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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 1 CVE

Fickle Stealer

Fickle Stealer is a Rust-based information stealer observed by FortiGuard Labs in May 2024 and targeting Microsoft Windows systems. Fortinet described it as using multiple delivery methods and a flexible, server-driven targeting model, which led researchers to name it "Fickle Stealer." Reported delivery vectors include malicious Word documents with VBA macros, link downloaders, and a .NET executable masquerading as a PDF viewer. Associated PowerShell stages such as u.ps1/bypass.ps1 were used to bypass UAC, establish persistence via scheduled tasks, and prepare execution. Fortinet reported that the malware uses a disguised packer, in-memory payload decryption and execution, anti-analysis and anti-VM checks, and Telegram bot reporting of victim status. Its theft capabilities include browser data, cookies, credentials, LevelDB data from Discord and Chromium-based browsers, password-manager extensions, cryptocurrency wallet data, targeted documents, application data including Steam, Telegram, Signal, Skype, and FileZilla, plus screenshots and system information.

Fickle Stealer is repeatedly associated in the provided reporting with the threat actor EncryptHub, also tracked as LARVA-208 and Water Gamayun. Trustwave reported EncryptHub delivering Fickle Stealer through PowerShell after social-engineering lures and exploitation of the Microsoft Management Console vulnerability CVE-2025-26633 ("MSC EvilTwin"). In that activity, PowerShell scripts established persistence, communicated with EncryptHub C2 infrastructure, received AES-encrypted commands, and deployed Fickle Stealer as a PowerShell-based information stealer designed to extract sensitive files, harvest system information, and steal cryptocurrency wallet data. PRODAFT also reported EncryptHub using PowerShell scripts to deliver Fickle Stealer alongside Rhadamanthys and Stealc in broader social-engineering campaigns, including operations that compromised hundreds of organizations.

The malware was also reported in Steam-related distribution cases. In the Chemia game compromise, Prodaft and other reporting stated that EncryptHub added Fickle Stealer via cclib.dll, which used worker.ps1 to fetch the payload from soft-gets[.]com. In that context, Fickle Stealer was described as stealing browser credentials, autofill data, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet data, while running in the background without affecting gameplay. Separate reporting on malicious Steam titles also described Fickle Stealer as stealing credentials, browser data, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallets. Additional lures included fake AI or meeting platforms targeting Web3 developers, where malware disguised as a Realtek HD Audio Driver executed PowerShell to retrieve and deploy Fickle Stealer for theft of cryptocurrency wallets, development credentials, and sensitive project data.

High-confidence indicators mentioned in the content include infrastructure and artifacts associated with campaigns delivering or involving Fickle Stealer: IPs 144.208.127.230, 185.213.208.245, and 138.124.184.210; GitHub URL hxxps://github[.]com/SkorikJR; domains soft-gets[.]com, reaitek[.]com, and safesurf.fastdomain-uoemathhvq.workers[.]dev; and hashes including a reported Fickle Stealer sample 6fb7fd9763d6b269793c80bbc03a1be358390781af4b698fba1591cb8dbb8825 and a related downloader hash ed076c27b420bfa66c251488b4121913fa461367a60c5fa32cee3953efcae32b.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2025-26633MSC EvilTwinExploited in the wild

The script ... communicates with an EncryptHub command-and-control (C2) server to receive and run malicious payloads, including a stealer called Fickle Stealer. | Trustwave SpiderLabs said it recently observed an EncryptHub campaign that brings together social engineering and the exploitation of a vulnerability in the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) framework (CVE-2025-26633, aka MSC EvilTwin) to trigger the infection routine via a rogue Microsoft Console (MSC) file.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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EncryptHub

Clicking the message leads to the download of malicious software disguised as a genuine Realtek HD Audio Driver, which executes PowerShell commands to retrieve and deploy the Fickle Stealer.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1
TacticExecution

Query string: SELECT Name FROM Win32_Process

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Additionally, it creates a new task that executes engine.ps1 after 15 minutes.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

For the most part, they download a PowerShell script for preparatory work. The file name is u.ps1 or bypass.ps1—they indicate the same file.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

This attack chain starts with a Word document. Its VBA macro loads an XML file stored in the caption of a UserForm object and executes a script encoded with Windows Script Encoder in the XML file.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

After downloading the verified Steam game, the streamer reported losing more than $32,000 from his cryptocurrency wallet.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2
TacticExecution

When the victim enables active content and macro, it reads the MSHTML file and extracts the command from the file.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Additionally, it creates a new task that executes engine.ps1 after 15 minutes.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Additionally, it creates a new task that executes engine.ps1 after 15 minutes.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

When a file is found, it runs inject.ps1 to inject shell code, which simply executes u.ps1 from the internet.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

The primary purpose of this script is to bypass User Account Control (UAC) and execute Fickle Stealer.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Its VBA macro loads an XML file stored in the caption of a UserForm object and executes a script encoded with Windows Script Encoder in the XML file.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

The executable downloader is a DotNet executable mimicking a PDF viewer.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

When a file is found, it runs inject.ps1 to inject shell code, which simply executes u.ps1 from the internet.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1
TacticStealth

Finally, it sends a screenshot to the server and deletes itself by executing the following command: cmd.exe /c timeout /t 5 & del /f /q {stealer} && exit

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1
TacticStealth

Initially, Fickle Stealer creates a mutex to prevent a race condition.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

It then performs a series of anti-analysis checks and exits the process while it is being analyzed.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

The packer only allocates memory to write the decrypted payload data and then executes it in memory.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Parses the Process Environment Block (PEB) structure to check the BeingDebugged flag at offset 0x2.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

The questionnaire indicates that the FBI is focused on cryptocurrency theft and account hijacks after the installation of the malware, asking questions about cryptocurrency transactions, compromised accounts, and stolen funds.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

If found, it copies the file to the Temp folder, sends a copy to the server, and deletes the copy.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

It parses data in Cookies, History, WebData, and Login Data files to obtain sensitive data and sends a summarized result to the server.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Besides the message, tgmes.ps1 sends victim information, including country, city, IP address, OS version, computer name, and user name to the Telegram bot.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

It then performs a series of anti-analysis checks and exits the process while it is being analyzed.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Parses the Process Environment Block (PEB) structure to check the BeingDebugged flag at offset 0x2.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Fickle Stealer sends all files in folders according to the list.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Finally, it sends a screenshot to the server

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

After being compressed with the Deflate algorithm, the JSON-formatted data is sent to the server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The web page contains a script that configures exclusions for Fickle Stealer and then downloads it to be executed.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The first one downloads u.ps1 directly.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

After being compressed with the Deflate algorithm, the JSON-formatted data is sent to the server.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

60 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
8 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
51 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching60

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping25

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.