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Malware1 associated actor5 associated CVEs

SafePay

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days21 mentions · peak 11 in a dayToday
Vulns5Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs45Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPrivilege escalationLateral movementDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanningBrute forceExtortion
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

SafePay is a Windows ransomware family associated with a financially motivated, centrally operated extortion group active since August 2024. The operation handles intrusions, ransomware deployment, and extortion internally rather than using a conventional ransomware-as-a-service affiliate model. It targets businesses and critical infrastructure across North America, South America, Europe, and Australia, including manufacturing, healthcare, government, and commercial services. Its ransomware shares command-line options and encryption logic with leaked LockBit Black source code; this overlap does not establish common operators.

SafePay intrusions begin through compromised or phished credentials, password guessing, exposed VPN and RDP services, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities in Cisco security appliances, SonicWall firewalls, and Veeam backup software. Operators establish persistent access through newly created or compromised accounts and remote-management software. They extract credentials using tools such as Mimikatz and DCSync, enumerate domain resources and network shares, escalate privileges through User Account Control bypass and token impersonation, and move laterally using PsExec, Windows Remote Management, RDP, and SMB administrative shares. Legitimate archiving and transfer tools, including 7-Zip, WinRAR, Rclone, FileZilla, and WinSCP, support data staging and exfiltration.

Before encryption, SafePay operators disable security protections and impair recovery by deleting shadow copies, disrupting backup services, or resetting network-attached backup storage. The ransomware combines ChaCha20 with RSA and supports full or partial encryption according to file type and size. Its double-extortion model combines encrypted systems with threats to publish stolen information. Victims receive ransom demands directing them to Tor-based negotiations, and representatives also make telephone calls to increase payment pressure.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2020-3259via hipaa journalExploited in the wildCisco ASA and FTD Web Services Memory DisclosureSafePay actors use vulnerability exploitation for initial access, including the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance vulnerabilities CVE-2023-20269 and CVE-2020-3259.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-40711via hipaa journalExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Veeam Backup & ReplicationSafePay's initial-access techniques include exploitation of the Veeam Backup & Replication vulnerabilities CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-40766via hipaa journalExploited in the wildImproper Access Control in SonicWall SonicOS Management and SSLVPNSafePay actors' initial-access techniques include exploitation of the SonicWall SonicOS vulnerability CVE-2024-40766.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-20269via hipaa journalExploited in the wildUnauthorized VPN Access in Cisco ASA and FTDSafePay actors use vulnerability exploitation for initial access, including the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance vulnerabilities CVE-2023-20269 and CVE-2020-3259.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-27532via hipaa journalExploited in the wildMissing Authentication in Veeam Backup & Replication Exposes Stored CredentialsSafePay's initial-access techniques include exploitation of the Veeam Backup & Replication vulnerabilities CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
SafePay

The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data, encrypting files with ransomware, and issuing ransom demands, payment of which is required to unlock files and prevent stolen data from being leaked online.

via hipaa journalhipaajournal.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It took the SafePay ransomware group 26 days from initial access to obtain Domain Admin privileges

T1078.002Domain AccountsEvidence1

T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts. The Threat Actor was able to gain access to a local account through a simple misconfiguration of the firewall. Once inside, the Threat Actor was able to escalate to a domain administrator account not covered by MFA at the time of the attack.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application. A misconfiguration of a policy in the Fortigate firewall allowed local & LDAP groups to authenticate against the VPN, therefore bypassing the multi-factor authentication requirement.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

T1059.003 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell. The compromised domain administrator account executed the batch file C:\ProgramData\<single digit>.bat.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It took the SafePay ransomware group 26 days from initial access to obtain Domain Admin privileges

T1078.002Domain AccountsEvidence1

T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts. The Threat Actor was able to gain access to a local account through a simple misconfiguration of the firewall. Once inside, the Threat Actor was able to escalate to a domain administrator account not covered by MFA at the time of the attack.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It took the SafePay ransomware group 26 days from initial access to obtain Domain Admin privileges

T1078.002Domain AccountsEvidence1

T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts. The Threat Actor was able to gain access to a local account through a simple misconfiguration of the firewall. Once inside, the Threat Actor was able to escalate to a domain administrator account not covered by MFA at the time of the attack.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

By default, the malware performs a Windows UAC system bypass using a COM interface, with this flag, the malware confirms if the UAC was.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

After encryption, SafePay may delete itself.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It took the SafePay ransomware group 26 days from initial access to obtain Domain Admin privileges

T1078.002Domain AccountsEvidence1

T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts. The Threat Actor was able to gain access to a local account through a simple misconfiguration of the firewall. Once inside, the Threat Actor was able to escalate to a domain administrator account not covered by MFA at the time of the attack.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110.003Password SprayingEvidence1

There was a 25-day gap between the initial access — achieved through password spraying against the VPN gateway — and the first discovery activities

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The attackers actively searched for backup solutions in the affected environment

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

T + ~7 hours – First malicious batch file utilised and network share discovery

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

T1021.002 – Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares. The malicious batch files observed across the estate accessed drives and shares and pushed the ransomware binary 1.exe to numerous servers.

Collection

1 technique
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The collection activities were conducted in a targeted manner, focusing on critical business data; the attackers used SharpShares to identify accessible file shares, employed WinRAR to compress the collected data

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Attackers claim to have exfiltrated over 13,400 GB of data across the period... Attackers claimed to have stolen a total of 13,405.22 GB.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

and successfully exfiltrated 450 GB of data by unknown means

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence12

A hybrid ChaCha20 and RSA scheme encrypts files, varying method by file type and size and supporting full or partial encryption.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

The attackers actively searched for backup solutions in the affected environment and encrypted them, in addition to deleting Volume Shadow Copies (VSC), all in an effort to inhibit recovery activities and maximize the impact of the attack.

T1531Account Access RemovalEvidence1

T1531 – Account Access Removal. The threat actor changed all admin passwords making it difficult for the victim to access the infrastructure once encryption had occurred.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

45 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching45Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities5CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.