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ALPHV/BlackCat, also known as BlackCat and Noberus, was a financially motivated, Russian-speaking ransomware-as-a-service operation. Its core operators supplied ransomware and extortion infrastructure to affiliates, advertising affiliate shares of up to 90% of ransom proceeds. Associated affiliates included Scattered Spider and Pistachio Tempest, also known as FIN12 and DEV-0237; these actors were distinct intrusion groups rather than aliases of the core operation. BlackCat operations combined system encryption with data theft and threats to publish stolen information through a victim leak site. Affiliates deployed ransomware against Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments. Documented access methods included stolen credentials used against exposed remote-access services without multifactor authentication, while an affiliate also targeted publicly accessible Veritas Backup Exec installations. BlackCat was additionally associated with ransomware incidents involving compromised SAP-based business data. A prominent attack against U.S. healthcare technology company Change Healthcare in February 2024 disrupted claims processing, reimbursements, and healthcare operations. Change Healthcare paid a reported $22 million ransom, but the payment did not prevent subsequent extortion involving the stolen data. BlackCat also obtained confidential victim negotiation information from a cooperating ransomware negotiator to maximize ransom payments. Law enforcement disrupted ALPHV infrastructure in December 2023. The operation ceased functioning by March 2024, after which former affiliates migrated to competing ransomware programs.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
20 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
15 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
Scattered Spider is known to exploit CVE-2015-2291 which is a vulnerability in the Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver for Windows (iqvw64.sys) that allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges... Scattered Spider exploited CVE-2015-2291 to deploy a malicious kernel driver in the Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver for Windows (iqvw64.sys).
The vulnerabilities, identified as CVE-2021-27876, CVE-2021-27877 and CVE-2021-27878, existed due to a flaw in the SHA authentication scheme used by Backup Exec.
The vulnerabilities, identified as CVE-2021-27876, CVE-2021-27877 and CVE-2021-27878, existed due to a flaw in the SHA authentication scheme used by Backup Exec.
The vulnerabilities, identified as CVE-2021-27876, CVE-2021-27877 and CVE-2021-27878, existed due to a flaw in the SHA authentication scheme used by Backup Exec.
An analysis of ‘exp.exe’ indicated that it is a privilege escalation tool based on the exploitation of CVE-2022-24521 – a vulnerability in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) Driver, known to be used by several ransomware groups.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
136 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as a separate example of collusion between ransomware operators and a negotiator. The article states that negotiator Angelo Martino received a 70-month prison sentence for conspiring with the group to extort victims by disclosing confidential client negotiation information.
Mentioned as a separate example of collusion between ransomware operators and a negotiator. According to the DOJ account cited in the article, BlackCat attackers paid a negotiator to disclose confidential client negotiating positions and strategies, enabling the attackers to maximize ransom payments.
A ransomware group mentioned as background in a separate case involving a negotiator who received payment for sharing information with the group.
The article describes BlackCat/ALPHV obtaining initial access with stolen credentials and subsequently distributing ransomware through Windows Task Scheduler and malicious Group Policy Objects. It explicitly states that the campaign attribution and technical details require source verification.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.