BianLian is a name used for two distinct malware tracks with no confirmed operational linkage: an Android banking trojan/bot family first publicly discussed in 2018, and a later Go-based ransomware and extortion toolkit associated with the BianLian intrusion set. The Android family began as a dropper and evolved into a modular banking malware platform focused heavily on Turkish financial institutions, while also targeting cryptocurrency and other financial applications. It abuses Android Accessibility Services, hides its icon, dynamically loads additional payload components, and communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP using JSON. Documented modules support SMS interception and sending, overlay-based credential theft, USSD execution, device locking, screen capture or screencasting, notification suppression, PIN theft or manipulation, remote app installation, and TeamViewer-assisted remote control. Some variants also implement proxy functionality over SSH and retrieve updated command-and-control information from attacker-controlled remote resources, including GitHub Gists and Tor-hosted infrastructure. The Android malware is best characterized as an infostealer with banking-trojan behavior and strong post-compromise device-control features.
Separately, BianLian is also the name of a Go-based ransomware family and associated threat actor active since late 2021 or 2022. That operation used a custom backdoor and encryptor, gained access through exploitation of public-facing systems such as ProxyShell and SonicWall VPN appliances as well as valid or weak remote-access credentials, and relied extensively on living-off-the-land techniques for reconnaissance, lateral movement, persistence, and defense evasion. Observed behavior includes use of RDP, WinRM, WMI, and PowerShell; manipulation of user accounts and firewall rules; disabling or bypassing endpoint protections; deletion of backups and shadow copies; and deployment of a custom backdoor capable of retrieving and executing payloads in memory. The ransomware encrypted files on Windows systems, appended a characteristic extension, and used double extortion by combining encryption with data theft. After a public decryptor became available in early 2023, the group shifted substantially toward exfiltration-based extortion without encryption. Victimology has included manufacturing, healthcare, education, financial services, and other sectors, with many observed victims in North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
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7 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
The BianLian group has successfully targeted the ProxyShell vulnerability chain (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) to gain initial access into victim networks. | The BianLian group has developed a custom tool set consisting of a backdoor and an encryptor, developing both using the Go programming language.
The BianLian group has successfully targeted the ProxyShell vulnerability chain (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) to gain initial access into victim networks. | The BianLian group has developed a custom tool set consisting of a backdoor and an encryptor, developing both using the Go programming language.
The BianLian group has successfully targeted the ProxyShell vulnerability chain (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) to gain initial access into victim networks. | The BianLian group has developed a custom tool set consisting of a backdoor and an encryptor, developing both using the Go programming language.
CVE-2024–27198: A vulnerability in JetBrains software leveraged by BianLian for data extortion operations. While not directly Qilin, it shows the types of software vulnerabilities targeted by sophisticated RaaS groups. | CVE-2024–27198: A vulnerability in JetBrains software leveraged by BianLian for data extortion operations.
SAP NetWeaver, a cornerstone for enterprise operations across countless global organizations, faces a severe threat from a newly discovered deserialization vulnerability, CVE-2025-42980. With a CVSS score of 9.1, this flaw could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code... Threat Intelligence Active exploitation by ransomware groups, including BianLian and Ransomexx, has been observed.
First observed in attacks in June 2022, BianLian was seen targeting critical infrastructure organizations and private entities in the US and abroad. The group has been stealing victim data, using it for extortion.
First observed in attacks in June 2022, BianLian was seen targeting critical infrastructure organizations and private entities in the US and abroad. The group has been stealing victim data, using it for extortion.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The BianLian group has developed a custom tool set consisting of a backdoor and an encryptor, developing both using the Go programming language.
39 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
MITRE TTPs Redacted researchers provided the following MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures: ID Technique T1047 Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation
Execution: Unknown binary launching PowerShell If leveraging an EDR that classifies binaries as known and unknown, searching for unknown binaries launching PowerShell will frequently detect use of the BianLian backdoor
MITRE TTPs Redacted researchers provided the following MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures: ID Technique T1078 Persistence: Valid Accounts
Credential Access: Account manipulation via net.exe “Net user” is too loud to alert on in most environments, but we recommend alerting on a threshold of “net user” executions.
Defense Evasion: Reg.exe modifying safeboot keys BianLian added a remote access tool to safeboot keys in order to enable network access for their remote access tool in safeboot.
MITRE TTPs Redacted researchers provided the following MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures: ID Technique T1078 Persistence: Valid Accounts
Credential Access: Account manipulation via net.exe “Net user” is too loud to alert on in most environments, but we recommend alerting on a threshold of “net user” executions.
the first thing the application does is hide its icon and constantly requests permission to abuse Accessibility services functionalities until granted. Once these are obtained, it initiates all of its modules.
At a first look, it seemed clear that the APK was heavily obfuscated... It seems to mostly rely on generating a variety of random functions to hide the real functionalities of the sample... Most of the strings in the code are generated by using functions implementing a XOR decryption of byte arrays.
The malware does not use DexClassLoader to unpack the payload DEX. Instead it loads the payload as a secondary DEX through multidex support. The packer re-implements multidex support and mainly changes names & adds asset decryption.
be on the lookout for... a botnet with tags such as “grim” that poses as a “Security” application ... Android banking trojans typically pose as famous applications: Video Player, Play Store, Flash Player, etc.
The same component also deals with removal of applications... If the package name is “bot”, then the bot removes itself. A self “cleaning” command!
MITRE TTPs Redacted researchers provided the following MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures: ID Technique T1078 Persistence: Valid Accounts
From attachBaseContext, the malware calls a cascade of functions which (1) locate an asset named G9ugwFtlG1.jwi, (2) deflates it and (3) finally decrypts it using a home-made algorithm with hard coded key...
The installation is performed by abusing the Accessibility API... automatically click to install. If the system is requesting permission to install from an external source, authorize it etc.
Upon execution of the ransomware, it attempts to identify if the file is running in a WINE environment by checking the wine_get_version() function via the GetProcAddress() API.
Reconnaissance: Ping -4 -n 1 BianLian used single pings to perform network reconnaissance.
MITRE TTPs Redacted researchers provided the following MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures: ID Technique T1069 Discovery: Permission Groups Discovery
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques ... Discovery T1082 T1083 T1518 T1120 System Information Discovery File and Directory Discovery Security Software Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery
MITRE TTPs Redacted researchers provided the following MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures: ID Technique T1021.005 Lateral Movement: Remote Services: VNC
Lateral Movement: Winrm dropping a file via PowerShell The binary wsmprovhost.exe is used to mediate the relationship between WinRM and PowerShell. Alerting on file modification by wsmprovhost.exe proved a reliable method to detect BianLian dropping malicious files.
we can see an interesting TLS certificate on port 443. | In this post we will investigate a Bianlian C2 address and use TLS certificates to obtain another ~50 servers.
MITRE TTPs Redacted researchers provided the following MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures: ID Technique T1071.001 Command and Control: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocol
This module is used to create a functioning SSH server on the device using JSCH... BianLian can setup a proxy that can run SSH sessions using remote port forwarding on port 34500, with an implementation similar to 2017’s malware MilkyDoor, making communication with the CC harder to detect.
160 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
72 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware family mentioned as possibly linked to the crypting actor hiddenroot.
Ransomware family mentioned as one of the criminal services hosted by Aeza Group infrastructure.
Financially motivated ransomware group that opportunistically targets multiple sectors and publishes stolen data on the dark web.
Ransomware family identified by the FBI as one of the biggest ransomware threats by complaint volume in 2025.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.