SafePay
- Type
- Ransomware
- Capabilities
- Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPrivilege escalationLateral movementDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanningBrute forceExtortion
- Delivery
- Phishing
- Platforms
- Windows
SafePay is a Windows ransomware family associated with a financially motivated, centrally operated extortion group active since August 2024. The operation handles intrusions, ransomware deployment, and extortion internally rather than using a conventional ransomware-as-a-service affiliate model. It targets businesses and critical infrastructure across North America, South America, Europe, and Australia, including manufacturing, healthcare, government, and commercial services. Its ransomware shares command-line options and encryption logic with leaked LockBit Black source code; this overlap does not establish common operators.
SafePay intrusions begin through compromised or phished credentials, password guessing, exposed VPN and RDP services, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities in Cisco security appliances, SonicWall firewalls, and Veeam backup software. Operators establish persistent access through newly created or compromised accounts and remote-management software. They extract credentials using tools such as Mimikatz and DCSync, enumerate domain resources and network shares, escalate privileges through User Account Control bypass and token impersonation, and move laterally using PsExec, Windows Remote Management, RDP, and SMB administrative shares. Legitimate archiving and transfer tools, including 7-Zip, WinRAR, Rclone, FileZilla, and WinSCP, support data staging and exfiltration.
Before encryption, SafePay operators disable security protections and impair recovery by deleting shadow copies, disrupting backup services, or resetting network-attached backup storage. The ransomware combines ChaCha20 with RSA and supports full or partial encryption according to file type and size. Its double-extortion model combines encrypted systems with threats to publish stolen information. Victims receive ransom demands directing them to Tor-based negotiations, and representatives also make telephone calls to increase payment pressure.
Associated vulnerabilities
5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data, encrypting files with ransomware, and issuing ransom demands, payment of which is required to unlock files and prevent stolen data from being leaked online.
Techniques & procedures
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
It took the SafePay ransomware group 26 days from initial access to obtain Domain Admin privileges
T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts. The Threat Actor was able to gain access to a local account through a simple misconfiguration of the firewall. Once inside, the Threat Actor was able to escalate to a domain administrator account not covered by MFA at the time of the attack.
T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application. A misconfiguration of a policy in the Fortigate firewall allowed local & LDAP groups to authenticate against the VPN, therefore bypassing the multi-factor authentication requirement.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
T1059.003 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell. The compromised domain administrator account executed the batch file C:\ProgramData\<single digit>.bat.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
It took the SafePay ransomware group 26 days from initial access to obtain Domain Admin privileges
T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts. The Threat Actor was able to gain access to a local account through a simple misconfiguration of the firewall. Once inside, the Threat Actor was able to escalate to a domain administrator account not covered by MFA at the time of the attack.
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
It took the SafePay ransomware group 26 days from initial access to obtain Domain Admin privileges
T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts. The Threat Actor was able to gain access to a local account through a simple misconfiguration of the firewall. Once inside, the Threat Actor was able to escalate to a domain administrator account not covered by MFA at the time of the attack.
By default, the malware performs a Windows UAC system bypass using a COM interface, with this flag, the malware confirms if the UAC was.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
After encryption, SafePay may delete itself.
It took the SafePay ransomware group 26 days from initial access to obtain Domain Admin privileges
T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts. The Threat Actor was able to gain access to a local account through a simple misconfiguration of the firewall. Once inside, the Threat Actor was able to escalate to a domain administrator account not covered by MFA at the time of the attack.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
There was a 25-day gap between the initial access — achieved through password spraying against the VPN gateway — and the first discovery activities
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
The attackers actively searched for backup solutions in the affected environment
T + ~7 hours – First malicious batch file utilised and network share discovery
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
T1021.002 – Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares. The malicious batch files observed across the estate accessed drives and shares and pushed the ransomware binary 1.exe to numerous servers.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The collection activities were conducted in a targeted manner, focusing on critical business data; the attackers used SharpShares to identify accessible file shares, employed WinRAR to compress the collected data
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
Attackers claim to have exfiltrated over 13,400 GB of data across the period... Attackers claimed to have stolen a total of 13,405.22 GB.
and successfully exfiltrated 450 GB of data by unknown means
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
A hybrid ChaCha20 and RSA scheme encrypts files, varying method by file type and size and supporting full or partial encryption.
The attackers actively searched for backup solutions in the affected environment and encrypted them, in addition to deleting Volume Shadow Copies (VSC), all in an effort to inhibit recovery activities and maximize the impact of the attack.
T1531 – Account Access Removal. The threat actor changed all admin passwords making it difficult for the victim to access the infrastructure once encryption had occurred.
Observables
45 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
74 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.