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1 malware familyExploits CVEs in the wild

BianLian

Also known asbianlian

BianLian is a ransomware and data-extortion threat actor first observed in June 2022. Reporting in the provided content states that it has targeted critical infrastructure organizations and private entities in the United States and abroad, including victims in sectors such as healthcare, legal, manufacturing, mining, and aerospace. The group has been associated with both ransomware and data theft for extortion, and multiple sources in the content describe it as having shifted by early 2023 to a primarily extortion-only model with no system encryption after Avast released a decryptor in January 2023. Other reporting in the content also describes a phishing campaign attributed to BianLian that used malicious SVG attachments, shortened links, compromised Brazilian domains, and a Go-based Windows payload with anti-analysis checks and AES file encryption. The content links BianLian to exploitation of TeamCity server vulnerabilities for initial access and use of a BianLian Go backdoor implemented via PowerShell. It also states that threat groups such as BianLian frequently exploit RDP access. Tooling and intrusion overlaps in the content connect BianLian with other ransomware operations including RansomHub, Play, Medusa, ALPHV, Knight, and 8Base. ESET reported clear links between RansomHub, Play, Medusa, and BianLian through shared affiliate tooling, including use of the EDRKillShifter EDR killer, and described an affiliate cluster called QuadSwitcher that conducted intrusions later associated with BianLian leak-site postings. Separate reporting cited shared malware hashes and multi-brand extortion workflow references across onion infrastructure associated with ALPHV, BianLian, Knight, Play, and 8Base. Victim examples directly mentioned in the content include Northern Minerals, which was listed on BianLian’s extortion site and had purportedly stolen data published; MedRevenu, which BianLian claimed on its leak site in December 2024; Dordt University, where BianLian reportedly claimed theft of 3 TB; Mosley Click O’Brien, which reported a February 2026 breach claimed by BianLian; and an unconfirmed 2023 claim by BianLian that it breached Collins Aerospace and stole about 20 GB of data. The content also notes FBI and FINRA warnings about mailed extortion letters falsely claiming to be from the “BianLian Group”; those letters were assessed as scams not connected to the actual BianLian ransomware and data extortion group. Some reporting in the provided content refers to BianLian as a Russian ransomware group, but this attribution is presented only as reporting language in those sources rather than as a confirmed government attribution in the supplied material. No sub-groups are directly identified in the content.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

36 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics47 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1587
Develop Capabilities
T1587.001
Malware
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002
Tool
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1190×2
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1505
Server Software Component
T1505.003
Web Shell
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1068×2
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.004
File Deletion
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1056.003
Web Portal Capture
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
TA0007
Discovery
3 techniques
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001
Remote Desktop Protocol
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1039
Data from Network Shared Drive
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1056.003
Web Portal Capture
T1213×2
Data from Information Repositories
TA0011
Command and Control
5 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1090
Proxy
T1090.001
Internal Proxy
T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219
Remote Access Tools
T1568
Dynamic Resolution
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1041×2
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1537
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1567.003
Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1485
Data Destruction
T1486×11
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1657
Financial Theft
ARSENAL

Associated malware families

1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.

IOCS

Observables

10 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping36

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal1

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables10

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.