"CVE-2026-1731 is an OS command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the thin-scc-wrapper component, which is exposed directly to the network via WebSocket... lets attackers run system commands with no login required."

Persistence

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

“Unit 42 confirmed the flaw is being actively exploited for… backdoor installation…”

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

“Unit 42 confirmed the flaw is being actively exploited for… backdoor installation…”

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“process and file enumeration.” / “process termination”

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“exfiltration of platform information (CPU, network, memory, disk, and system uptime information)”

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“process and file enumeration.”

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence3

Key initial access vectors include ... Exposed Outlook Web Access (OWA) and VPN infrastructure

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

“By sending specially crafted requests, an unauthenticated remote attacker may be able to execute operating system commands in the context of the site user.”

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

“Information theft… screenshot theft” / “screen view”

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"Among the tools put to use by the threat actor are command-and-control (C2) frameworks... Cobalt Strike, VShell, Havoc, Sliver, and SparkRAT"

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“SparkRAT uses the WebSocket protocol to communicate with the C2 server…” | “upgrade request… an HTTP POST request, with the commit query parameter…”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

This confirms the actor delivers tools through operator-controlled open directories, not mass-mail or drive-by chains.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Sandbox family search for family:sparkrat . Returned a per-victim SparkRAT sibling submitted independently to the sandbox. Its ldflags COMMIT differs from the case sample. Confirms the operator uses per-target SparkRAT builds.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching10

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution8

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping16

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

SparkRAT | Mallory