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Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

POORTRY

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs110Tracked
Type
Wiper
Capabilities
Defense evasionByovdPost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

Poortry, also known as BurntCigar, is a malicious Windows kernel-mode driver used to disable antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR) products. It is commonly deployed with Stonestop, a user-mode loader and controller that installs the driver and directs its operations through an IOCTL interface. Used after attackers obtain access to a system, the toolkit impairs endpoint defenses before subsequent malicious activity, particularly ransomware deployment.

Poortry can terminate, suspend, and resume selected processes. Later variants support file deletion and overwriting, allowing attackers to destroy essential security software components rather than merely stop their processes. This EDR-wiping functionality impedes recovery or restart of affected products. More advanced variants also neutralize security-related kernel callbacks and interfere with filter drivers and device stacks. Stonestop can direct deletion of targeted security files by name or file type.

Poortry abuses code-signing trust to load malicious code into the Windows kernel. Variants have used Microsoft attestation signing, stolen or leaked signing certificates, and forged signature timestamps. Operators have deployed differently signed versions in rapid succession to evade blocking. Poortry and Stonestop also use heavy packing and obfuscation, and some variants imitate legitimate driver metadata.

Poortry has been used by Scattered Spider, also tracked as UNC3944, and in attacks involving Cuba, BlackCat, Medusa, LockBit, and RansomHub ransomware. Its use spans multiple sectors, including telecommunications, business process outsourcing, and financial services. EDR-file destruction was observed during a July 2024 RansomHub intrusion.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-2291via trellix otherExploited in the wildKernel Privilege Escalation in Intel Ethernet Diagnostics DriverScattered Spider is known to exploit CVE-2015-2291 which is a vulnerability in the Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver for Windows (iqvw64.sys) that allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges... Scattered Spider exploited CVE-2015-2291 to deploy a malicious kernel driver in the Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver for Windows (iqvw64.sys). | Scattered Spider uses POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security software and evade detection. POORTRY is a malicious driver used to terminate selected processes on Windows systems, e.g., Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agent on an endpoint.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider uses POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security software and evade detection. POORTRY is a malicious driver used to terminate selected processes on Windows systems, e.g., Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agent on an endpoint.

via trellix othertrellix.com
BlackCat

"Scattered Spider uses POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security software and evade detection. POORTRY is a malicious driver used to terminate selected processes on Windows systems, e.g., Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agent on an endpoint."

via trellix blogtrellix.com
Spearwing

The attackers used the known POORTRY driver... for the purposes of killing security software during this attack

via symantec blogsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence2

Scattered Spider ... has been linked to several past phishing campaigns and deployments of malicious kernel drivers – including the use of a signed but malicious version of the Windows Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver.

Execution

3 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence2

CVE-2015-2291 ... allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges via a crafted ... IOCTL call.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Through a series of hooks to these low-level API calls inside the operating system, attackers can alter the signing process and bypass these checks to sign their own kernel driver. One of the functions being hooked in this technique is GetLocalTime to return a forged timestamp to pass through the checks in signtool.exe.

T1574.013KernelCallbackTableEvidence1

Through a series of hooks to these low-level API calls inside the operating system, attackers can alter the signing process and bypass these checks to sign their own kernel driver. One of the functions being hooked in this technique is GetLocalTime to return a forged timestamp.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

When received, Poortry modifies the CmpCallbackCount variable to either enable or disable registry kernel callbacks. The variable is used to count the number of registered callbacks. We suspect that if this value is patched to zero, the callbacks will be rendered useless.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Attackers used Windows Service Control (sc.exe) to load the driver: sc create fgt binPath= %TEMP%\fgt.sys type= kernel sc start fgt

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence8

The threat actors also leverage known system vulnerabilities using “Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver” (BYOVD) techniques to gain administrative privileges and evade detection from endpoint security products.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Attackers used Windows Service Control (sc.exe) to load the driver: sc create fgt binPath= %TEMP%\fgt.sys type= kernel sc start fgt

T1548.006TCC ManipulationEvidence1

Poortry (also sometimes called BurntCigar) is a malicious kernel driver used in conjunction with a loader named Stonestop... The driver bypasses Driver Signature Enforcement by using any of the three techniques described above.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence4

The binary is a 64-bit Windows PE driver named smuol.sys, and imitates a legitimate CrowdStrike Falcon driver.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Throughout 2022 and 2023, Poortry continued to evolve, optimizing its code and using obfuscation tools like VMProtect, Themida, and ASMGuard to pack the driver and its loader (Stonestop) for evasion.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Notably, it tries to masquerade by using the same information in its properties sheet as a driver (idmtdi.sys) for a commercially available software... the attackers merely cloned the information from it.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The latest report by Sophos is based on a RansomHub attack in July 2024 that employed Poortry to delete critical executable files (EXEs), dynamic link libraries (DLLs), and other essential components of security software.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

Poortry now can also delete critical EDR components completely, instead of simply terminating their processes... The loader contains a list of hardcoded paths pointing at the location where EDR products are installed... and deletes files critical to the EDR agent, such as EXE files or DLL files.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

The vulnerable drivers used by Scattered Spider are signed by stolen certificates from well-known authorities, such as Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Global Software LLC, which makes them appear legitimate.

T1218.001Compiled HTML FileEvidence1

SentinelOne has observed prominent threat actors abusing legitimately signed Microsoft drivers in active intrusions... a threat actor utilizing a Microsoft signed malicious driver to attempt evasion of multiple security products.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

Scattered Spider typically exploits vulnerabilities such as CVE-2015-2291 and utilize tools like STONESTOP and POORTRY to terminate security software and evade detection.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Through a series of hooks to these low-level API calls inside the operating system, attackers can alter the signing process and bypass these checks to sign their own kernel driver. One of the functions being hooked in this technique is GetLocalTime to return a forged timestamp to pass through the checks in signtool.exe.

T1574.013KernelCallbackTableEvidence1

Through a series of hooks to these low-level API calls inside the operating system, attackers can alter the signing process and bypass these checks to sign their own kernel driver. One of the functions being hooked in this technique is GetLocalTime to return a forged timestamp.

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

When received, Poortry modifies the CmpCallbackCount variable to either enable or disable registry kernel callbacks. The variable is used to count the number of registered callbacks. We suspect that if this value is patched to zero, the callbacks will be rendered useless.

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence6

To evade detection, attackers have signed POORTRY driver with a Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Authenticode signature.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence12

The malicious PoorTry kernel-mode Windows driver used by multiple ransomware gangs to turn off Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions has evolved into an EDR wiper, deleting files crucial for the operation of security solutions...

Discovery

1 technique
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

First, the user-mode component sends multiple I/O requests with IOCTL code 0x222144 to the kernel-mode component, including the process id of the process to kill.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

In August 2023, during a Sophos X-Ops investigation, we found that attackers gained initial access via a remote access tool named SplashTop.

Impact

2 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence1

The file-tampering functionality features the capability to overwrite files... IOCTL 0x22218c Used to overwrite target files. This routine expects two parameters: a destination file path to overwrite, and a source path to read from.

T1489Service StopEvidence2

It then sends requests to the kernel-mode component to systematically terminate security-related processes and then delete their crucial files.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

110 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching110Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.